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ABSTRACT 
Entrepreneurship is usually associated with the small 
(i. e. owner-manag.e.d) firm. The small, rather than the large, 
firm is often recognised for exhibiting innovation, profit 'maximis-
ation, and risk-taking. And, it is the setting-up of a new firm 
(which is typically small by nature) that is the most obvious 
example of entrepreneur.ship. 
This thesis is concerned with the direct investigation of 
the inception and development of the new small firm. The object-
ive is to increase awareness and understanding of the nevi small 
firm without being critical or judgmental; a positive, rather 
than normative, approach is taken. 
A data base containing numerical and textual information 
was established by fieldwork methods. The instruments of 
investigation include an administered questionnaire and a semi-
structured interview. The administered questionnaire contains 
5 sections: ( 1) General; (2) Pricing; ( 3) Costing; (4) Sales 
and Competition; and (5) Finance. The semi-structured inter-
v iew contains 3 sections: (1) Competitive Forces; (2) Competi ti ve 
Strategy; and (3) Defensive Strategy. 
The sample consists of 73 new small firms in Scotland. 
The sampling procedure used was judgmental or non-probabilistic. 
The Edinburgh Venture Enterprise Trust, Glenrothes Enterprise 
Trust, Irvine Development Corp., Leith Enterprise Trust, and 
Scottish Development Agency assisted in the establishment of the 
sample. 
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Entrepreneurship is, perhaps, most closel y identified with 
the small firm. And, it is the founding of a new firm (which 
is generall y small by nature) that is the most visible form of 
entrepreneurship. It is the small, rather than the large, firm 
that is renowned for displaying innovation, profit maximisation, 
and risk-taking. Alternatively, the large firm is recognised 
for reacting to, rather than initiating, innovation, maximising 
such objectives as sales revenue and management emoluments, rather 
than profits, and reducing its exposure to risk by means of diversi-
fication and mergers. Joseph Schumpeter [1943] presented in 
his classic book , Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, the thesis 
that the very success of capitalism would lead to its self -destruction 
and "march into' socialism". The result of successful entrepreneur-
ship would be an economy dominated entirel y by a few large firms. 
Moreover, these firms would grow or "mature" to the point where 
management was separated from ownership. Consequentl y, conduct 
in such firms would be characterised by routine and bureaucracy 
wi th the entrepreneurial function becoming ob solete . Therefore, 
it is in the small (i.e. owner-managed) or "immature" firm where 
entrepreneurship can best be expected to flourish (at least potent-
ially). 
The importance of the small firm sector in the UK econom y 
in generating economic growth has never been more emphasised 
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than it has over the past few years. Since the appointment 
of the Bolton Committee in 1969 to examine the disadvantages 
su ff ered by small firms, there has been a growing conscious effort 
by Governments (both Labour and Conservative) to remove market 
and political prejudices (e.g. limited access to finance, lack of 
legislation to encourage competition, and unfair taxation). In 
recent years, Government policy has shifted from being non-
discriminatory to acti vel y encouraging growth in the small firm 
sector. For example, the Government has introduced such initia-
tives as The Enterprise Allowance Scheme, The Business Expansion 
Scheme, and The Loan Guarantee Scheme. 
The promotion of small firms is in recognition of the 
necessary restructuring of the UK economy away from being heavil y 
dependent on a few hundred large enterprises. At present, the 
level of aggregate industry concentration in the UK is probabl y 
greater than any other Western industrialised economy. According 
to Utton (1984], "it is still likely that in the near future half 
of manufacturing output in the UK will be produced by the 100 
largest firms". (p . 5] Of course, industry concentration naturall y 
grows according to what is commonl y referred to as Gibrat I slaw 
or "spontaneous drift". However, according to Prais [1981], half 
of the growth in industry concentration in the UK is attributed to 
significant technical and systematic factors (e. g. production economies 
of scale, transport and communications, advertising and finance). 
These factors have not onI y meant a general bias towards large 
firms, but little productive benefit has resul ted. The most 
direct means of rapid concentration growth has been mergers and 
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takeovers. Prais [1981] argues that about one-third of the recent 
growth of the largest UK companies may be attributed to mergers. 
In the United States, however, the figure is more like one-tenth. 
This difference suggests a notable gap between UK merger controls 
and US antitrust laws. According to Samuels and Morrish [1984], 
the increase in merger and takeover activity in the UK over the 
past two decades has not resul ted in higher profitability or even 
increased levels of investment. (Samuels and Morrish cite the 
studies by Whittington [1980] and Singh [1971] as supporting evi-
dence. ) It is generall y admitted that Britain has for far too 
long suffered under the delusion that, in order to compete success-
full y in the international market and create economic growth and 
employment, large firms are to be encouraged at the expense of 
the small and medium firm sectors. The argument is not that 
there should be fewer large firms, but a more balanced industrial 
structure featuring more smaller firms. 
This thesis is concerned with the direct investigation of 
the inception and earl y development of small firms in Scotland. 
As Hood and Young [1984] announced, "the statistical base in the 
proposed area of research is weak and urgentl y needs to be im-
proved, and further work is needed to identify the general 
principles governing the growth of new enterprises in Scotland." 
Therefore, by examining first-hand the conduct of owner-managers, 
it is hoped that a better understanding has been attained of how 
small firms not onl y start, but survive, prosper, and perhaps 
ul timatel y become large firms. The investigation was sub j ecti ve 
in nature and based on the opinions of the owner-managers; given 
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that businessmen often act according to their own opinions, it 
seemed important to inquire about those opinions [Reid, 1981]. 
Moreover, the investigation was positivist, rather than normative, 
in its approac h. Again, the purpose of this research was to 
increase awareness and understanding, rather than to be judgmental 
and critical, of the nascent small firm. 
Chapter II examines entrepreneurship within a Schumpeterian 
perspecti ve. This concept has long been plagued with many 
differing treatments resulting in much misunderstanding and misuse. 
Thus, it is important to establish earl y on what is meant by 
entrepreneurship in the thesis. Schumpeter's assessment of the 
concept is adopted given his incomparabl y thorough and rigorous 
approach as revealed in his comprehensive writings. His anal ytical 
treatment of entrepreneurship as "the fundamental phenomenon of 
economic development" remains unsurpassed in its clarity and 
precision. Essentiall y, Schumpeter' s entrepreneurship refers 
to innovation or "carrying out new combinations", whereby a new 
production function is created. An obvious example of entrepreneur-
ship is the founding of a new firm. 
is measured by its resulting profits. 
Successful innovation 
Furthermore, it is argued 
that the entrepreneurial function pervades all business acti vi ties 
in an often "humble" and "temporary" manner. 
Chapter III is particular I y concerned with the recent maj or 
contributions of Michael Porter [1980 and 1985]. Essentially, 
Porter (with the assistance of others) has bridged a significant 
gap between industrial organisation and business strategy. Since 
the pioneering work of Edward Mason and Joe Bain, economists 
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studying industrial organisation have been primarily interested 
in the impact market structure has on market performance, whilst 
assuming that firms' conduct (strategy) has no notable influence 
on either performance or structure. These economists were con-
cerned with the development of competition policy and focused 
their attention strictly on industry as the unit of analysis. 
Business strategy, however, treats the firm as the unit of anal ysis 
and is concerned with improving the firm's performance. Business 
strategy is the dynamic or entrepreneurial element of a firm's 
activities. Porter's contribution is a framework by which a 
firm can assess the competitive forces - i. e. rivalry (existing 
and potential), customers, suppliers, and substitutes - which 
determine the kind of competitive strategy - i.e. low cost, differen-
tiation, and focus - undertaken. Moreover, Porter introduces 
the "value chain n as a tool by which a firm's acti vi ties can be 
systematicall y disaggregated in order to formulate and implement 
competiti ve strategy to achieve competitive advantage. 
Chapter IV discusses the methods of investigation used 
in the research as well as the derivation and characteristics of 
the sample. The formulation of the administered questionnaire 
and semi-structured interview was preceeded by important unstruc-
tured design work. This stage of the research involved spending 
three months with an enterpr ise trust as a consul tant. This 
opportunity offered direct insight into the problems small firms 
faced in their inception and earl y years. This experience was 
of immense aid in influencing the formulation of the methods of 
investigation and interpreting the data. 
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The administered questionnaire involves 5 sections: 
( 1) General; (2) Pricing; (3) Costing; (4) Sales and Competition; 
and (5) Finance. The Gen.eral section is concerned with information 
regarding a firm I s industrial classification, number of employees, 
sales revenue, main product group, principal market, market share, 
number .of competitors, and characteristics of customers. The 
Pricing section examines such aspects as price determination and 
the affects of a boom and recession on pricing decisions. The 
Costing section looks at, for example, a firm I s capacity level, 
fixed and variable costs, and changes in output. The Sales 
and Competition section anal yses price changes under varying 
business conditions, reasons for altering selling price, and forms 
of competition from rival firms. Finall y, the Finance section 
considers such matters as obstacles to obtaining finance, security, 
"gearing" (leverage) ratios, cash flow difficulties, and expansion 
plans. The content of the first four sections and the administered 
questionnaire's overall design is attributed to Dr. Gavin C. Reid. 
The administered questionnaire was conducted amongst 13 small 
firms iIi Scotland. 
The semi-structured interview adopted Porter I s framework 
and contains 3 sections: (1) Competitive Forces; (2) Competitive 
Strategy; and (3) Defensive Strategy. The design of the semi-
structured interview is credited to Dr. Reid. 
amongst a sub-set of the sample. 
It was conducted 
Chapter V examines the findings from the semi-structured 
interview. The approach is integrative, rather than attempting 
to anal yse each firm on its own merits. Looking at comparisons 
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and contrasts between firms seems a more useful means of increasing 
our understanding of how new small firms assess competitive forces, 
formulate and implement competitive strategy, and sustain competitive 
advantage. Some of the information from the administered question-
naire data was useful in the analysis. 
Chapter VI inspects the data from the Finance section of 
the administered questionnaire. An investigation of entrepreneur-
ship and competitive strategy would seem to be incomplete without 
assessing the financial needs of inception and development. The 
inability to obtain sufficient finance is the fundamental deterrent 
to entrepreneurship. Schumpeter [1934] certainly agreed and 
argued at great length about the importance of bank credit to 
the entrepreneur in his influential book, _ The Theory of Economic 
Development. Finance is a particular concern for the new small 
firm since it invariabl y starts undercapitalised and often confronts 
serious cash flow problems. 
Chapter VII summarises the findings from Chapters V and 
VI and what they might suggest. Also, further possi b Ie academic 
work as derived from the established data base is discussed. 
CHAPTER II 
Entrepreneurship: A Schumpeterian Perspective 
Introduction 
Entrepreneurship, perhaps more than any other concept in 
economics, has been much maligned with seemingl y confounding 
and contradictory assessments. It may well be the beauty of 
the beast. After all, one merel y needs to travel through the 
history of economic thought beginning with Cantillon to appreciate 
the evolving character or transformation of the concept of entre-
preneurship that has unfolded. Moreover, the study of entre-
preneurship extends beyond the attention and care of economics 
into the disciplines of psychology, sociology, history and business 
studies. 
Joseph Schumpeter, probabl y more than anyone else, appre-
ciated the complexity of the beast, as his richl y comprehensive 
writings bear witness. His treatment of entrepreneurship as 
"the fundamental phenomenon of economic development" possesses 
a clarity and anal ytic precision which had been hitherto unattained. 
Consequentl y, any assessment of Schumpeter' s contribution must 
not neglect a comprehension of his model of economic development. 
In Schumpeter's schema, entrepreneurship is an endogenously 
generated factor. This approach is at odds with neoclassical 
and Keynesian theories of development that reI y on changes 
external to the model, whether they be changes in resources, 
preferences, or technology. In such anal yses, Schumpeterian 
9 
entrepreneurship is defined out of existence. Moreover, 
Schumpeter is insistent that economic development be cyclical 
and not depend on some underl ying trend as do some conventional 
schemas. Thus, with "desperate brevity" (to use Schumpeter's 
phrase), the first section of this paper seeks to lay down 
Schumpeter's Circular Flow. Onl y wi thin this "ideal" context 
can the introduction of the disruptive element, innovation, have 
any distinct and significant meaning as the entrepreneurial function. 
The Circular Flow, in Professor Loasby' s [1984] words, serves 
. 
as "a condition of innovation because it generates the stable data 
which make rational calculation possible." 
In the second section, we are in a position to come to grips 
with the rather controversial aspects of Schumpeter' s conception 
of entrepreneurship. Specificall y, by observing the inadequate 
portrayals of the entrepreneurial function by Cantillon, J. B. 
Say, J. S. Mill and Marshall, as depicted by Schumpeter, it will 
be seen that indeed the entrepreneur is not the bearer of risk. 
More important, entrepreneurship should not be viewed in terms 
of a person, but as a function that pervades all activities of 
business in an often "temporary" and "humble" fashion. More-
over, attention is called to the necessity of all business acti vi ties 
and their "routine ways" to effect entrepreneurial success. 
The Circular Flow and Innovation 
The brilliance of Schumpeter' s ability to capture and 
establish the entrepreneurial function as the sine qua ~ of 
economic development is found in his utilization of static or 
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stationary analysis. His schema, which involves what he calls 
the Circular Flow, is essentiall y similar to that of a Walrasian 
equilibrium state. Such an unrealistic construct, as Schumpeter 
[1939] argues, " ... is useful and indeed indispensable for purposes 
of anal ysis and diagnosis, as a point of reference. Actual states 
can convenient! y be defined by their distance from it". [p . 69] 
But, before "actual states" can be properl y examined, meticulous 
attention must be given to ascertaining the equilibrium state. 
As Schumpeter [1939] makes quite plain: 
The first and foremost task of economic 
anal ysis is to explore the properties of 
that system.... This is the magna charta 
of economic theory as an autonomous science, 
assuring us that its subject matter is the 
cosmos and not a chaos. It is the 
rationale of the idea of variables that do 
not vary, the justification of the schema of 
a stationar.y economic process. [p .41] 
In Schumpeter' s Circular Flow or Theoretical Norm, we find 
an economic state totall y uncomplicated or undistrubed by 
capricious 
1 
change. More precisely, change is not discontinuous 
or spontaneous, but predictable and inconsequential in the routine 
1. Schumpeter's concept, the Circular Flow is similar to 
what Mises described as an "evenl y rotating economy". Mises [1949] 
stated: "But in the evenly rotating economy change and succession 
of events are eliminated. Action is to make choices and to cope 
with an uncertain future. But in the evenly rotating economy 
there is no choosing and the future is not uncertain as it does 
not differ from the present known state.... it is a world of soul-
less unthinking automations ... " [p. 249] Moreover, Mises argued 
that such a state was necessary to an understanding of change. 
"It is therefore preposterous to maintain that the construction 
of an evenl y rotating economy does not elucidate conditions within 
a changing universe and to require the economists to substitute 
a study of 'dynamics' for their alleged exclusive occupation with 
I statics' . This so-called static method is precisel y the proper 
mental tool for the examination of change". [p .248] For an 
interesting and persuasive argument for Schumpeter' s inclusion 
in the Austrian School, see Simpson [1983]. 
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affairs of the economic subj ects. Consequent! y, we find an 
essentiall y repetitive and harmonious economy, dominated by con-
sumption, which is found to run on, year in and year out, in 
essentially the same fashion. In such a state where neveryone 
will cling as tight as possible to hab itual economic methods", 
it could be argued that the economic subjects are a complacent 
2 and agreeable lot. Schumpeter [1934], in describing his 
Circular Flow, writes: 
We can imagine that, year in and year out, 
every recurring employment of permanent sources 
of productive power endeavours to reach the 
same consumers. The result of the process 
is in any case the same as if this happened. 
Hence it follows that somewhere in the 
economic system a demand is, so to say, 
ready. awaiting every suppl y, and nowhere in 
the system are the commodities without 
complements. . . . It follows, again from the 
fact that all goods find a market that the 
circular flow of economic life is closed, in 
other words that the sellers of all commodities 
appear again as buyers in sufficient measure 
to acquire those goods which will maintain 
their consumption and their productive equip-
ment in the next economic period at the level 
so far attained, and vice versa. [po 8] 
However, because this Pure Model
3 
is void of disruptive 
innovation and its consequential profits, economic development 
is hopelessly elusive. Schumpeter [1934] argues that this 
"d ynamic" phenomenon, innovation, is "entirel y foreign to what 
may be observed in the circular flow or in the tendency towards 
equilibrium. It is spontaneous and discontinuous change in the 
2. In his famous chapter, "On the Stationary State", Mill 
[1848] discusses the desirability and necessity of such a 
"Utopian" state. 
3. See Clemence and Doody [1950] for a concise and accurate 
appraisal of Schumpeter' s schema. 
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channels of the flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which forever 
alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing". 
[p. 64] Furthermore, development is that kind of change arising 
from within the system "which so displaces its equilibrium point 
that the new one cannot be reached from the old one by infinites-
imal steps". [p. 64n] 
The single causative factor of economic development is 
innovation, which is defined as "doing things differentl y in the 
realm of economic life" (or, more precisel y, setting up a new 
production function by "carrying out new combinations"). If 
this were interpreted to mean no more than that "the cause of 
change is change", it would, of course, be a mere tautology; 
but such an interpretation would be an injustice to Schumpeter IS 
. . 4 Intenhon. 
innovation. 
He is quite specific regarding the acts constituting 
Schumpeter [1939] states: 
By changes in the methods of suppl ying 
commodi ties we mean a range of events much 
broader than the introduction of new commod-
ities which may even serve as the standard 
case. Technological change in the production 
of commodities already in use, the opening 
up of new markets or of new sources of supply, 
Taylorisation of work, improved handling of 
material, the setting up of a new business 
organisation such as new department stores •.. 
all these instances of what we shall refer to by 
the term Innovation. [p. 84] 
It is clear that Schumpeter I s idea of innovation is quite 
inclusi ve in respect to both technical and organisational forms. 
Indeed, we find Schumpeter to be explicit and exacting in his 
4. This argument is attributed to Sweezy [19431. 
5 use of the concept. 
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Innovation is introduced into the Circular Flow by the 
entrepreneur, the primum roobile of economic development. 
Sc humpeter confidently asserts that innovation, the sy stems I 
nprime mover n, is the single cause of economic change (i. e. 
shaking the Circular Flow out of its lethargic equilibrium state). 
This assertion that the model, by permitting onl y this one cause 
to operate, is a comprehensive theory of economic change has 
invariabl y fallen prey to criticism. For example, Kierstead 
[1948] in his book, The Theory of Economic Change, stated: 
The more recent writings of Professor 
Alvin Hansen, with a pessimistic tone 
resembling in some ways that of Karl 
Marx, require of us a critical approach 
to Schum peter , s system. Professor 
Hansen believes that there are three 
gi ven and external causes of economic 
change, which act more or less 
independent! y. Professor Schumpeter 
does not explicitl y deny these other 
causes. On the contrary, he insists 
on the complexity of the causes of 
change. But he does select a model 
for anal ysis in which onl y one cause is 
allowed to operate. We do not intend 
to be understood that this is not valuable 
anal ysis, and a perfect 1 y proper use of 
limitation and selection. It is, however, 
distinctl y limiting, and precludes the 
possibility of a comprehensive theory of 
economic change. Professor Schumpeter IS 
general optimism would be dimmed, 
perhaps, by a study of other models, in 
which other causes present in the real 
world, were allowed to operate. [p. 97] 
5. Lange [1943] considers Schumpeter's definition of innovation 
to be ntoo wide n . Since innovation is defined as simpl y "setting 
up a new production function", Lange asserts that innovation could 
therefore include an infinite number of possibilities. However, 
a firm will only choose changes that will possibly be profitable 
and disregard all others. This argument should be at least 
implicitly obvious in Schumpeter. 
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Clemence and Doody proposed that Kierstead's criticism is not 
valid upon inspection of Hansen's three causes of change and find 
that they are indeed consistent with Schumpeter' saIl-embracing 
concept, innovation. To quote Hansen [1941]: 
. .. the constituent elements of economic 
progress are: (a) invention, (b) the 
discovery and development of new territory 
and new resources, and (c) the growth of 
population. Each of these in turn, 
severall y and in combination, has opened 
investment outlets and caused a rapid 
growth of capital formation. [po 352] 
As noted earlier, Schumpter' s specific activities constituting 
innovation include the development of new resources and new markets, 
thus bringing a phenomena related to territorial expansion within 
the scope of the analysis. Of course, inventions refer to the 
scientific forerunner of commercially applied innovations. Not 
all inventions, however, lead directl y to economic fruition. 
Schumpeter is quite adamant in distinguishing innovation from 
invention. For example, Schumpeter [1934] states, "as long as 
they are not carried into practice, inventions are economicall y 
irrelevant." [p. 88] Of course, innovation need not always be 
a consequence of invention. 
The issue therefore reduces to the question of population, 
and to whether or not the exclusion of population changes from 
the model precludes the possibility of a comprehensive theory 
of change. 
criticism: 
Schumpeter [1939], of course, anticipates this 
Increase in productive resources might 
at first sight appear to be the obvious 
prime mover in the process of internal 
economic change. Physical environment 
being taken as constant, that increase 
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resol ves itself into increase of population 
and the increase of the stock of producers' 
goods. Neither can, of course, be 
treated as an independent variable; both 
are at the same time effects of economic 
changes and conditions of other economic 
changes. Our reason for I isting variations 
in population among external factors was 
that there is no unique relation between them 
and variation in the flow of commodities. 
Hence, it seemed convenient for our purpose, 
although it would be inadequate for others, 
to look upon an increase in population as 
an environmental change conditioning certain 
phenomena. Moreover, it could be 
demonstrated by familiar cases (India and 
China) that a mere increase in population 
does not bring about any of these phenomena 
which presuppose either a certain density 
or a certain rate of increase in population 
except a fall in real income per head. 
Finall y, it occurs so continuousl y as to be 
capable of current absorption. Short-
time variations in marriage rates are 
obviously the reflex of business fluctu-
ations, and do not cause them. [p. 74] 
Essentiall y, because of empirical evidence (viz. India and China) 
showing no relation of a unique sort between population growth 
and commodity flows, it is convenient to minimise discussion of 
population growth. 
It is generall y ac knowledged that Schumpeter' s concept of 
innovation is nothing short of being bold, perhaps even obtrusive. 
Only with the introduction of "new combinations" can the Circular 
Flow be jolted out of its dull and lifeless pattern. As 
Schumpeter [1939] states: "Those disturbances must necessaril y 
be 'big' in the sense that they will disrupt the existing system 
and enforce a distinct process of adaption which should show 
up as such in any time series material ... individual innovations 
impl y, by virtue of their nature, a 'big' step and a 'big' change". 
[p.lOl] 
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The success of innovations, moreover, pave the way for sub-
sidiary and/or competitive innovations. These induced innovations, 
as well as imitations, "cluster" in the wake of the initial 
innovations. Consequent! y, innovations do not occur as either 
isolated events or distribute randomly over the whole of the 
economic system. The time frame of initial, and the consequent 
induced, innovations and their "followers" can be rather extensive 
depending on the magnitude of the perturbations. The more 
robust the innovations, the longer is the length of time required 
for their effects to wor k themselves out into a new Circular Flow. 
Of course, the "ideal" state of the Circular Flow, where uncertainty 
or ignorance is nonexistent, prevails once innovations have been 
entirel y exhausted in the sense that they have been adapted or 
transformed into routine. Schumpeter hesitantly admits the 
prevalence of equilibrating forces and prefers to speak of 
"neighbourhoods of equilibrium" rather than actual states of 
'l'b' 6 equl 1 rlum. 
Though Schumpeter [1939] asserts in fami! iar style, "the 
history of capitalism is studded with violent bursts and catas-
trophes" (p .102], induced innovations and imitations are not to 
be relegated to an after-thought or simpl y dismissed as anything 
less than entrepreneurial (though Schumpeter seems to suggest 
otherwise) . The time lag of induced innovations and imitations 
can be so extensive given their degree of success that one can 
6. Taussig (1921] shares Schumpeter's reluctance to speak of 
an equilibrium point and alternativel y speaks of a "penumbra of 
prices". As he states, "In reality, however, as everyone knows, 
fluctuations persist. There is a penumbra within which market 
prices fluctuate." 
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easil y forget or lose sight of the initial and responsible 
perturbations. Of course, S~humpeter is explicit in his concern 
for small as well as big "new combinations". To quote 
Schumpeter [1939]: "We must try to divest ourselves of the 
idea that innovation necessaril y means something spectacularl y 
important. .. " [p. 92] Elsewhere, he [1947] writes, "It need 
not be Bessemer steel or the explosion motor. It can be the 
Deerfoot sausage." [p.1S1] 
The modus operandi of Schum peter , s schema is Creative 
Destruction; i. e. the created mar kets and accompanying profits 
are reduced and then annihilated by those who recognise a "good 
thing" and want, in the vernacular, a "piece of the action" 
(viz. profits). Induced innovations and imitations are easier 
to effect but remain nonetheless entrepreneurial, in a relati vel y 
modest sense, as long as "new combinations" are being carried 
7 out and profit is the enticing reward. Schumpeter [1939] 
states: " . .. whenever a new production function has been set 
up successfull y and the trade beholds the new thing done and 
its major problems sol ved, it becomes much easier for other people 
to do the same thing and even to improve upon it. In fact, 
they are driven to copying it, if they can and some people will 
so forthwith." [p.lOO] Schumpeter is suggesting that imitation 
7. Schumpeter is careful to avoid referring to "induced 
innovations" and "imitations" as anything but consequences or 
adaptations to entrepreneurial distrubances to the Circular Flow. 
Allowing what would be equilibrating (Kirznerian) activities to 
be deemed as "entrepreneur ial" would relax the significance of 
what Schumpeter saw as "fundamental" to economic development 
i. e. disequil i brating innovation. 
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(and certainl y induced innovation) is not necessaril y automatic. 8 
The imitator mayor may not achieve a "piece of the action". 
Moreover, such equilibrating tendencies are invariabl y incomplete t 
given the concomitant security and certainty, which will foster 
further competitive reactions or initiatives in the form of entre-
preneurial disruptions to the Circular Flow. As long as profit 
(and its consequent personal rewards) remains the motivation, 
innovation will ensure the elusiveness of the Circular Flow as 
an actual state of the world. 
The Management, Cap i talist, and Entrepreneurial Functions 
Schumpeter [1934] makes the apparentl y provocative state-
ment, "the entrepreneur is never the risk bearer". [p.137] 
A proper investigation of the attendant qualifications reveals a 
logical and plausible argument which essentially draws a partic-
ular and necessary distinction between the entrepreneurial function 
and the capitalist and management functions that economists have 
largel y neglected. Economists in the tradition of Cantillon and 
J. S. Mill have successfull y cloistered the capitalist function - i. e. 
providing the financial and/or productive means - within the 
entrepreneur due to the pre-eminent concern of placing ris k-
bear ing at the centre of the entrepreneurial function. 
The entrepreneur as defined by Cantillon is cloaked in non-
8. Nelson and Winter [1982] emphasise the imitator's 
difficulty in achieving economic success. For example, they 
state: "An imitator working with an extremely sparse set of clues 
about the imitatee's performance might as well adopt the more 
prestigious title of 'innovator', since most of the problem is 
reall y being solved independent! y. However, the knowledge that 
a problem has a solution does provide an incentive for persistance 
in efforts that might otherwise be abandoned." [p .124] 
19 
insurable, risk-taking garb. Quite simpl y, an entrepreneur buys 
at certain prices and sells at uncertain prices with the hope of 
realising a profit. Schumpeter [1954], seemingly ironically, 
pays tribute to Cantillon for having a "clear conception of the 
function of the entrepreneur" [p.222] because as he [1949] else-
where states, "Cantillon emphasizes the elements of direction and 
speculation that certainly do enter into entrepreneurial activity". 
[p. 64] Cantillon [1755] stated: 
The Farmer is an undertaker (entrepreneur) 
who promises to pay to the Landowner, for 
his Farm or Land, a fixed sum of money 
(generall y supposed to be equal in value 
to the third of the produce) without 
assurance of the profit he will derive 
from this enterprise. He employs part 
of the land to feed flocks, produce corn, 
wine, hay, etc. according to his judgement 
without being able to foresee which of 
these will pay best. The price of these 
products will depend part! y on the weather, 
part! y on the demand; if corn is abundant 
relative to consumption it will be dirt 
cheap, if there is scarcity it will be dear. 
Who can foresee the number of births and 
deaths of the people in a state in the 
course of the year? And yet the price of 
the Farmer's produce depends naturall y 
upon these unforeseen circumstances, and 
consequentl y he conducts the enterprise 
of his farm at an uncertainty. [p. 49] 
Cantillon's conception was, as Schumpeter [1954] suggests, "quite 
general, but he analysed it with care for the case of the farmer." 
[p,222] Schumpeter [1954] further states: 
Cantillon said indeed that the entrepreneur 
acquires means of production at certain 
prices with a view to selling at uncertain 
prices. This describes one of the 
businessman's activity very well, but it 
does not describe (or at any rate, 
emphasise) its essence [p.555n] 
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Schumpeter's statement should 'in no way be construed as a dilution 
of the significance of Cantillon' s contribution. On the contrary, 
Schumpeter cites Cantillon' s [1755] laudable Essai sur la Nature 
" " du Commerce ~ General as "the first systematic attempt to work 
over the whole field of economics". Cantillon's contribution 
E.!.2. tanto was simpl y an embryonic one; viz., he recognised 
the entrepreneur and its central position in economic development, 
however generalised and unrefined. 
The essence of the entrepreneurial function is what Schumpeter 
refers to as "carrying out new combinations", nothing more, 
nothing less. This strictest of definitions penetrates Cantillon' s 
latency and calls forth a necessary distinction between the 
entrepreneurial and capitalist functions as is certainl y evident 
with Cantillon' s farmer. Schumpeter [1954] principall y credits 
Say with this refinement whereby the entrepreneur is given "a 
definite position in the schema of the economic process". [p. 555] 
However, Schumpeter does find fault with Say's refinement in 
that it fails to go far enough. Say's entrepreneurial function 
is merel y "carrying out combinations" and not necessaril y ~ 
combinations. Therefore, his formulation is relegated to an 
interpretation wherein the function can be carried out by a mere 
manager. As Schumpeter [1954] explains: 
His [Say's] contribution is summed up by 
the pithy statement that the entrepreneur's 
function is to combine the factor~ of 
production into a producing organism. Such 
a statement may indeed mean much or little. 
He certainl y failed to make use of it and 
presumabl y did not see all its anal ytic 
possibilities. He did realise ... that a 
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greatl y improved theory of the economic 
progress might be derived by making the 
entrepreneur in the anal ytic schema what 
he is in capitalist reality, the pivot on 
which everything turned. But he failed 
to realise that the phrase 'combining 
factors I when applied to a going concern, 
denotes little more than routine manage-
ment; and that the task of combining 
factors becomes a distinctive one onl y 
when applied not to the current admin-
istration of a going concern but to the 
or gani sa tion of a new one. In any 
case, however, he turned a popular 
notion into a scientific tool. [p. 555] 
While Say was providing a necessary distinction between the 
entrepreneur and the capitalist, he failed to abstract the managerial 
role from Cantil Ion 's farmer. In effect, Say's conception 
unfortunate I y, but undeniabl y, tolerated the entrepreneur in a 
static as well as dynamic sense; viz., one can simpl y maintain 
operations qua manager or administrator and improve operations 
qua entrepreneur or innovator and still be regarded as fulfilling 
the entrepreneurial function. 
In Schumpeter' s [1954] view, the damage was furthered by 
the younger Mill: 
J. S. Mill in anal ysing the entrepreneurial 
function, went from 'superintendence' to 
'control' and even to 'direction' which he 
admitted, required 'often no ordinary 
skill' . But this defines the function of 
management and not anything distinct from 
mere administration. If this were all, 
he might as well have been content with 
the good English word for entrepreneur. 
A reason why he did not do so was possibl y 
that managers are frequentl y salaried 
employees and they did not necessaril y 
share in business risks, whereas J. S. Mill, 
like all the authors of that period and 
most of the authors of the next one, wished 
to make risk-bearing an entrepreneurial 
function alongside of 'direction'. But 
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this only served to push the 
further on the wrong track. 
it stuc k ... Say's suggestion 




In this extraordinary statement we gain a particular I y valuable 
insight into the tendency to emphasise risk-bearing as the prime 
characteristic of the entrepreneurial function. In Mill's success-
ful effort to bring the entrepreneur into general use among 
economists he also succeeded in vitiating the term. Mill [1848] 
stated that when capital is borrowed, "the lender ... is remuner-
ated for it by the interest paid to him, while the difference 
between the interest and the gross profits remunerates the 
exertions and ris ks of the undertaker". [p. 406] But, what if 
the entrepreneur fails and profits do not exist to cover interest 
payments and the principal, let alone his "exertions"? Moreover, 
what if the entrepreneur cannot fulfill the contractual obligations 
out of his personal wealth? Wi th his attempt to extract the 
managerial function from Say I s entrepreneur by adding risk-bearing, 
Mill, in effect, further entangled the capitalist function with the 
entrepreneurial function. Consequentl y, Mill's entrepreneur 
simpl y compounded and epitomised henceforth the confusion. 
Finall y, with Marshall, the confusion seems to come full 
circle. He insisted that if profits are treated simpl y as 
remuneration for risk (1. e., the remainder of gross profits once 
interest and management earnings have been deducted) then manage-
ment activity is relegated or restricted to one of maintenance 
or administration. As Marshall [1910] asserted: "But this use 
of the term profits seems not on the whole advantageous, because 
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it tends to class the work of management with mere routine 
attendance". [p.613] Ironically, perhaps, Schumpeter can no-
where be found to display such criticism as that levelled 
against Mill or Say. In fact, one can at best find criticism 
onl y of a gingerl y sort that smacks of no less than praise. 
For example, in regard to Marshall's penetrating treatment of 
the scope of management earnings, Schumpeter [1954] remarked: 
"Marshall went further than most, however, in his careful 
anal ysis of earnings of management that expanded and deepened 
Mill's wages of superintendence so great! y as to make practicall y 
something new out of them". [pp. 893-4] Schumpeter further 
stated that this was a "helpful suggestion" (and no more!). 
Marshall treated the "wor k of management" in a very general 
manner to encompass all functions necessary to business. He 
[ 1910] wrote: "The work of management may be heavy because 
it invol ves great mental strain in organising and devising new 
methods; or because it involves great anxiety and risk; and 
these two things frequentl y go together It • [p.612] Neverthe-
less his conception of the entrepreneurial function (though residing 
in the domain of management activity) was well depicted in his 
Principle of Substitution: "At the beginning of his undertaking, 
and at every successive stage, the alert business man strives 
to modify his arrangements as to obtain better (profitable) 
results with a given expenditure or equal results with a less 
expenditure" [Marshall, 1910, p.355]. Marshall's view, however, 
is not consonant with Schumpeter' s in that he does not speak 
of entrepreneurship as being anything more than subtle modifications 
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to ever-changing conditions. 
Marshall is to be applauded for recognising and emphasising 
the differential ability in skills and performance between firms 
as a source of profits. Schumpeter holds Marshall in high 
esteem for establishing the necessity for awareness of behavioural 
or sociological aspects in economic theory. Leadership, for 
example, is an indispensable element in both their writings. 
As Schumpeter [1928], in defending his own work, remarked: 
" ... experience has taught, [the well-trained economist] to think 
of such intrusions [viz. leadership] into theory of views savouring 
of sociology ... " [p. 397n] He [1928] further stated: "no want 
of theoretical training is responsible for statements which I believe 
to tally fundamentally with Marshallian analysis". [p.379n] 
Perhaps, Schumpeter preferred to overlook Marshall's neglect 
to distinguish the entrepreneurial function from the capitalist and 
management functions because of Marshall's generall y known reserv-
ations concerning static analysis (though he did not make unsparing 
use of it in his Principles' footnotes). (Marshall's "biological" 
or "survival of the fittest" regard for economic growth is certainl y 
in keeping with Schumpeter' s viewpoint on Creative Destruction.) 
As Professor Loasby [1982] so delicatel y and apologeticall y noted: 
He [Marshall] does not make this distinction 
beca use he does not pursue very far the 
distinction between a stationary state and an 
evol ving economy; and the reason for what 
he regards the formal anal ysis of a stationary 
state as a potentially misleading guide to 
the study of economic progress, which is the 
underlying concern in his Principles. [p.235] 
Schumpeter, being a great admirer of Walras, did not share in 
Marshall's distaste for abstract or static anal ysis. Schumpeter 
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[ 1939], for example, asserts: " the bare bones of economic 
logic ... render indispensable service in clearing the ground 
for rigorous analysis". [p. 68] Had Marshall been as flexible 
as Schum peter , his treatment of the entrepreneurial function may 
have been less clouded in the Say-Mill tradition. As it stands, 
he offered no anal ytic insight. 
Schumpeter, however, offers a solution which dismisses 
the confusion and ushers in an explicit distinction between the 
capitalist and entrepreneurial functions whilst keeping intact the 
distinction between the managerial function and entrepreneurial 
function. He does so by placing risk-bearing soleI y in the safe-
keeping of the capitalist and not the entrepreneur. As 
Schumpeter [1934] logicall y argues: "Risk obviousl y always falls 
on the owner of the means of production or of the money-capital 
which was paid for them, hence never on the entrepreneur ~ 
such." [po 75n] The entrepreneur simpl y bears no immediate 
or direct financial risk. To further quote Schumpeter [1954]: 
It should be obvious, so soon as we have 
realised that the entrepreneur's function 
is distinct from the capitalist's function, 
that an entrepreneur, when he employs his 
own capital in an unsuccessful enterprise 
loses as a capitalist and not as an entre-
preneur. It has been said that if he 
borrows at a rixed rate of interest, the 
capitalist being entitled to repayment plus 
interest irrespective of results, it is the 
entrepreneur who bears the risk. But 
this is a typical instance of a very common 
confusion of economic and legal aspects. 
If the borrowing entrepreneur has no means 
of his own, it is obviousl y the lending 
capitalist who stands to lose, his legal 
rights notwithstanding. If the borrowing 
entrepreneur has means by which to effect 
discharge of his debt, he too is a 
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capitalist and, in case of failure, the loss 
again falls upon him as a capitalist and not 
as an entrepreneur. [pp. 556-7n] 
By confining or limiting risk to capital, Schumpeter provides a 
most vivid and clear distinction between the capitalist's function 
and the entrepreneur's function. In this restricted sense, 
Schumpeter is correct in proclaiming that risk-taking is in no 
wayan element of the entrepreneur's function; viz, lithe direct 
economic responsibility of failure never falls on him II. 
[Schumpeter, 1954. p.137] 
Certainl y, Schumpeter' s entrepreneur is a risk-taker, but 
in an indirect way. His very definition of the entrepreneur 
as being one who II carr ies out new combinations" is undeniabl y 
coloured with certain inordinate risk. Schumpeter [1939] is 
quick to concur, but with a requisite qualification: 
Risk, nevertheless, enters into the pattern 
in which entrepreneurs work. But it does 
so indirectl y and at one remove; Riskiness-
and every new thing is risky in a sense in 
which no routine action is - makes it more 
difficul t to obtain the necessary capital and 
thus forms one of the instances of the 
environment which explain why innovations 
are not carried out smoothl y and as a matter 
of course. [p .104n] 
Schumpeter frequent! y recognises the indirect risk of the entre-
preneur as that of "reputation". If an entrepreneur is unsuccessful 
with a particular venture, he obviously jeopardises his ability 
to persuade capitalists to finance future ventures. The magnitude 
of the failure, and the concomitant, future repercussions, are 
determined by the extent of the inability to fulfill the contractual 
arrangements established ex ante by the entrepreneur and investing 
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capitalist. Indeed, in no way can he lose in the immediate 
or direct sense unless he too invested capital in his venture. 
But, then, he would also be acting in the capitalist capacity. 
Again, to call on Schumpeter [1934]: 
The one who gives credit comes to grief 
if the undertaking fails. For although 
any property possessed by the entre-
preneur may be liable, yet such 
possession of wealth is not essential, 
even though advantageous. But even 
if the entrepreneur finances himself out 
of former profits or if he contributes 
the means of production belonging to 
his "static" business, the risk falls on 
him as capitalist or as possessor of 
goods, not as an entrepreneur. [p.137] 
Perhaps Schumpeter I s stirring statement, "the entrepreneur 
is never the risk bearer", is intended to mean simultaneously 
very much and very little. In attaining a proper distinction 
between the entrepreneur and the capitalist it means a great deal. 
Again, it is the capitalist who undertakes the immediate or direct 
financial risk of a venture. The entrepreneur, however, is 
simpl y responsible for innovation. The success in "carrying 
out new combinations" is undeniabl y a ris k, but nevertheless an 
indirect risk of reputation. Entrepreneurial failure jeopardises 
acquisition of future capital. Thus, in this light, Schumpeter' s 
statement ~ se comes to mean very little. 
Wi thin Schumpeter I s argument that the entrepreneur is never 
the bearer or risk resides the condition or corollary that the 
entrepreneur ial function is temporary. Innovation is simpl y by 
necessity an intermittent function of the businessman. As 
Schumpeter [1949] proclaims: "... it is difficult to imagine a 
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case where a man does nothing but set up new combinations and 
where he does this all his life". [p. 66] It is one thing to 
set up a "new combination", but q.lite another to utilise innovation 
within the general scope of business success. Innovation, by 
defini tion, calls forth improvement and more precisel y profits, 
but onl y if necessary and proper business conduct exists to 
implement it. Business conduct entails many activities besides 
entrepreneurship - i.e. administration, production, financial control, 
etc. Most of the literature on entrepreneurship neglects or assumes 
away such activities. Supposedly, the "routine ways" (those 
which fall under the all-encompassing function of management) 
of business take care of themselves. 
Unfortunatel y, entrepreneurship is commonly considered 
synonymous with business success. It has often been said by 
scholar and layman alike: "One who does not succeed at business 
is a failed businessman, not an entrepreneur." In other words, 
success and not failure is attributed to the entrepreneur. Even 
Schumpeter, in his choice of words, skates dangerousl y near this 
implicit ceteris pari bus assumption regarding other business 
activities. He [1934], for instance, states: " ... everyone 
is an entrepreneur onl y when he actuall y t carries out new combin-
ations I, and loses that character as soon as he has buH t up his 
business, when he settles down to running it as other people run 
their business n. [p. 78] Is the reader left to assume that 
because once one innovates, he ipso facto "builds up his business"? 
What if one does not "build up his business", does he remain 
an entrepreneur until he does so? The reasoning in the latter 
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query seems logical, but would unlikely reflect Schumpeter' s 
intention. The probable (though misleading) purpose of his 
statement was to show that "doing something new" was intended 
to increase profits, whether or not actual I y real ised . 
Naturally, it would be quite naive and mistaken to assume 
that entrepreneurship ~ se is responsible for business success. 
This statement may in turn be construed as: Without entrepreneurial 
activity, a business with all the other essential (though routine) 
activities will eventually succumb to competitive pressures and 
either be forced to innovate or lose its existence. The latter 
re-statement is more in keeping with the familiar Schumpeterian 
theme of Creative Destruction. Nonetheless, treating entre-
preneurship as being soleI y responsible for business success or 
growth would be similar to performing Hamlet with onl y the Prince 
of Denmark. Surel y, the play would prove inconsequential without, 
say, the ghost of Hamlet's father. And so it maybe said, for 
example, of the management function and its part in effecting 
business success 
Given the lengths to which Schumpeter goes to distance the 
entrepreneurial function from other functions of the businessman, 
he has sometimes been accused of neglect in his treatment of the 
management function. Hutchinson [1983], for example, stated: 
"It [Schumpeter' s definition of the entrepreneurial function] is 
narrower in the sense that it excludes in practice many businessmen 
who fulfill a purel y maintenance or control role". (p. 
statement smacks of the "second coming" of J. B. Say. 
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Recog-
nising (or even emphasising) other necessary activities of business 
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need not, nor should t be at the expense of sacrificing necessary 
anal ytic distinctions. As Schumpeter [1934] succinct! y explains: 
" •.. the entrepreneur's essential function must always be mixed 
up with other kinds of activity, which as a rule must be more 
conspicuous than the essential one". [po 77] Of course, 
Schumpeter is understandabl y leery of emphasising the merits 
of other business acti vi ties given his central concern of meticulousl y 
depicting the entrepreneurial function sui generis. Schumpeter 
[1934] quickly further states: "Hence the Marsha11ian definition 
of the entrepreneur, which simpl y treats the entrepreneurial function 
as management in its widest meaning, will natura 11 y appeal to 
most of us. We do not accept it, simpl y because it does not 
bring out what we consider the salient point and the onl y one 
which specifica11 y distinguishes entrepreneurial from other activities". 
[p. 77] 
Perhaps much of the controversy regarding the use (or should 
we say abuse) of the concept would be extinguished if we stopped 
treating the entrepreneur as a physical person; alternatively, 
the focus should be on entrepreneurship, a unique business function 
that pervades all acti vi ties of business in a variety of degrees. 
After all, innovation like other business functions is performed 
invariabl y, however subtl y, throughout a business organisation. 
Schumpeter [1934] concurs: " ... it is just as rare for anyone 
always to remain an entrepreneur throughout the decades of his 
active life as it is for a businessman never to have a moment 
in which he is an entrepreneur to however a modest extent". [p. 78] 
Though Schumpeter is no exception to this sin of speaking of the 
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entrepreneur as a physical person, he has rightl y expressed the 
need for examining entrepreneurship as a distinct function, direct! y 
and indirect! y within the scope of his emphasis on the "temporary" 
and frequently "humble" nature of "carrying out new combinations". 
Conclusion 
Schumpeter [1954] once remarked: "anal yUc progress -
not only in economics - hinges in great part on making things 
explicit that have been implied or implici tl y recognised for ages". 
[p,555n] However, Schumpeter I s accomplishment was more than 
to clarify, refine, update and therefore make useful what had 
been said before; his anal ytical distinction between the entre-
preneurial function and the capitalist and management functions 
serves to emphasise (though indirect! y) the importance of all 
business activities in attaining profits and growth. 
In an ever-changing competitive environment, business is 
continua 11 y forced to improve its competitive position. As is 
often said, "Business can either grow or decline, but it can never 
stand still". Improvement of course means effecting innovation 
as when, for example, a change in organisational structure brings 
about greater efficiency, an introduction of a different production 
process decreases costs, or the introduction of a new or improved 
product increases revenue. Innovation can (and should be expected 
to) come from all components of business, whether it be administ-
ration, production, or strategy and planning. Yes, the strategist 
ma y generall y be more entrepreneurial than the administrator. 
But, the nature of entrepreneurship, as Schumpeter stressed, can 
often be "humble" and "temporary". Certainl y , it is pervas i ve . 
Introduction 
CHAPTER III 
A Synthesis of Industrial Organisation 
and Business Strategy 
Industrial organisation and business strategy have long 
remained mutua 11 y exclusive in their use of anal ytical techniques, 
methodologies, and ob jecti ves in assessing competitive performance. 
The stark differences in approaches and purposes are fundamental I y 
accounted for by the respective fields' practitioners. As Porter 
[1981] explained: 
The majority of economists studying industrial 
organisation and strategic management 
researchers have, over the years, mostl y 
viewed each other with suspicion - if they 
knew each other existed. Wi th few exceptions, 
industrial organisation had little effect on the 
business policy concept of strategy, and 
business policy had little effect on industrial 
organisation, despite the increasingl y clear 
evidence that much promise for cross-
fertilisation existed. Why these ships have 
passed in the night is an intriguing question. 
Some of the reasons reflect subtle, deep-
rooted suspicions and even the type of 
training that scholars in both fields 
traditionall y received. But many of the 
reasons reflect real underl ying differences 
in the purposes, frame of reference, unit 
of anal ysis, and research values that each 
field has traditionall y embraced. [p. 609] 
Within the past decade, however, significant advances in industrial 
organisation and business strategy have resulted from "cross-
fertilisation" 0 
The concern of business strategy is the study (normatively 
and descriptivel y) of the individual firm, its resources, capabil-
ities, and values, and its environment. The emphasis of 
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business strategy is on the intertwinement of competitive 
positioning, attaining long term objectives, and dynamics. 
According to Andrews [1971], for example: "Business strategy 
. .. is the determination of how a company will compete in a given 
business and position itself among its competitors." [pp. 18-9] 
In other words, a firm's strategy, in establishing a particular 
competi ti ve position, can onl y be revealed in view of the 
behaviour of competitors. Alternati vel y, Chandler [1962], for 
instance, places the emphasis of business strategy on seeking 
long term objectives. These goals dictate the courses of action 
pursued and the necessary allocation of resources. Finall y, 
business strategy is also seen as a dynamic or ongoing process. 
For example, Cannon [1968] states: "Strategy is the catalyst, 
the main thread and thrust of the business. It is the dynamic 
element of managing which enables the company to achieve its 
resul ts in the competitive mar ketplace over the long run." [p. 3 ] 
Whilst business strategy is concerned with anal ysing the 
individual firm and its performance within an ever-changing envir-
onment, industrial organisation has traditionall y focused onl y on 
industry as the unit of analysis and its performance. Moreover, 
industrial organisation has assumed a static or, at least, stable 
environment. Out of a desire to contribute to public policy-
making, industrial organisation economists have centred their 
anal ysis on the direct relation between industry structure and 
industry performance, whilst disregarding the import of conduct 
(strategy) on performance. The argument has been since conduct 
was influenced by structure and could not, in turn, influence 
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structure, conduct could be suppressed in any assessment of 
performance. (Contrary to business strategy, the human dimension 
played no role in industrial organisation.) A further limitation 
invol ved examining relatively few critical, structural elements, 
such as distribution of firm sizes (viz. concentration) and entry 
barriers. 
The self-imposed limitations did not hinder, but actuall y 
encouraged, the statistical testing of structure/performance 
relationships in the quest for developing and improving competition 
policy. Where business strategy is concerned with improving 
a firm's performance from a private viewpoint, industrial organi-
sation has been concerned with improving industry performance 
from a social viewpoint, which could actuall y mean reducing a 
firm's performance. 
Fortunatel y, these general limitations in industrial organis-
ation have been addressed by economists over the past ten years. 
The advances have included both empirical work and theoretical 
modelling to highlight the significance of intraindustry differences 
(viz. conduct) on performance, whilst not denying the influence 
of structural elements. A wealth of statistical investigations 
have given support to treating both the firm and industry as the 
uni t of anal ysis. Significant modelling contributions have 
included "strategic groups", "mobility barriers", "competitive 
strategy", and "the value chain" (which are discussed in the 
chapter) . Indeed, the long-awaited synthesis between industrial 
organisation and business strategy has well begun. 
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The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm 
The first and most seminal paradigm in the field of industrial 
organisation is attributed to Edward Mason and Joe Bain. Mason, 
in the wake of Chamberlin's [1933] The Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition, Robinson's [1933] The Economics of Imperfect 
Competi tion, and Ber Ie and Means' [ 1932] The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, pioneered what has become known as the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm. Mason [1939] was very 
much concerned that the theorists of oligopol y in the 1930' s were 
fundamentall y mistaken because their "theoretical techniques of 
price anal ysis have been constructed without regard to their 
empirical applicability". [p .199] The inability of theoretical 
economists prompted Mason [1939] to state: "The theory of oligo-
pol y has been apt! y described as a tic ket of admission to 
insti tutional economics. It is to be regretted that more theorists 
have not availed themselves of this privilege". [p.194] 
The contributions of Chamberlin, his Harvard colleague, 
and Mrs. Robinson, provided Mason the positive impetus to approach 
the issue of price policy by emphasising the necessity of investi-
gating the behavioural aspects of the firm. The theories of 
monopolistic and imperfect competition in Mason's [1957] words, 
"opened our eyes to the fact that firms typicall y have a scope 
of action with respect to prices and price structures, outputs 
and product mix, advertising and selling, investment, research, 
and other economic dimensions that require examination". [p. 4] 
In other words, Mason was emphasising the need to examine 
indi vidual firms and their business strategies to full y understand 
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the forces of competition in a capitalist economy. He quite 
agreed that we trul y lived in Joan Robinson's "world of monopoLes". 
However, in order to test and measure statisticall y the per-
formance of firms, Mason found it necessary to group firms into 
classes with generally the same type of market structure. And, 
in order to differentiate between a number of market structures, 
it was important onl y to consider a limited number of industry 
attributes deemed significant. With such a classification, Mason 
[1 ~39] argued one could "reduce voluminous data concerning indus-
trial organisation to some sort of order" which could therefore 
"explain through an examination of the structure of markets and 
the organisation of firms, differences in competitive practices 
including price, production, and investment policies". [p.195] 
Specificall y, empirical studies noting differences in market 
structure could explain differences in policy and practice. More-
over, since conduct was direct! y determined by market structure, 
and market structure and conduct joint! y determined performance, 
Mason was suggesting that performance was essentiall y determined 
by market structure. The influence of conduct. on performance 
could therefore be ignored since it merely reflected the environ-
mente By establishing a cause-effect relationship between 
structure and performance whereby the direction of causality was 
one way, the determinants of price policy could be ascertained. 
To ensure that performance could not notabl y affect structure, 
and therefore maintain the direction of causality, Mason[ 1939] 
appealed to a Schum peter ian theme of technological factors to 
account for differences in market structures. In effect, Mason 
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signalled the genesis of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 
[See Figure 1] 1 
Structure ~ Conduct ~ Performance 
The Traditional Industrial Organisation Paradigm 
Figure 1 
The "structuralist" paradigm was primarily established by 
Mason's most distinguished student, Joe Bain. Bain I S role and 
contribution was best described by Shepherd [1976]: 
In the 1930' s Joe Bain entered a field 
which was in flux, rich in possibilities 
for giving new rigor to older concepts, 
for developing new ones, and for shaping 
the framework. That has been his main 
role and contribution. Though he did 
not create concepts, nor indeed the frame-
work, he selected among them and carried 
their scientific anal ysis further than 
anyone else.... Like a Ulysses S. 
Grant, Bain hammered relentlessl y at the 
basic problems. [pp. 4-5] 
Like Mason, Bain argued that in order to anal yse the market 
performance of business enterprise, an examination of market 
structures and market conduct needed to be undertaken. Bain 
[1968] believed that these two determinants were the main ones 
since "casual observation, common-sense, and formal theory" fp. 3] 
1. Mason stated: "I never completed this research for relations 
between structure and performance because it proved in the end 
too elusive and complex. But the study of the various elements 
that have to be taken into account in a study of market structures 
formed the basis of a series of articles and these by a whole 
series of students ... developing the relation of structure to be-
haviour to performance. The performance anal ysis tool went 
back into the antitrust field and I spent a considerable amount 
of time on the economic and legal characteristics of the monopol y 
problem." [Phillips and Stevenson, 1974, p.340] 
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suggested so. Performance (though broadl y defined by Bain 
[1968]) refers to technical efficiency, allocati ve efficiency, and 
innovation. Conduct refers to the strategies or policies and 
practices undertaken by business enterprises taking into account 
such key variables as advertising, price, capacity and quality. 
Finall y, structure refers primaril y to number and size distribution 
of sellers and buyers and the condition of entry or height of 
barriers to new entry into a mar ket. Sources of barriers to 
entry include generally: (1) product differentiation; (2) absolute 
cost advantages; 
2 
and (3) economies of scale. Of course, basic 
conditions are assumed to exist that influence market structure 
and conduct. On the supply side, for example, basic conditions 
include technology, accessibility to raw materials, product 
durability, etc. On the demand side, for example, basic con-
ditions include price elasticity, substitutes, rate of growth, 
etc. Figure 2 illustrates (according to Scherer [1970]) the 
"structuralist" paradigm. 
2. For examples cf the various arguments for what 
constitute "barriers to entry", see Stigler [1968]' Ferguson [1974], 
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Moreover, Bain agreed with Mason that it was necessary 
to use a classificatory system whereby the number of market 
attributes were limited to a significant few. Otherwise, 
statistical testing would be inconseq uential, if not impossi b Ie. 
Certainl y, cross-sectional testing would not prove very meaningful, 
since the distinctiveness of different market structures would be 
eroded if too many market features were considered. As Bain 
[1970] proclaimed: "if one poured into mar ket structure 'ever y-
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thing but the kitchen sink I, we were left with an hypothesis 
irrefutable ~ priori and not subject to empirical test, because 
we were approaching the limit at which nearl y every industry 
was in a very significant degree structurall y unique, in a 
different I class I ". [p. 42] 
Bain admitted that limiting the number of independent struc-
tural variables was not without its troubles. Indeed, some 
"statistical static" (viz. variance) would be expected. However, 
he believed this was a price worth paying in trying to confirm 
the central Masonian hypothesis where the relationship between 
structure and performance was deterministic. 
Effecti ve testing of the Masonian hypothesis cri ticall y 
depended on the components of market structure - viz. concentration 
and entry barriers - being reasonably stable or "comparatively 
immutable" over the long-run (Le. "about ten years on average"). 
As Bain [1970] readily concurred: "If, afterall, attributes of 
market structure were will-o I -the-wisps that moved quite signifi-
cantl y with the tides or seasons, there would not be much left 
to test, except in some vary econometric context in which a number 
is just a number. Thus, we do need to inquire into comparative 
structural stability." [p. 44] Bain [1956; 1968; and 1970] 
found in his statistical studies that product differentiation 
proved to be the least stable of all structural variables primaril y 
because of the nature of the consumer-good industries. (However, 
seller concentration along with conditions of entry were found to 
be "fairl y stable over time".) Though his findings of some 
structural instability of "mutation" were cause for concern, Bain 
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regarded the problem as "not destructive, but disturbing". 
Sain [1970] suggested that "in every case, compliment the 
selected measure of each mutable structural characteristic with 
a matching independent variable that denotes roughl y the direction 
and degree of structural change over the period of the statis-
tical test". [po 46] Sain believed this statistical modification 
would assist in maintaining market structure "immutability" and 
therefore validate findings of the Masonian hypothesis. 
In Bain I s earlier years, he adopted Mason I s original ideas 
regarding the influence of behavioural aspects (conduct) on per-
formance. Sain [1944] stated: 
A considerable acquaintance with the 
population of sellers and buyers in a 
market, with the source of the materials 
and the character of their productive 
techniques, with the framework of law 
surrounding it is a prerequisite to the 
effective study of competition and price 
behaviour within the market. This is true 
for both the author and the reader. The 
merits of such an anal ysis should not be 
confined, however, to its service as a 
preface to further work. A description, 
from the vantage point of economic anal ysis, 
of the environment of a principal industrial 
market may prove useful and perhaps 
illuminating to the economist and the 
general reader alike. It may further 
acquaintance with the extremely complex 
character of business institutions in the 
modern world, and may suggest hypotheses 
for investigation in the immediate or 
other industries. [po vii] 
But, like Mason, Sain chose instead to de-emphasise the influence 
of conduct on performance. In fact, Sain concluded that conduct 
provided a "poor basis for predicting market performance". 
Specificall y, in industries where varying degrees of interseller 
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co-ordination existed, tremendous variation in pricing aims were 
observed which naturall y resulted in diverse performance con-
sequences. Bain, however, agreed that an investigation of 
indi vidual firms would reveal a deterministic relationship between 
conduct and performance. But, of course, he was concerned with 
examining market performance. Consequent! y, though conduct 
is an important linkage ~ priori in the structure-conduct-performance 
triad (as will be discussed later), it was essentiall y "unascert-
ained" empiricall y. Conduct mere 1 y reflected the environment. 
As Bain [1968] explained: 
But as we try through empirical 
investigation to implement or verify this 
sort of explanatory-predictive hypothesis, 
we find that actual patterns of market 
conduct cannot be full y enough measured 
to permit us to establish empiricall y a 
meaningful association either between 
market conduct and performance, or 
between structure and mar ket conduct. 
It this becomes expedient to test 
direct! y for net associations of market 
structure to market performance, leaving 
the detailed character of the implied 
linkage of conduct substantiall y 
unascertained [p.329] 
Elsewhere ~ Bain [1968] asserted with equal conviction: "The 
particular choice of the device for ordering nonindependent 
seller action is relativel y inconsequential" and perhaps haphazard, 
since any of the devices, in a particular structural setting, can 
lead to roughl y com para b Ie performance results". [p . 331] It 
is of little wonder that Bain [1968] devoted onl y one chapter 
(out of sixteen) to market conduct in his "basic textbook", 
IndustrIal Organisation. 
The profound impact of Bain' s commitment (among other 
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ecnomists his wor k influenced 
3
) to "structural ism" was to prov ide 
a basis for formulating government antitrust and regulatory policy 
(i.e. examining the effects of seller concentration and entry 
barriers on industry competition as measured by profitability). 
More important, perhaps, Bain had given the field of industrial 
organisation a lasting scientific foundation. Specificall y, in the 
words of Shepherd [1976], "he had given it structure, precision, 
and high standards of research quality" [p. 16], from which 
future research would be precipitated. 
The Gulf Between Industrial Organization and Business Strategy 
The seminal work of Bain and his followers have, in effect, 
isolated a gulf between industrial organisation and the field of 
business strategy, which offers a wealth of theoretical and empiri-
cal investigations. The suggestion, therefore, is that industrial 
organisation needs to make an important transition. As Teece 
[1984] succinctly stated: "The principal focus becomes not one 
of how to increase consumer welfare by enhancing competition but 
rather how to increase profits (and, if necessary, reduce consumer 
welfare) by containing or restricting competition." [po 94] 
Elsewhere, Porter [1981] explained: "public policymakers could 
use their knowledge of the sources of entry barriers to lower 
them, whereas business strategists could use theirs to raise 
barriers, within the rules set by anti-trust policy".[p.612] 
Clearl y, this fundamental philosophical difference between 
3. See Weiss [1972; 1974] and Scherer [1970] for a 
comprehensi ve review of "structuralist" contributions. 
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industrial organisation and business strategy has rested on the 
uni t of analysis - i. e. the firm v. the industry. 
Originall y, Mason and Bain believed in the anal ysis of 
the firm (as discussed earlier) as pr incipall y important in under-
standing competition and price policy. Both, of course, changed 
their minds and decided that industry should be the unit of anal ysis 
if any significant contribution was to be made in the formulation 
of public policy. But, examining the industry as a whole 
implied treating the individual firms as homogenous entities or 
"empty boxes" that only differed economicall y in terms of size 
and market share. Consequently, conduct was not considered 
to alter appreciabl y from one firm to the next. And, since it 
was directl y dictated by market structure (which was assumed 
not to change "over the long run") conduct was deemed incon-
sequential in assessing market performance. The Bain/Mason 
paradigm was essentiall y static in nature. Contraril y, business 
strategy had focused on the individual firm and its organisational 
structure being unique vis-a-vis other firms within an industry. 
As is readil y observed, differences in firms and their levels 
of profitability do exist and must be accounted for somehow. 
In other words, anal ysing conduct or strategy is important (if 
not often crucial) in ascertaining a firm's performance and its 
possible feed-back effects on conduct and market structure. 
Over the past fifteen years, the industrial organisation 
literature has given a great deal of attention to what has become 
known as the conduct v. structure debate. As Newman (1978] 
asserted: "We question whether an anal ysis of conduct patterns 
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and their direct determinants is either the empirical redundancy 
of the statistical quagmire that it has been commonl y portrayed." 
[p. 425] Though structural elements are still considered meaning-
ful as underl ying determinants of conduct and performance, intra-
industry differences (which infers conduct discrepancies) have 
become recognised as a credible influence that must be reckoned 
with in any realistic and therefore accurate assessment of industry 
t .t. 4 compe 1 Ion. A number of studies have been fostered by this 
viewpoint whereby both firms and industries have been examined. 
Findings by Osborn [1970], Demsetz [1973], and Round [1975] 
have shown that small firms' performance as measured by their 
levels of profit is better in unconcentrated industries than 
concentrated industries. Stonebraker [1976] in his industry 
studies found a simultaneous existence of large firms with high 
profit rates and small firms with eratic and generall y low profit 
returns. Shepherd [1970] and Gale [1972] argued that market 
power is firm-specific and primaril y dependent on the firm's 
own market share, whereby the level of profits are consistent 
wi th size. However, Shepherd further argued that entry 
barriers "appear to have only a relatively small role in market 
structure ... " [p. 35] Marcus [1969]' alternatively found in a 
study of 118 industries that the relationship between firm size 
and profitability to be mixed, if not dubious. While 35 
industries exhibited a positive relationship, 9 revealed a negative 
4. Phill ips and Stevenson [1974] pointed out that Adam Smith 
in The Wealth of Nations "saw not onl y the affects of mar ket 
structure and conduct on performance but also the endogenous effects 
of conduc t and performance upon mar ket structure." [p. 325 ] 
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relationship, and 74 showed no significant relationship at all. 
Finall y, Porter [1979] pointed out a co-existence of profitability 
being related to market power and leading firms not necessaril y 
being the most profitable. Clearl y, the sample of empirical 
studies cited purport the existence and significance of dynamic 
intraindustry (interfirm) differences, whilst (in most cases) 
maintaining the importance of static structural determinants. 
Evidence of the significance of interfirm differences on per-
formance highlights the heterogeneity or segmentation of industries 
and differences in firms' capabilities and strategic choices. 
Interfirm differences and their impact on the competitive environ-
ment can be greatl y explained by the "strategic groups" model 
[Newman, 1978; and Porter, 1976; 1980] and "mobility barriers" 
[Caves and Porter, 1977; and Porter, 1980]. Essentiall y, the 
existence or relevance of strategic groups is founded on the premise 
that "market structure has an affinity for differentiated oligopol y" 
[Caves, 1980, p. 66]. Because firms sell different products in 
response to heterogeneous buyers' preferences and possess durable 
firm-specific assets, they undertake variegated strategies and 
differences in rates of return therefore result. Conseq uentl y , 
firms that undertake similar strategies are assumed to be members 
of the same strategic group. An industry could have onl y one 
strategiC group whereby all firms would follow essentiall y the 
same strategy. Also, it is possible for every firm in an 
industry to be a separate stategic group. 
The question that asserts itself regarding the concept of 
strategic groups is that of industry boundaries. It might appear 
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that all that is taking place is to reduce a redefinition of a 
homogenous set of sellers from an industry to a group. 
[1976], however, stressed that this is not the case: 
First, although I suppose that oligopolistic 
interdependence is recognized more full y 
within groups than between them, I also 
suppose that it is recognized more full y 
by firms in the same industry than by 
firms in different industries. The industry 
becomes segmented but does not disappear. 
Second, groups may be distinguished 
from one another because their products 
are imperfect substitutes, but that is not 
necessary. Groups can be differentiated 
by factors that affect the conditions of 
sale of a good but not the good itself 
(such as the width of the product line 
of which it is a part or the manufacturer's 
policy toward the retail stage), or by 
factors (such as vertical integration) 
that differentiate the product not at all 
in the eyes of the customer. [p. 77] 
Porter 
Where strategy variations exist in industries, an industry 
contains a set of strategy groups which Porter [1976] termed as 
"group structure". Group structure is an important concept 
because it "affects rivalry by making mutual dependence asym-
metricall y recognised within industries." Where firms have similar 
strategies and differ in terms of, say, absolute cost, then there 
is a recognised mutual dependence related to onl y absolute cost. 
Mutual dependence is more clear! y evident among firms in the 
same strategic group than between groups. Firms having recog-
nised other firms within the same strategic group are likely to 
predict and react to these firms' actions in an effective manner 
since their common strategy reflects similar subjective and object-
ive attributes. Consequent! y, co-ordination of actions are more 
likel y to be attained within strategic groups than across groups. 
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Mul tiple strategic groups within an industry usuall y trans-
late into rivalry implicati-ons [Porter, 1980, Ch 1]. Generall y, 
the greater number of strategic groups within an industry, the 
greater the degree of rivalry because of the implied increased 
asymmetry among firms. Porter [1980] cites four factors which 
determine the strength of interaction between strategic groups i 
(1) the degree to which different strategic groups compete in 
different market segments; (2) the degree of product differen-
tiation; (3) the number and size (Le. market share) of 
strategic groups; and (4) strategic difference or the extent to 
which strategies diverge. [pp. 138-139] All four determinants 
combined dictate the pattern of rivalry. 
Mobility barriers serve a useful and natural purpose within 
the strategic group model. Essentiall y, they act to general ise 
entry barriers by further encompassing exit barriers and movements 
between strategic groups. The determination of mobility barriers 
is partl y exogenous (structural) and party endogenous (strategic). 
The merit of mobility barriers is not to refute Bain's [1954] 
rigorous treatment of entry barriers, but to extend it whereby 
the "mobility" of firms can be considered. As Caves and Porter 
(1911] stated: 
The theory of entry barriers, concentrating 
on the movement of a firm from zero out-
put to some positive output, has missed a 
great opportunity for generality. Entrants 
into an industry can be entirely new firms 
or firms already established elsewhere. 
Firms may enter one or another segment 
of a given industry, and firms already 
operating in one segment may shift to 
another. [p.249] 
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Within the traditional framework entry barriers serve to protect 
all firms in an industry in the same way from external competition, 
whereas n:obility barriers serve to protect firms from other firms 
in different strategic groups within the industry as well as firms 
outside the industry (" dual protection"). The structural aspects of 
barriers between groups are the same as those between any group and 
firms outside the industry. For any individual group the queue of 
potential entrants includes firms from other strategic groups, estab-
lished firms in other industries, and entirely new firms. Generall y, 
going firms (whether inside or outside an industry) would be expec-
ted to be the principal entrants into an industry "core", whereas 
5 new firms would seek to enter the competitive fringe. 
Conventional entry barrier anal ysis also assumes that the 
queue of potential entrants is simpl y ranked by the rate of return 
each expects to earn given a recognised limit price which measures 
the height of entry barriers. The situation is merel y "them 
and us". However, when examining mobility barriers, several 
queues of potential entrants are considered because of the recog-
nised diverse capabilities and strategic objectives of incumbents. 
Absent within the Bain tradition is consideration Dr. the 
process by which firms would enter an industry. To quote Caves 
and Porter [1977]: "Conventional entry theory has the unsatis-
factory property of positing that the firm chooses to enter at 
the same scale x in the industry, and that this choice is indepen-
dent of its future plans". (p.255] However, in the presence 
of strategic groups and mobility barriers, because several paths 
5. Important antecedents of this argument are Andrews (1964] and 
Hines [1957]. 
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exist for a ris k-averse, potential entrant, several alternative 
strategies would be considered. Entrance into an "optimal" 
group may well require taking a circuitous route via other groups 
where barriers are more easil y surmounted. If the potential 
entrant is unsuccessful, it will have probabl y lost less than if 
it had directl y attempted to break into the ultimatel y desired 
group where the height of barriers was higher. The under lying 
assumption is that groups with the higher barriers offer the highest 
return for the successful challenger over the long run. The 
sequence of moves for the challenger is likely to be contingent 
on the incumbents' irreversibility of investments (exit barriers) 
and capacities and experience accumulated along the way which 
allow it to reach a position to successfull y mount an assault on 
the "optimum" group. 
The irreversibility of investments refers to the concept, 
"committed competition", which Caves [1984] defined as "rivalrous 
moves among incumbent producers that are irrevocable for non-
trivial periods of time". [p.127] The extent of committed com-
petition is measured by the salvage value of abandoned resource 
commitments. Caves and Porter [1977] asserted that the more 
intangible the nature of investments, the lower the sal vage value, 
and therefore the greater the actual commitment. Intangible 
-- assets (e. g. goodwill, knowledge), acquired through expenditures on 
advertising and research and development, for example, are perhaps 
the most significant barriers to entry in that they serve as the 
extreme forms of differentiation and excess capacity. 
Expenditures on intangible assets are generall y referred 
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to as "sunk costs" to the extent they are non-recoverable. 6 
Such investments can consequent! y act as significant obstacles to 
entry, particularl y given the incumbent has first-mover advantage 
[Johns, 1962; Sa lop, 1919 ] • Eaton and Lipsey [1981] refer 
to capital investment that is irrecoverable as must being "product 
specific". Otherwise, if past expenditure on capital can be 
recovered, it can be used in the production of other products. 
Elsewhere, Geroski and Jacquemin [1984] treat committed compet-
ition by examining what they call "differential movement advantage", 
whereby an incumbent can limit the range of alternatives available 
to a potential challenger given its investments that cannot easil y 
be matched. Schelling [1960], perhaps, best captured the thrust 
of an incumbent's behaviour, when he remarked: "the essence 
of their tactics is some voluntary but irreversible sacrifice of 
freedom of choice. They rest on the paradox that the power 
to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself". 
[p. 22 J 
The strategic group model (encompassing mobility barriers), 
in essence, serves to identify firms' strengths and weaknesses 
and therefore explains differences in profitability of firms within 
the same industry. The structural elements and concepts wi thin 
the Mason/Bain framework can indeed be generalised by way of 
strategic groups and mobility barriers to substantially increase 
6. The significant work of Baumol, Panzar, and Willig [1982] 
and Sharkey [1982] regarding "contestable markets" and "natural 
monopoly" have rigorously propounded that sunk costs, rather 
than fixed costs, account for entry barriers or committed com-
peti tion. They cite the air transport and communication 
industries as evidence. 
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one's knowledge of the forces of competition that have been ex-
tracted from business strategy. Caves [19801, for example, 
stated that the concepts of strategic groups and mobility barriers 
were "a dynamised add-on to the traditional structure-conduct-
performance paradigm." Porter [19831 went further and declared: 
"This theory (i. e. the strategic group model) addresses the under-
1 ying causes of differences and attractiveness among different 
strategic positions within an industry, bringing structural anal ysis 
down to the level of the firm". [p. 1771 And, furthermore, "strategy 
research [should 1 start with the premise that competitive patterns 
differ from industry to industry, and where competitors are 
recognised as central and are viewed as living organisations with 
particular personalities, strengths and weaknesses". [p. 179 J 
However, the strategic group model is incomplete because it does 
not account for all of the competitive forces. It onl y serves 
to address existing rivals and potential entrants, with no con-
sideration for the bargaining leverage of buyers and suppliers 
and the threat of substitute products and services. Without 
knowledge of these other forces, any understanding of firms' 
strategic behaviour and industry competitiveness or profitability 
can onl y be partial and therefore, perhaps, misleading. 
Michael Porter [1980] in his important book Competi ti ve 
Strategy, has redressed this deficiency in the strategic group 
model by incorporating the "competitors" - buyers, suppliers 
and substitutes (along with existing rivals and potential entrants) -
into a competitive strategy framework. Porter refers to this 
broader scope of competition as "extended rivalry" [See Figure 3 
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taken from Porter, 1980, p. 4] 
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Once these "structural" determinants of the intensity of competition 
have been anal ysed and the underl ying causes identified, a firm 
shoul d be able to accuratel y assess its strengths and weaknesses. 
Only then, can a firm effectively devise a competitive strategy 
which would enable it to position itself in an industry so that 
its capabilities can best influence and defend against the existing 
arr a y of competi ti ve forces. The effectiveness of a firm's 
competitive strategy and consequent market positioning is, of course, 
reflected in its performance vis-a-vis that of rival firms. 
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Porter [1980] identified three generic strategies a firm 
can choose from to attain above-average performance 
in any industry: overall cost leadership, differentiation, and 
focus. A firm undertaking a cost leadership strategy seeks to 
become the low-cost producer (without sacrifice to quality and 
service) in the industry. The sources of cost advantage include, 
for example, scale economies, low-cost labour, going down the 
learning curve, preferential access to raw materials, and tight 
overhead control. A cost leadership strategy generall y requires 
a firm to hold a large share of the market. 
sa y, economies of scale be full y realised. 
Only then can, 
Having a low-cost 
position provides a firm protection from competitors, because 
its lower costs assure above-average industry returns in the event 
of price reductions. A low cost firm will be defended against 
buyers because buyers will onl y exert pressure on the next most 
efficient firm. Also the low-cost firm will maintain greater 
flexibility regarding increases by suppliers on input prices. 
Scale economies and/or absolute cost advantages act as barriers 
to potential entrants. Finall y, employing a low-cost strategy 
reduces the threat of substitutes. 
The second strategy is concerned with a firm differentiating 
a product or service to the extent" it is considered unique in 
the industry. Therefore, large market share is unlikel y to be 
a realistic objective given the emphasis on seeking exclusivity. 
The essence of this strategy regarding the competi ti ve forces is 
that differentiation creates brand loyalty and goodwill, and there-
fore effects price insensitivity or inelasticity which mitigates 
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the power of existing rivals, potential entrants, buyers, suppliers, 
and substitutes. 
The last strategy is concerned with focusing on an industry 
subset such as a certain buyer group, geographic market, or 
product segment. Focus strategy differs from low-cost and differen-
tiation strategies by being directed at a particular industry target 
rather than the industry as a whole. Serving an industry target 
is based on providing either low-cost, differentiation, or a combi-
nation of the two more effecti vel y than any at her firm. Because 
the strategy is very specialised, the focus firm will not likel y 
enjoy a large market share. The relationship between the three 















Competitive strategy, as stated by Porter [1980]: 
p:--esents a comprehensive framework of analytical 
techniquestohelp a firm analyse itsindustry 
as a whole and predict the industry's future 
evo1 ution, to under stand its competitor sand 
its own position, and to translate this 
anal ysis into a competitive strategy for a 
particular business. The underpinning of 
this framework is the analysis of the five 
competi ti ve forces acting on an industry and 
their strategic implications. [p .xiv] 
Indeed, as Teece [1984] suggests, competitive strategy is "a trans-
1ation, redirection, and refinement of the Mason/Bain structure-
conduct-performance paradigm ... " [p. 94] Moreover , it has 
provided the fundamental link between industrial organisation and 
business strategy. 
Porter's [1985] latest contribution, Competitive Advantage 
has gone beyond Competitive Strategy. Competitive Advantage 
introduces the "value chain" as an anal ytica1 tool by which firms 
can choose and implement the appropriate competitive strategy 
and therefore create and sustain high performance. Value chain 
anal ysis is a systematic method of disaggregating all the strategic-
all y important activities a firm undertakes. [See Figure 5] 
By isolating such activities, the manager or strategic analyst can 
better understand the behaviour of costs and the existing and 
potential sources of differentiation. Creating value for its 
customers is the essence of achieving competitive advantage. 
Value may be in the form of prices lower than a firm's competitors 
for the same benefits or differentiated products that create benefits 
that more than offset premium prices. Quite simpl y, differences 
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Figure 5 
Value activities are divided into two general categories, 
primary activities and support activities. Primary activities 
are grouped into five categories: ( 1) inbound logi stic s ; 
(2) operations; (3) outbound logistics; (4) marketing and sales; 
and (5) service. Inbound logistics are those acti vi ties concerned 
with receiving, storing and disseminating inputs to the product. 
Operations are those activities that convert inputs into finished 
products. Outbound logistics are those acti v i ties associated 
with collecting, storing, and distributing the product to customers. 
Marketing and sales concerns those activities connected with provid-
ing the means by which customers buy the product and are persuaded 
to do so. Finall y, service involves those activities that enhance 
or maintain the value of the product. 
Support activities support the primary activities and each 
other. These acti vities include procurement, technology develop-
ment, human resource management, and firm infrastructure. 
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Procurement refers to the purchase of inputs not direct! y 
associated with the product and may be purchased anywhere in 
the firm's value chain. Technology development activities are 
concerned generall y with the improvement of the product. Human 
resource management involves those acti vi ties concerning the hiring, 
training, and motivation of personnel. Finall y, firm infrastructure 
refer s to those acti vi ties (e. g. accounting, finance, legal ) that 
might be considered "overhead". 
Some or all of the primary and support activities may apply 
to a ,_ particular firm, depending on the make-up of the firm and 
its industry. All of a firm's activities are assigned a place 
within the value chain with regard to their economics, impact 
on cost, and potential benefit to differentiation. In other words, 
categorizing activities is made in accordance with their contributions 
to a firm's competitive advantage. The systematic and inte-
grati ve approach of value chain anal ysis allows for all possible 
sources of competitive ad vantage to be examined. 
Conclusion 
The synthesis of industrial organisation and business strategy 
has been primaril y due to the efforts of economists studying 
industrial organisation. In recent years, such economists have 
done so because they have shown, in the words of Teece and 
Winter [1984], "greater diversity and flexibility of theoretical 
approach, and particularl y a greater willingness to trade off some 
of the aesthetic advantages of simplified models against the 
virtue of a greater contact with a complex reality." [p .120] 
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It has been argued that scholars of business strategy have 
failed to contribute to the synthesis because of not being well-
equipped by their backgrounds. Caves [1980], for example, 
asserts: 
If one accepts the weak postulate that the 
firm is a purposive organisation maximising 
some objective function, it follows that its 
strategic and structural choice represents a 
constrained maximisation problem. My 
reading is that students of business organ-
isation with disciplinary bases outside of 
economics would accept that proposition but 
have lacked the tools to follow its blue-
print. Constrained maximisation problems 
are mother i s mil k to the well-trained 
economist. [p. 88] 
However, both economists and business scholars can make 
further offerings in the form of empirical investigations. The 
recent pioneering work of Porter, in particular, has provided 
a necessary theoretical foundation for examining directl y the 
process by which a firm establishes its competitive advantage. 
Clearl y, empirical contributions must naturall y follow if the 
synthesis of industrial organisation and business strategy is to 
continue its progress. As Leontief [1971] made quite plain: 
"True advance can be achieved onl y through an interative process 
in which improved theoretical formulation raises new empirical 
questions and the answers to these questions, in turn, lead to 
new theoretical insights." [p. 5] 
CHAPTER IV 
The Methods of Investigation and Sample 
Introduction 
The research had its beginning in December 1983 when 
Dr. Gavin C. Reid, my supervisor, introduced me to Professor 
Peter Grinyer of St. Andrews University. Professor Grinyer 
spoke enthusiasticall y about empirical research yet to be under-
taken (to his knowledge) regarding the inception and growth of 
small (i. e. owner-managed) firms by way of enterprise trusts 1 
in Scotland. He suggested that in order to acquire access to 
enterprise trusts, the proper channel would be Mr. Graham Ross, 
1. Enterprise trusts are a relati vel y new phenomenon in Britain 
(the first being established in England in 1978) created jointly 
by the private sector and (usually local) government authorities 
in an effort to promote economic welfare in particular communi ties 
plagued with high unemployment. Specificall y, enterprise trusts 
seek to assist new and existing businesses in their particular 
areas by providing advice, writing business plans, finding premises, 
and, in some cases, offering financial support. What is unique 
about enterprise trusts is the commitment by private industry. 
Most of the personnel of an enterprise trust are on secondment 
from sponsoring, private sector firms. The secondees are usual! y 
experienced managers or specialists who plan to stay with the 
trust for a period of time ranging from a few months to several 
years. Almost invariabl y onl y large corporations can afford 
such secondments. Often times, secondments are used for the 
management develo pment of employees in mid-career, but there 
is also a significant number who are highl y experienced senior 
managers approaching retirement. This begs the question of 
whether relati vel y sophisticated, corporate managers could reall y 
understand and relate to the independent entrepreneur or small 
businessman. However, given that the principles of business 
appl y to all enterprises no matter what the size, age, or type, 
experienced managers from corporate enterprises would therefore 
seem to be ideal sources of advice. 
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Director of Scottish Business in the Community (Scot BIC). 2 
Professor Grinyer kindl y agreed to write a letter of introduction 
to Mr. Ross on my behalf. 
Within a fortnight of meeting Professor Grinyer, I met Mr. 
Ross and discussed the merits of my proposed research and 
emphasised the lack of research undertaken at the university level 
regarding the small firm sector in the economy. It was impressed 
on Mr. Ross the need to meet a number of enterprise trust directors 
in order to obtain effective access to new small firms and actuall y 
spend a period of time with an enterprise trust. The experience 
of being in residence with an enterprise trust would allow me 
the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of new small firms 
and their mar ket environments. Consequentl y, the acquired 
insight would fundamentally influence the construction of the methods 
of investigation (viz. the Finance Section in the administered 
questionnaire) and assist in the anal ysis of the data. 
Unstructured Design Work 
In January 1984 I met Mr. Douglas Martyn, Chief Executive 
of Ardrossan, Sal tcoats, and Stevenston Enterprise Trust, Ltd., 
(ASSET) . Given that ASSET was the first and largest enterprise 
trust in Scotland, I thought a wealth of insight and experience 
could be gained by being associated with ASSET for an extended 
per iod of time. However, if I was to be in residence with 
2. Scottish Business in the Community (Scot BIC) is an 
entity sponsored by corporate business for the purpose of setting-
up enterprise trusts in Scotland. 
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ASSET, I would be expected to acti vel y participate in a 
contributory way. I stressed that I could act in a consultant I s 
capacity with respect to the "after start-up care" given my academic 
training in finance, management and economic s . Because ASSET 
was primarily involved with starting-up new businesses and helping 
esta b lished companies expand into the ASSET area, Ii ttle time 
remained for ASSET to effectivel y satisfy the consultancy needs 
of up-and-running firms. After making two more visits to ASSET 
to meet other member s of staff, I was offered a consultant I s 
position. It was mutually decided that 10 weeks (21 May -
27 Jul y 1984) would be an adequate period of time for both ASSET 
and myself to sufficient! y benefit. In return for my being able 
to observe ASSET I S operations and meet businesses who had 
recei ved assistance from ASSET, I was expected to give a series 
of seminars to businesses on such matters as cash flow accounting, 
inventory control, and marketing and visit individual firms to 
help resolve their particular problems. This latter responsibility 
ranged from discussing market strategy, to costing, to finding 
market surveys and reports, to simpl y acting as a "sounding 
board" • 
During my first two weeks with ASSET, most of the time 
was spent familiarising myself with the project officers I functions, 
being introduced to a number of businesses, and taking notes from 
the files in order to acquaint myself with the ASSET-supported 
enterprises. The files were divided into four sections: 
Ini tial Enquiries, Live Projects (i. e. firms in the process of 
starting-up or expanding), Completed Projects, and Dead Projects 
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(i.e. firms that had failed to get started or went into liquid-
ation) . In examining the Initial Enquiries, I found a wide 
variety of business proposals. Moreover, the great majority 
of individuals seeking to start their own businesses were doing 
so as merel y an al ternati ve to unemployment. In other words, 
people were primaril y being "pushed", rather than "pulled", into 
entrepreneurship. In fact, out of 141 Initial Enquiries, 112 
expressed that unemployment, redundancy, or anticipating redun-
dancy were primaril y responsible for pursuing self-employment. 
Finall y, nearl y every Initial Enquiry indicated a need for 
financial assistance. 
The Live Projects included business plans for individuals 
seeking finance either to set-up in business or expand their present 
operations. The business plans were written by an accounting 
firm hired by ASSET. The plans provide the history of the 
business under consideration (usuall y in the case of expansion 
of "phoenix n operations), background of proposers, assistance 
needed (general I y finance and / or premises), proposed funding 
structure, market potential, and pro forma financial statements. 
What was particularl y interesting of the 25 business plans examined, 
in 21 cases the "gearing" (leverage) ratio exceeded one. And, 
in ma y of these cases, the external finance (viz. debt) came from 
a variety of sources. Sources of finance included banks, the 
Scottish Development Agency, regional and local government author-
Hies, the British Steel Corporation, and ASSET. Business ventures 
that seem viable and show promise in creating employment usuall y 
recei ve ASSET's support even in cases where the business proposer s 
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cannot match pound for pound the external finance. ASSET 
firml y believes that without bringing together what would trul y 
be risk capital, most of the ventures they have assisted would 
not have got "off the ground" or at the very least would have 
been great I y handicapped by inadequate finance. As they right! y 
expressed, the undoing of any business venture is undercapitalisation 
from the start. And, with its highl y qualified and respected 
3 
staff, ASSET is able to attract capital which businesses could 
probabl y not be able to do on their own. Banks, in particular, 
are more willing to lend to ASSET-supported businesses because 
they know ASSET has properl y scrutinised the proposed venture 
in advance. Banks are actuall y quite grateful to ASSET for acting 
as a "screen". Moreover, because ASSET has funds of its own 
to invest (up to £5000/firm) and can appeal to a consortium of 
public and private institutions for capital finance, there is a 
greater likelihood for businesses to acquire the necessary finance 
in a relatively short period of time. 4 
Much time was spent assisting in the preparation for Enter-
prise Week (17th - 23rd June 1984). Enterprise Week invol ved 
the official opening of the Ardrossan Small Business Centre by 
Mr. David Trippier, Under-Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, Open Day at the Stevenston Industrial Estate, and seminars 
3. Mr. Stewart McA~thur has been particularly valuable 
in this regard as a member of ASSET because of his influence 
in the banking community. He is a banker of long experience 
and is a former Assistant General Manager of the Cl ydesdale Bank. 
4. ASSET is rather unique with respect to other enterprise 
trusts in Scotland in that it does have funds to invest in business 
ventures, as well as premises to let. 
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on "How to Start Your Own Business n. One of my responsibilities 
was to telephone all the enterprise trusts in Scotland to inquire 
about what they were doing for Enterprise Week. This activity 
proved to be very helpful to the research in that it gave me 
the opportunity to introduce myself and explain the objectives 
of the research. In the conversations, directors expressed 
enthusiasm for a meeting and at the very least a willingness to 
provide introductions to firms in their area. Consequentl y, 
visits were made to some of the enterprise trusts which ultimately 
led to the establishment of the sample. 
Given the length of time spent with ASSET, my responsibilities, 
and the number of businesses and concerned individuals met, I 
believe proper consideration for the problems and concerns confront-
ing new small firms was established, which was the major objective 
of this phase of the research. More specificall y, with respect 
to the survey work to follow, much inaccuracy and superficial 
knowledge would be avoided because of having played an inter-
active role with research participants as they went about their 
ordinary activities in their natural habitat. 5 In short, it was 
paramount to observe and participate in real-life situations in 
order to effecti vel y and honestl y analyse them. 
would continue in the collecting of the data. 
The Administered Questionnaire 
This approach 
The administered questionnaire (AQ) was conducted by Dr. 
5. This argument is supported in Burgess [1984] 
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Reid and myself amongst 73 firms during April - October 1985. 
The AQ is divided into 5 sections: ( 1) General; (2) Pricing; 
(3) Costing; (4) Sales and Competition; and (5) Finance. 
The General section seeks information regarding a firm's industrial 
classification, number of employees, sales revenue, main product 
group, principal market, market share, number of competitors, 
and characteristics of customers. The Pricing section is 
concerned with such factors as price determination and the 
affects of a boom and recession on pricing decisions. The Costing 
section investigates, for example, capacity level, fixed and 
variable costs, and changes in output. The Sales and Competition 
section looks at, for instance, price changes (5 and 10 percent) 
under varying business conditions, reasons for altering selling 
price, and forms of competition from rival firms. Finall y, the 
Finance section examines such matters as obstacles to obtaining 
finance, security, "gearing" (leverage) ratios, cash flow difficulties, 
and expansion plans. [See Appendix 3] 
The design of the AQ was accomplished by Dr. Reid. 
The categories and content of the first four sections were inspired 
by Reid [1981] and Nowotny and Walther [1978J. The formulation 
of the categories and content of the Finance section is essentiall y 
credited to the influence of my experience with ASSET (as discussed 
earlier) and my academic training in finance and accounting. 
After a number of redrafts, the AQ was tested in a "pilot" 
study of 13 firms in February - March 1985. The primary benefit 
derived from the "pilot" was the actual experience of conducting 
the AQ. Specificall y, attaining consistency in defining terminology 
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and clarifying intentions of questions resulted. Many of the 
13 firms expressed concern that the AQ was "big business" and 
"manufacturing" oriented. Consequent! y, much of the wording 
was altered or "softened" so that the AQ would appeal to all 
business enterprises irrespective of size or type. Also, it was 
quickl y realised in the "pilot" that the AQ should be conducted 
in a reasonably relaxed and "open-ended" manner. In other words, 
the interviewee was not discouraged to elaborate (and to some 
extent digress) on his responses, if he so desired. It was 
appreciated that the interviewee regarded the interview as an 
opportunity to share some of his concerns with someone whom 
he considered genuine 1 y interested in the welfare of his business 
and something of an expert. In many instances, the interviewer 
was asked to give advice or a t least share his thoughts on 
particular aspects of the firm's conduct and performance. Allow-
ance for discussion great! y served to influence the formulation 
of the second stage of the research - i. e. the semi-structured 
interview. 
Final1 y, the Finance and Costing sections were the most 
cumbersome part of the interview. The "gearing" ratio questions, 
for example, often required careful elaboration. Many of the 
firms indicated they left such financial matters with their accountant. 
Questions regarding borrowing and security, in particular, were 
often times considered sensitive issues by the interviewee and 
consequentl y had to be treated with some degree of delicacy by 
the interviewer to insure hone st y in responses. Because of the 
inter-relationship of the Finance questions, the interviewer 
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could easil y identify inconsistencies in responses. However, 
much tact was necessary in pressing the interviewee to rectify 
his inconsistencies. With respect to the Costing section, a 
number of firms expressed difficulty conceptualising a static cost 
function that depicted their overall cost structure. Specificall y, 
many firms wanted to treat expenditure on fixed assets as variable 
costs in examining the change in total output with changing total 
costs. Also, many firms were more comfortable dealing with 
fixed and variable costs, rather than marginal costs. They 
knew what marginal costs were but often times it was admittedl y 
a difficult figure to calculate. 
Arranging to see each firm involved a letter of introduction 
followed by a telephone call. The letter opened by noting the 
importance of the small firm sector to the economy and pointing 
out that little research from the university level had been under-
taken "which could help promote awareness for further support" 
of small business. The letter proceeded to explain the purpose 
of the research. It was emphasised that it is important to acquire 
knowledge of firms' conduct first-hand in order to provide an 
accurate and meaningful assessment of what could be done to promote 
the inception and growth of small firms. After asking for an 
hour of time to go through the AQ, it was stated that the firm 
could immediately benefit from the objective exercise in that they 
would "perhaps learn (or at least be reminded) ... about the 
conduct of their business and its effectiveness ... " Also, it 
was mentioned that a summary of results from the study would 
be sent to them if they so desired. Finall y, the letter suggested 
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that the firm contact the mentioned enterprise trust director, 
who had provided the firm's name and address, to inquire about 
the research further as well as Dr. Reid and myself. [See 
Appendix 1] 
A few days after sending the letter of introduction, the 
firm's owner-manager was given a telephone call with the intention 
of arranging a meeting. After stating who I was, the owner-
manager was asked if he had received my letter. And, if so, 
did he have any questions regarding the letter's content. Once 
these questions (if any) were addressed, the owner-manager was 
asked when it would be convenient to go through the AQ (assuming 
he was interested). It was stressed that it was important to 
try and meet within a week and at a venue and time which was 
mutuall y agreeable. I indicated that I was prepared to see him 
during or after working hours and at his office or home; it was 
made quite clear that time and place did not have to be a problem. 
Upon arrival, and after the normal exchange of pleasantries, 
I usuall y spoke brief! y about the purpose of the research as a 
reminder. Second, I stressed that this was an academic project 
and not one being conducted for an enterprise trust, the Scottish 
Development Agency, or some other governmental bod y. In fact, 
I often noted that the research was being principall y funded by 
Edinburgh University and the Scottish Economic Society, an indepen-
dent, academic organisation. Third, the interviewee was told 
that his name or the firm's name would not be mentioned in the 
findings; confidentiality would be upheld as promised in the 
letter. Fourth, it was stated there were no right or wrong 
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answers; the research was not prescriptive, but rather descriptive, 
in its approach. Final! y, the interviewee was told that if he 
did not understand any of the questions, he should feel free to 
ask for clarification. The ob j ecti ves in the preliminary conver-
sation were to dismiss any unc ertainty or apprehension the inter-
viewee might have about the AQ and/or myself and establish a 
comfortable (if not informal) rapport in what was inherent I y 
a formal situation. By recognising that the interviewee is human, 
has his own set of personal characteristics and interests, and 
has never met the interviewer before, it was necessary to try 
and put the relationship on a personal basis quickl y to create 
a positive atmosphere whereby the interview could proceed smoothl y 
wi th unnecessary formality. Keeping the interview on an abstract 
business level would have likely inhibited the quality and candour 
of the information given. 
Prior to leaving the interview, I restated that a summary 
of results would be sent in due course and thanked the owner-
manager for his time. A thank-you letter was sent within a 
week of each interview; there was the conscious effort to not 
onl y create goodwill with all participants, but also maintain it. 
The Semi -Structured Interview 
The semi-structured interview (SS!) [See Appendix 4] was 
conducted by Dr. Reid and myself in Jul y-October 1985 amongst 
24 firms (counting 7 in the "pilot") that participated in the AQ 
stage. The intention of the SS! was to go beyond the AQ and 
del ve into the conduct of firms to create and sustain competitive 
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advantage in the market. The S51 contains three distinct 
sections: (1) Competitive Forces; (2) Competitive Strategy; 
and (3) Defensive Strategy. (This framework was adopted from 
Porter [1980 and 1985] as discussed in Chapter III). Each 
section consists of a series of probes/agenda items to effectivel y 
direct the course of the interview. After the interview was 
concluded, the interviewer would record any additional notes, 
observations, and impressions that were not recorded during the 
interview. This was to be done as soon as possible once the 
interview was finished whilst it was fresh in the mind of the 
interviewer. Then the interviewer would type a summary note 
for each of the components of the S5I' s sections. Finall y, the 
summary notes were stored in the data base in the computer along 
with the AQ information. 
Dr. Reid was responsible for the design of the 551 as well 
as the procedures by which it was conducted. The 5S1 was 
greatl y influenced by the previous stages in the research and 
Porter [1980 and 1985]. In particular, the 5S1 allowed for points 
to be pursued that were raised during the course of the AQ stage. 
Porter's influence was that of a casework orientation and an appeal 
to fieldwork methodology. Moreover, the 551 adopted Porter's 
framework and made it operational. 
Similar to the AQ stage, the primary benefit gained from 
undertaking a "pilot" for the SSI was interview experience and 
enhanced familiarity and consistency with the content and use 
of the terminology. Because the 5S1 was discussion-oriented, 
the interviews were found to average 90 minutes in duration, 
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rather than the expected 60 minutes. Once the "pilot" was con-
cluded, Dr. Reid and I were satisfied with the probes/agenda 
items and decided against any revision of the SSI. 
The SSi was particular I y successful because the firms found 
the exercise to be significantl y relevant and beneficial to their 
opera tions . By first examining the 5 competitive forces - i. e. , 
existing rival s, potential rivals, suppliers, buyers, and substitute 
products/services - that exist for all businesses in all industries, 
the firms could objectivel y assess their strengths and weaknesses. 
Once this was accomplished, they could assuredl y determine the 
appropriate strategy - Le. low cost, differentiation, or focus 
- to implement in order to effecti vel y compete in their industry. 
Many times firms pleasantl y realised they did not have to worry 
about direct confrontation with larger rivals by pursuing a focus 
strategy that concentrated on a particular market niche. The 
final section was not always relevant, particular I y with newer 
firms since they were still creating or finding, rather than defend-
ing, a market niche. However, discussion on defensive strategy 
often revealed certain considerations and tactics firms would 
eventuall y confront. 
The firms that participated in the SSI stage did so because 
of their expressed interest at the time of their AQ interview; 
i.e. they saw the quid E.!.9. quo as being fee consultancy service. 
Though the research was entirel y academic, it was quite clear 
that in order to get ports of entry, firms had to be approached 
on their own terms. In doing so, it was understood that some 
firms perform well whil st others do not. Consequentl y, it was 
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imperative in seeking further access to firms not to suggest that 
the SSI would be judgmental in spite of it being directl y relevant 
to assessing firms' strengths and weaknesses and effecti vel y 
formulating the right business strategy. Unfortunatel y, more 
firms agreed to undertake the SSI than time and financial constraints 
of the research allowed. Otherwise, the sample frame of the 
SSI would have been much larger. Therefore, those firms that 
were selected were done so because of their uniqueness vis-a-
vis other interested firms; it was important to have examined 
a highl y diverse set of firms. 
The Sample 
The sample consists of 73 small firms from the Lothian, 
Fife, and Strathcl yde regions. The sampling procedure used 
was judgmental or non-probabilistic. The Edinburgh Venture 
Enterprise Trust, Ltd. (EVENT), the Leith Enterprise Trust, Ltd 
(LET), the Glenrothes Enterprise Trust, Ltd (GET), the Irvine 
Development Corporation (IDC), and the Scottish Development Agency 
(SDA) provided names, addresses, and telephone numbers of firms 
6 
to contact. It was emphasised to these organisations that I 
did not want to approach any firm that would not want to be 
involved in the research. Otherwise, reference could have been 
made to telephone directories and/or industrial indexes which 
would probably have meant a much lower response rate. Establish-
ing the sample by this means would have been a more time-
consuming and expensive activity. However, gaining access to 
6. Four firms in the sample were contacted because of personal 
referral. 
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firms through the above mentioned organisations proved to be a 
quite effective and efficient method in that 86 out of 104 firms 
contacted actuall y participated either in the "pilots" or the stud y 
proper. The response rate of 83 percent was particular 1 y 
gratifying given that many other similar studies' response rates 
were typical 1 y less than 60 percent. 7 It could be considered 
disadvantageous to undertake this type of judgmental sampling 
because it might be biased towards successful firms. After all, 
it seems plausible that such firms would be more likel y to 
participate than those that are simply trying to survive. However, 
many of the sample firms were in fact found to be struggling and 
looked at participation in the research as an opportunity to 
ob jecti vel y anal yse and perhaps assist in solving their problems. 
Also, because the sample firms are generally regarded as new 
in that onl y 4 firms have been in existence for more than 10 
years, firms were still very much trying to establish their market 
niche. Conseq uentl y, invol vement in the researc h was often 
regarded as a means of seeking advice. Moreover, many of the 
firms that did not wish to participate in the research were relati vel y 
large and expressed that because they were satisfied with their 
conduct and performanc e, there was little, if anything, to be 
gained from involvement in the researc h . 
Other kinds of possible biases, aside from the invbl vement 
of onl y successful firms, may act to distort the quality of the 
data. For example, many firms in the sample were controlled 
7. The most notable studies include Boswell [1972] with a 60 per 
cent response rate and the Research Reports which accompanied the 
Bolton Committee Report [1971] with response rates of 30, 40 and 
50 percent. 
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by more than one owner-manager, with potentiall y varied expertise 
(e. g. production, finance and marketing), experience and perceptions 
of the firm I s conduct and even performance. Fortunately, only 
in a few cases did all of a firm I s owner-managers not participate 
in the research. Also, it is possi ble that the perceptions of 
the owner-manager{s) may vary from that of other firm-related 
individuals such as employees and financiers. Employees, for 
instance, might consider themselves as indispensable inputs, whereas 
the owner-manager( s) might consider the possible substitution 
of capital goods (e.g. automated machinery) for labour. This 
possible fundamental difference in attitudes rna y account for altered 
perceptions of the conduct of the firm. Providers of external 
finance may also have a different perception of a firm's operations 
because of their central concern of recovering their invested funds. 
The suggestion is that perhaps all individuals involved with a 
particular firm should participate in the research in order to 
acquire a more accurate appraisal of the firm I s conduct and perfor-
mance. However, it should be stated that the intention of the 
research was to examine the owner-managers I perceptions and how 
they acted on these perceptions. Finall y, the owner-managers I 
possible concern with trying to please the interviewer by giving 
the "right answers" would be a source of bias. However, this 
bias is believed to be negligible given that it was always stressed 
by the interviewer that there were no right or wrong answers; 
the research was intended to be expositi ve, rather than critical 
of the firms I operations. 
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The significance of potential biases in the research has 
been much relaxed because of the "slices of data" approach taken 
and the incorporation of "consistency checks" in the administered 
questionnaire. As stated by Reid [1986] * a "slices of data" 
approach refers to "using diverse methods of collecting data, 
with the purpose being to get different perspectives on categor ies, 
or emerging hypotheses." [p. 8] The methods underta ken in 
the research include: ( 1) unstructured design wor k; (2) an 
administered questionnaire; and (3) a semi -structured interv iew . 
The merit of taking "slices of data" according to Reid [1986] is 
that it "tends to offset the bias of methods, and balance the 
misrepresentations of respondents against one another". [p.8] 
Also, a number of "consistency checks" were utilised in the 
Administered Questionnaire to ensure consistency in responses and 
accuracy. For example, the owner-manager was asked whether 
he borrowed money to start his business. Later, he was as ked 
about his initial "gearing" ratio. If, for instance, a negative 
response is given to borrowing money, zero should be the "gearing" 
ratio. Otherwise, the owner-manager(s) would be asked to 
explain the discrepancy. 
The sample firms are quite diverse in that 29 classes from 
the 1980 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) are represented. 
[See Table 1] Though many firms indicated that more than one 
*See G. C. Reid [1986] Methodological and Empirical Issues in the 
Application of Field Research Techniques to the Business Enterprise. 
Discussion Paper I, Economics Department, University of Edinburgh. 
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class was applicable to the scope of their operations, they chose 
the class that defined their main business. In other words, 
more than 29 classes could have been noted. Unfortunatel y, 
no official statistics exist to give some idea of how representative 
the sample is of its universe. The essential problem is that 
the Business Statistics Office does not collect census information 
from business establishments employing fewer than 20 persons. 
This is indeed problematic given that onl y 11 firms from the 
sample employ 20 or more persons; this figure represents onl y 
15 percent of the sample. Moreover, the most recent census 
data regarding the number of business establishments in Britain 
was published in 1982. 8 Out of the sample of 73 firms, 54 firms 
(L e. 74 percent of the sample) did not exist 4 years ago. 
However, the wide cross-section of firms in the sample may provide 
some insight or indication of the new small firm population in 
9 
Scotland. 
With respect to the type of business, all firms except one 
are either a one-man business (i. e. sole trader), a partnership, 
or a private (Le. limited liability) company. [See Table 3] 
The exception is a cooperative, which is defined as being largel y 
owned and managed by all those working in it. No public 
companies are included in the sample. Though 35 firms, 48 
8. See Business Monitor PAl002 Report .£!! the Census of 
Production, 1982, HMSO. 
9. In support, Binks and Coyne [1983] stated: "small firms are 
found in most sectors of the UK economy. Contrary to what might be 
expected, there is no evidence that they are concentrated !n service 
industries; they provide high proportions of employment In both 
manufacturing and construction." [p. 22] 
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percent of the sample, are private companies, where technicall y 
ownership is divorced from management because such a company 
is a separate legal entity, all the firms I owners or shareholders 
and the managers or directors are one and the same. That is, 
in every case, every individual that holds an equity stake is 
direct! y involved in the firm's decision-making process. Forming 
a limited company was done with the intentions of taking advantage 
of lower tax rates, limiting owners I liability, and enhancing the 
firms credibility or image with their customers and competitors. 
Many firms that are either one-man businesses or partnerships 
indicated that they did not think they could generate enough 
profits to take advantage of lower tax rates applicable for private 
companies and justify the £800 registration fee. Another consider-
at ion was that if a firm could not generate a sufficient level of 
profit as a limited liability company, it would be taxed at a 
higher rate than if it were a sole trader or partnership. 
As indicated in Table 2, the great majority of the firms 
started at a modest size in terms of total assets (book value). 
The average size was £17,200 with £130,000 being the largest 
individual figure. Also, it is important to note that 58 firms 
had total assets of £50,000 or less when they started operations. 
This figure represents 89 percent of the firms that stated starting 
total assets. In examining present total assets, the average 
rose by £65,000 to £83,000 with the largest figure being £500,000. 
Nonetheless, there were still 44 firms with total assets of £50,000 
or less. The figure represents 66 percent of the firms that 
stated present total assets. If one considers the number of firms 
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that started with less than £100,000 in total assets, 63 firms -
i. e. 97 percent of the sample that provided this figure - would 
fall into this category. Howev~r, in terms of present total assets, 
52 firms - i.e. 78 percent of the sample that provided this 
figure - have less than £100,000. In other words, whereas onl y 
2 firms stated they started with £100,000 or more in total assets, 
15 firms indicated that in terms of present total assets they have 
at least £100,000. In 9 instances, firms failed to give the amount 
of their starting and/or present total assets because of either 
simpl y not knowing or an expression of confidentiality. 
Looking at the most recent fiscal year's sales revenue 
of the firms provides yet another insight into the firms' size 
of operations. As shown in Table 4, a large majority of firms 
that provided sales figures (49 firms or 86 percent of the sample), 
had sales revenue of £300,000 or less with a significant proportion 
(29 firms or 51 percent of the sample), showing no more than 
£100,000. The reason 15 of the 16 firms did not prov ide sales 
figures was that they had not yet been in business for a full 
year. Gi ven their size of present total assets and change in 
starting and present total assets, it would appear that no more 
than 2 firms would exceed £100,000 of sales revenue in their 
first year of operation. If this were the case, 59 percent, 
rather than 51 percent, of the sample had no more than £100,000 
in sales revenue for the past year. The remaining unaccounted 
firm did not wish to comment on sales. Of the 8 firms that 
had turnover exceeding £400,000, 4 had sales revenue between 
£1,000,000 and £2,000,000 and 4 noted that sales revenue was 
18 
less than £1,000,000 .. 
In examining the employment figures in Table 5, it can 
be seen again that the firms are essentiall y small and likel y 
owner-managed. The average size of the sample's work force 
(including full-time and part-time employees and trainees) is 
nearl y 11 employees. Onl y 3 firms have more than 50 employees 
with the largest figure being 89. And, the firm with 89 
employees, onl y 50 of these are full-time. Most important! y, 
49 firms have 10 or less total employees and 69 firms - i. e. 
95 percent of the sample - have 30 or less total employees. 
In many instances, firms expressed concern for keeping the level 
of employment at an absolute minimum out of fear of having to 
lay-off employees if an unexpected drop in demand occurred. 
Also, there was an expressed preference or need to be capital-
intensive. Both factors were seen to contribute to maintaining 
stable employment levels and therefore insuring good labou r 
relations. 
Finall y, the firms' mar ket share of their main mar ket, 
in view of the firms' recent sales figures, partiall y highlights 
their degree of industry influence. Usuall y, there is a positive 
relationship between size of firms and market power. Table 6 
shows that the sample is essentially one of either small mar ket 
shares of small markets, small market shares of large markets, 
or large market shares of small markets. In other words, as 
supported by the sales figures, firms are small in that they 
exert rela ti vel y minimal mar ket influence. For firms 2, 3, 4, 
8, 12, 16 and 18 where there appears to be a large share of 
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a large market, their main product group appeals to a narrow 
market segment because of uniqueness, lack of demand, or being 
too technologicall y advanced. 
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TABLE 1 
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE SAMPLE 
Classes * Number of Firms 
Production and distribution of electricity, 
gas and other forms of energy 1 
Metal manufacturing 1 
Manufacture of other metal goods 2 
Mechanical engineering 4 
Electrical and electronic engineering 7 
Manufacture of motor vehicles and parts 1 
Instrument engineering 1 
Food, drink and tobacco manufacturing 3 
Textile industry 3 
Footwear and clothing industries 2 
Timber and wooden furniture industries 4 
Manufacture of paper and paper products; 
printing and publishing 4 
Processing of rubber and plastics 1 
Other manufacturing industries 8 
Construction 4 
Wholesale distribution 3 
Commission agents 1 
Retail distribution 3 
Hotels and catering 1 
Repair of consumer goods and vehicles 1 
Other inland transport 1 
Air transport 1 
Supporting services to transport 2 
Business services 5 
Renting of movables 1 
Owning and dealing in real estate 1 
Medical and other heal th services 1 
Other services provided to the general public 4 
Recreational services and other cultural services 2 
Total: 73 



























































































































































































































STAkTMO - month business star~ed 
STARTYR - year business started 








































































SASSET - total assets of business when started 
PASSET - total assets of business at present 
3A.LES - last fiscal year's sales revenue 
...... ,~po«: - not given 
o - total assets not given 
- -SALES 
fl - £50.01. 
OVCR HOo, a 00 
£0 - £5 •• 000 
£100.001 - £150,'00 
fO - £51,000 
£250,001 • £308,001 
£100.001 - £150.101 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
fl00.001 - £150,000 
OVCR HOO.OOO 
OWER i400,OOO 
fO • £50.000 
£0 - £51.001 
f200.001 • £250.000 
fSo,OOl - £100.010 
£200,001 - £250.000 
to - £50.000 
£200.001 - £250.000 
tit ~ £50.000 
£0 - £50,000 
£150,001 - £200,'00 
t50.001 - £100.010 
£Q - £50.000 
£0 - £5IhOOO 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
£100.001 - £150.000 
•••••••••••••••••••• 




£150.001 - £200.000 
OVER HOO,OOO 
£150,001 - t200,000 
£1 .. £50,000 
£50.001 - fl00,000 
£15D.OOl - f200.100 
£50.001 - £100.010 
f250,001 - f300,QOO 




fa - £50,000 
fO - £50.000 
OVER £"00.000 
f50,001 - £100.000 
£50,001 - £100,000 
OVER i400,OOO 
f50.001 - £100,000 
f II - f50,OOO 
f200,001 - £250,000 
•••••••••••••••••••• 




ta - £5ChOOO 
fa - £50,000 
f 2 50 .0 01 - f 3 a a •• 0 0 
f50.001 - fl00,000 
f50,001 - £100,010 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
£150.001 - f200.100 
fl0o,001 - £150,000 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
fa - L50.0oo 
L50,001 - tlDo,aao 
OyeR HOO, 000 
fO - L50.000 
£250.001 - £300,000 
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TABLE 3 
TYPE OF BUSINESS 
Type Number of Firms 
One-man business 22 
Partnership 15 
Private company 35 





Sales Number of Firms 
£0 - £50,000 18 
£50,001 - £100,000 11 
£100,001 - £150,000 7 
£150,001 - £200,000 5 
£200,001 - £250,000 4 
£250,001 - £300,000 4 
£300,001 - £350,000 0 
£350,001 - £400,000 0 
Over £400,000 8 
Total 57 
* Firms were as ked to give their last fiscal 
year I s sales figure excluding VAT. 
--- ,- PTNO 'TltAINNO fO'rAL 
1 2 •••••••• 0 2 
I 11 2 2 15-
S 1 1 0 :2 • 16 1 4 21 5 5 1 0 6 
6 12 2 1 15 
1 5 •••••••• • 5 • 3 3 1 7 9 2 •••••••• II 2 
11 6 •••••••• 0 6 
11 47 3 0 50 
12 513 35 " 89 13 1 2 a 3 
U 1 •••••••• 0 _1 
15 • • a 13 .. U. 4 1 13 5 
17 15 •••••••• a 15 
18 2 2 II 4 
19 16 3 0 19 
21 1 •••••••• 0 1 
21 1 1 1 3 
22 " •••••••• 0 4 23 " 2 • 6 2" 2 •••••••• I , 
25 5 •••••••• 0 5 
26 1 •••••••• a 1 
27 1 •••••••• 0 1 
28 , •••••••• I 10 
2') 1 1 II 2 
30 2 •••••••• 0 2 
31 1 •••••••• 0 1 
32 1 2 0 , 
33 ~ •••••••• 1 5 
34 27 1 I 28 
35 25 2 1 28 
36 513 •••••••• 3 53 
37 1 1 I 2 
38 2 " 0 6 39 11 1 1 13 
4O l' 6 1 14 
41 10 1 0 11 
"2 7 1 1 .'"9 
43 2 1 0 3 
44 52 2 3 57 
45 , 2 3 14 
"60 2 3 2 7 
47 2 2 0 4 
48 20 1 a 21 
49 5 •••••••• 1 6 
513 7 I 1 9 
51 18 •••••••• 2 20 
52 3 •••••••• 0 3 
53 2 1 a 3 
54 5 2 0 7 
55 5 1 2 8 
56 3 3 • 6 
57 5 5 1 11 
58 2 •••••••• 0 2 
59 3 1 a 44 
60 1 1 1 3 
61 " •••••••• 13 
4 
62 3 •••••••• a 3 
63 3 2 2 
7 
6" 5 •••••••• 0 5 3 0 6 65 3 15 
66 
, 2 4 
5 1 13 12 67 





3 " 0 
7 
70 a 19 
71 18 1 0 7 
1'2 2 5 ....u 73 ..!! --1 ..-Z 
~ ill ..£I. ill. Total 
8.15 1.82 .64 
10.61 
Average 
76.8" 17.2~ 6.0" 100" Percentage 
S'(M]l)LS: 
iMFLOY - full-time employees 
PTNO - part-tiae employees 
TRAINliO - trainBes 
~.."..ft1t - 0 
1 ItCION 
a IIlTL. EcaNOM' 
3 SCOTLAND 
• UeK. 












17 IITl. ECONO'" 
18 SCOTLAND 
11! SCOTLAND 

























.S LOCAL COM"'UNITY 
46 IITL. EC ONOMY 
47 LOCAL CO""'UNITY 
48 SCOTLAND 









58 LOCAL COR"'UNITY 
59 REGION 
60 LOCAL CO~"'UNIT' 
61 SCOTLAND 
62 LOCAL CO "''''U N ITY 
63 INTl. ECONO"'Y '4 U.K. 
65 LOCAL COPl"'UNITY 
66 LOCAL CO"HUN ITY 
'7 LOCAL C,,""'UNITY 
&8 LOCAL COIIIMUNITY 
" lEGION 
70 LOCAL COMMUNITY 
71 LOCAL COIIIHUNITY 
72 SCOTLAND 











































































P1MKT - main market 
SHARE _ percentage share of main market 
SALES _ last fiscal lear's sales revenue 
.~,. •• .,...,....,...,...~.,..- not known 
SALES 
iO - i50.000 
aYE. £4QO.0I. 
fO - i50.000 
fl ••• 001 - f150.000 
fO - £50.001 
t251.001 • f300.aoo 
fIOI.O.1 - flS0,OGO 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
£100.001 - £lso,ooe 
OYER f400,OOI 
OVER £400.000 
fO - iSO.OOO 
fO - £50. 000 
f201.001 - £250.000 
£50 •• 01 - fl10,000 
£20 •• 001 e f250.000 
£0 - £50.000 
£20 •• 001 - f250.000 
fa - £50,000 
to - l50,000 
115.,001 - £200,000 
L5D.aOl - 1110,000 
fa - f50.000 
!O - f50.000 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
£10.,001 - £150,000 
•••••••••••••••••••• 




f15.,OII - l2DO.OOO 
OVER f400.00e 
flS'.OOl - !200.000 
to - f50.000 
£SO,'Ol - £180.000 
f151.001 - 1200.000 
£50.101 - £110,000 
£2S'.001 - £300,000 




to - fsa.ooo 
{O - f50.000 
OYER f400.000 
£50.001 - £110.000 
£50.001 - £100.000 
aVER l400.000 
{SO,DOI - £110.000 
£0 - i50.000 
{200,OOI - £250.000 
•••••••••••••••••••• 




fa - iSO,ODO 
{O - £50,000 
L250,OOl - £lOO.OOO 
£50.001 - £100,000 
150,001 - £110.000 
• ••••••••••••••••••• 
l150.001 - £200.000 
l100.001 • 1150.000 
• ••••••••••••••••••• 
to - i50.000 
l50.001 - £110,000 
OVER i-OO.ODO 
LO - £50.000 
l250.0Dl - £300.000 
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Final Remar k 
The primary objective set forth at the outset of this 
research project was to establish a data base, rich in both 
quantitative and qualitative information. Once the fieldwork 
was completed, the obtained data was mounted on the computer 
using the Scientific Informational Retrieval (SIR) package for the 
purpose of analysis and storage. SIR is unique with respect 
to other computer pac kages in that it is able to handle not onl y 
the numeric information of the administered questionnaire, but 
also the textual information of the semi-structured interview. 
It is expected that in time further information from the data 
base will be gleaned for other academic projects. 
CHAPTER V 
Competitive Strategy: Some Evidence 
Introduction 
The formulation and implementation of competitive strategy 
in pursuit of competitive advantage is inextricabl y related to 
entrepreneurship. The dynamic process of strategic choice or 
(using Schumpeter' s phrase) "carrying out new combinations" is 
fundamental to any business enterprise that intends to survive 
and develop. Conditions in a firm's environment are always 
changing and require either proactive or reactive adjustment on 
the part of the firm. 
In this Chapter, evidence from the semi-structured interviews 
conducted amongst 17 firms from the sample is examined. As 
discussed in Chapter IV, the semi-structured interview adopts 
Porter's [1980 and 1985] framework in assessing how a firm 
actuall y interprets its market and industry and the consequent 
impact that interpretation has on moulding its competitive strategy. 
The first section analyses the competitive forces - Le. rivalry 
(existing and potential), customers, suppliers, and substitutes -
that influence, if not determine, the generic competitive strategy 
firms undertake. The second section looks at the generic com-
peti ti ve strategies - i. e. low cost, differentiation, and focus -
and how they are implemented and sustained. Using Porter's 
"value chain" analysis (as discussed in Chapter III) is a valuable 
means by which to systematicall y assess the activities a firm 
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performs in designing, producing, marketing, and distributing its 
products and services. Competitive advantage is ultimatel y 
deri ved from these acti vi ties. Finall y, the third section con-
siders the defensive strategies firms pursue in order to sustain 
competi ti ve advantage in their chosen market niches. Specificall y , 
increasing barriers to entry, increasing retaliation which challengers 
can expect, lowering the inducement for attack, using industry 
senarios to examine deterrence possibilities, and responding to 
attack are ascertained. The approach is intergrative, rather 
than examining each firm individuall y. 
Competi ti ve Forces 
Ri valry (Existing and Potential). In examining the extent 
of rivalry, it is helpful to do so within the context of levels 
of industry concentration - I.e. low, medium and high. Given 
the nature of the study being concerned with new small firms, 
it might well be anticipated that the large majority (if not all) 
of the sampled firms would not be in highl y concentrated industries, 
where entry (and exit) is re·stricted. In fact, out of the 17 
firms examined, 7 are regarded as operating in low concentration 
industries, with 7 and 3 considered operating in medium and high 
concentrated industries, respectively. 
Where low concentration is assumed to exist, the firms 
are in such industries as service, distribution, and manufacturing. 


















Theatrical Props Mig. 
All of the firms, except firm 61, regarded rivalry as being 
n generall y strong n to "fierce n in all respects (i. e. price, quality, 
service, etc.). And, all firms are confronted by numerous 
similarl y-sized competitors with similarl y- small (insignificant) 
market shares. In fact, all firms noted market shares of no 
more than 5 percent (and usuall y less than 1 percent) of their 
main mar ket . The exception, firm 61, considered competition 
to be "generally weak" and believed it held a market share of 
over 20 percent of its main market. However, the lack of regard 
for its rivals may be attributed to the "rapid growth" in market 
demand whereby "firms react to, rather than look for, orders". 
Firm 61' s inclusion in the low industry concentration category 
is based on the fact that it is quite small (£7000 in total assets) 
and is faced with a large number of similarly-sized competitors. 
(viz. 11-30). 
All of the firms indicated that entry and exit barriers 
were low. For example, little capital investment was necessary; 
e. g. premises coul d be leased or "one could start from home". 
Also, Ii ttle or no product differentiation existed, (i. e. regarding 
physical attributes). Consequent! y, many of the firms (viz. 1, 
9, 10, 13, 30 and 61) tried to place their emphasis on competence, 
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service, deli very and sheer effort in order to acquire competitive 
advantage. Differentiation of products does appl y for firms 5 
and 13. However, this characteristic has more to do with the 
nature of their industries (Le. knitwear and holiday tours) where 
intensive market fragmentation results from an increasing number 
of close sub sti tutes. Firm 5 stated that their pursuit of product 
differentiation was simpl y in design of knitwear, which was in 
response to a growing fashion-oriented market. Firm 13 declared 
that in the tour industry "there is as much specialisation or 
differentiation as there are holidays". It is therefore easy 
to see how product differentiation as displayed in these two industries 
can actuall y attract, rather than deter, new entrants. 
The primary obstacle to entry for these firms is customer 
contacts. According to firm 30, because of strong interfirm 
rivalry, establishing a profitable customer base might take 2-3 
years. Firm 13 stated that without the co-operation of hotels. 
car rentals, and principall y travel agencies, customers were 
unlikel y to ever find out about the firm. To a lesser extent, 
the presence of intermittent overcapacity is a deterrent to entry. 
This barrier was particularl y noted by firms 13 and 61 because 
of the seasonal nature of their products. The possible use of 
an entry deterring price was onI y cited by firm 9. 
There are 7 firms considered in medium concentrated indus-













Computer Software Mfg. 
Cassette Tape Mig. 
Electronics 
Bulk Bag Mfg. 
Fencing Mfg. 
Printing 
Similar to those firms in low concentrated industries, these firms 
regard competition as "generally strong" to "fierce". Also, all 
of these firms, aside from firm 54, have insignificant market 
shares (viz. less than 5 percent). (Firm 54 believed that it 
held 11 - 20 percent share of its main market - i.e. Scotland.) 
However, these firms differ from those in the low concentrated 
industries in that they are generall y confronted with fewer and 
larger rivals; these rivals sometimes include multinational companies. 
These firms also differ from those in low concentrated industries 
in that they are on the whole much larger in size with total assets 
ranging from £50,000 to £130,000. 
Nearl y all of the firms are in expanding markets to the 
extent where congenial and supportive intraindustry relations exist 
between small and large firms. The small firms are actual! y 
able to thrive because of catering to the small orders or contracts 
in which large firms have no interest. Moreover, there is the 
existence of subcontracting work given out to small firms by the 
large firms. For instance, firm 25 fills an important niche in 
the electronics industry by designing and manufacturing test equip-
ment for the large firms. In this case, the principal customer 
is "rival" firms. Because of standard large-volume production 
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facilities, large firms are unable and not wanting to satisfy 
specialised and small volume demands. Consequentl y, there is 
a recognised need in certain industries dominated by large firms 
for small firms. 
The extent of barriers to entry and exit is mixed for these 
firms. Generall y, attempting high volume production would be 
difficul t for small firms because they would confront large rivals 
who are well-astablished with high strategic stakes, control 
significant scale economies, and maintain substantial financial 
reserves to effecti vel y counter any threat to their market segments. 
The exceptions to this concern are illustrated by firms 17, 52 and 
54. In the computer software industry where there are many 
multinational companies, firm 17 believed that there were generall y 
low entry and exit barriers. Because of continued significant 
market growth (I.e. 15 - 30 percent/year), increased value added 
relati ve to fixed costs, no intermittent overcapacity, dynamic 
technological advances, and tremendous product differentiation 
or market segmentation, there is considered plenty of room for 
manoeuvrability and entry. Technical expertise and knowledge 
of the industry are the primary obstacles. Firm 25 indicated 
that similar characteristics appl y to the electronics industry. 
However, attempting high volume· production woul d be met with 
fierce resistance by the larger, more established, firms in the 
industry. 
Firm 52 also argued that low entry and exit barriers exist, 
but for entirel y different reasons, in the chestnut fencing industry. 
This industry has actuall y declined over the years due to lack 
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of suppl y. Consequentl y, customers have had to turn to more 
expensi ve and inferior types of fencing. It is now a matter 
of re-educating the customer. At present, there are onl y a few 
firms in the industry with the larger firms located in southern 
England where chestnut is grown. And, they do not pose a threat 
(despi te their large scale economies) to the Scottish and Northern 
Ireland markets because of prohibitive delivery costs and satis-
faction with present mar kets. Firm 52 has basicall y rediscovered 
the market for chestnut fencing and is rapidl y expanding as a 
resul t. However, because it believes it has only reached 5 
percent of the market, the potential for all firms, whether existing 
or potential, is virtuall y barrier-free. 
Finall y, in yet another set of unique circumstances, firm 
54 has actually directly confronted the industry leader (a multi-
national's subsidiary) which has resulted in dramatic growth and 
increased market share for the firm at the expense of the multi-
national rival. In fact, the multinational has had to subsidise 
its subsidiary's losses since firm 54 entered the industry. 
What is particularl y unusual about this situation is that lamination 
of printed materials is a homogeneous product which should allow 
the mul tina tional with its presumab Ie large scale economies and 
substantial financial resources to dominate the industry. Of 
course, it did prior to firm 54' sentry. However, because of 
firm 54' s access to the most productive machinery available com-
bined with significantl y lower overheads and nurtured personal 
customer relations, it has now put the industry leader on the 
defensi ve. The success of firm 54 has nonetheless substantiall y 
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increased the level of entry and exit barriers. Ini tiall y, upon 
entering the industry, the firm was fortunate in being able to 
acquire the necessary modern machinery because of an exceptional 
and inexpensive lease arrangement. Now, however, the suppliers 
expect onl y to sell, rather than lease, its machinery and at a 
substantial price (nearly £150,OOO/machine). Moreover, the buyer 
would have to wait 18 months. 
to existing and potential rivals. 
This has been a major deterrent 
Because lamination of printed 
materials is a homogeneous product customers are highl y price 
sensiti ve. Consequent! y, firms have to reI y on cutting unit costs 
in order to be profitable. The extent to which firm 54 is able 
to exert its low cost position is revealed in its belief of main-
taining a 15 percent ftelbow-room" in pricing. And, to a lesser 
extent, intermittent overcapacity does exist in the industry as 
a barrier due to the seasonality factor in demand, (e. g. calendars 
and Christmas cards). 
In firms 22 and 34, the extent of entry and exit barriers 
is sub stantial . In the cassette tape manufacturing industry, firm 
22 sees absolutel y no scope for entry in the high volume segment 
of the market where very large and long-established firms (e. g. 
EM! and Decca) with huge scale economies and financial resources 
and high strategic stakes exist. Small firms (with rather large 
scale economies in their own right) are left with catering to small 
vol ume demands. Often a penny can make a difference in determining 
who wins anyone contract. Entry deterring pricing is evident 
in all segments of the mar ket given product homogeneity. Similar 
to firm 54, firm 22 was able to successfull y enter the market 
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because of its highl y productive machinery. However, in the 
case of firm 22, it had to spend 5 profitless years developing 
the right machinery. The emphasis on low-cost production is 
due to product homogeneity. Firm 34 faces an identical set of 
circumstances in the bul k bag .industry. The onl y difference 
is that its successful entry was based on developed customer 
contacts and industry experience acquired by the owner-managers 
prior to the firm's inception. Also, firm 34 has some limited 
scope for product differentiation on a smaller scale which the 
large established firms have no hrterest or capability due to 
inflexible and large production facilities. 
Firms 2, 15, and 32 are regarded as being in high concen-








Security Printer's Blankets 
Cosmetics 
Acrobatic Aeroplane Mfg. 
Exceptional circumstances and highl y specialised products have 
allowed for these new small firms to come into existence. 
Firm 2 is confronted by five large (multinational) rivals 
throughout the world. Nonetheless, despi te its relati vel y small 
size (£110, 000 total assets), it has been successful in attaining 
11 - 20 percent of the int ernational market. And, it intends 
to make continual inroads in the market; viz. it expects market 
growth of 10 percent with 20 percent growth in its size over 
the next year. The firm's expected continued success is principall y 
95 
attributed to patent protection on some of its products and previous 
experience in the industry, which established necessary and pro-
minent customer contacts (e. g. Bank of England). (The firm 
is the result of a management buyout). Not surprisingl y, the 
industry is characterised by prohibitive entry and exit barriers, 
which consist of large capital requirements, patent protection, 
absence of channel access, specialised machinery, sophisticated 
technical expertise, and high strategic stakes. 
Firm 15 is perhaps an "unfair" example of a new small 
firm in that it is a franchise. Although it was onl y started 
two years ago with a modest investment of £16,000, the franchisor 
has long been established as a large manufacturer with an extensive 
distribution and retail network throughout the U.K. Consequentl y, 
this "new small" firm has been able to overcome the significant 
entry and exit barriers of large capital requirements, intensive 
advertising, and high strategic stakes of a few long-established 
rivals that exist in the cosmetics industry. The large degree 
of product differentiation in the industry has assisted the firm 
in making a distinctive impact in the industry. Specificall y, 
it has concentrated on inexpensive pac kag .... ing and a refill policy. 
The acrobatic aeroplane industry has long been dominated 
by two large American companies producing expensive, high-
performance aeroplanes. The industry is one with tremendous I y 
high entry and exit barriers such as large capital requirements 
and stiff government regulations regarding inspection, safety, 
specification of all parts, in addition to registration and licensing. 
With the assistance of a large government grant, vast previous 
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experience on the part of the owner-manager in the aeroplane 
industry, and identification of a large gap in the market for 
inexpensive, yet high-performance acrobatic (" ki t") planes, firm 
32 was able to overcome what would otherwise be insurmountable 
barriers to entry. All of the conditions were necessary, but 
not individually sufficient, for the firm to enter the industry. 
And, given the large capital requirements with the return on 
investment being long term, exit barriers are also considerable; 
it takes a minimum of six months to build and test one plane 
before it can be put on the mar ket. 
Customers. The firms I customers invariabl y act as an 
important competitive force. There is a tendency for a positive 
relations hi p between customer leverage and price sensi ti vi ty; 
I.e. the greater customer leverage, the more sensitive is price 
and v ice ver sa. This relationship does occur for all the firms 
except 11, 54 and 61. Those firms (viz. 1,2,5,10,22,30, 
34 and 52) that experience notable customer leverage and price 
sensiti vi ty exhibit similar characteristics. First, all of these 
firms I products are homogeneous or close substitutes with respect 
to their rival s I products. Consequentl y, the extent of customers I 
switching costs is much reduced. Second, all of these firms 
noted that there is a strong dependence on large (high volume) 
customers who consequent! y tend to exert a great deal of leverage 
and are quite price sensitive. And, third, most of the firms I 
customers are well-informed of the firms I rivals. 
A few firms (viz. 22, 30, 34 and 52) expressed a need 
to acti vel y cuI ti vate personal relationships with customers 
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and placed a premium on delivery and service in order to develop 
customer loyal ty and therefore increase switching costs which 
would lower customer leverage and price sensiti vi ty. For example, 
firm 22 ~tated that it made an "annual pilgrimage" to its largest 
customer in England to make a "social call". And, firm 3 0 does 
not simpl y sell wine, but offers to make-up wine lists and provide 
"own-label" bottles for its restaurant customers. Al though this 
-s-ervice enhances loyalty and price insensitivity, firm 30 indicated 
that it is onl y effective as long as its customers are experiencing 
"comfortable" performance. Finall y, firm 34 found that in spite 
of selling a homogeneous good, loyalty could quite easil y be gained 
through taking a personal interest in their customers' business 
and providing a prompt service. Most of its customers recognized 
the importance of the firm's product in enhancing their products' 
quality and the small cost of the firm's product relative to their 
total costs, which helped alleviate price sensitivity. Also, 
customers were unlikel y to look to other firms if they were 
"generall y satisfied" because they had an aversion to "disrupting 
continui ty" . This conservative approach has also meant a lack 
of interest in backward integration. 
There are a number of firms (viz 2, 9, 15, 17, 25 and 
32) that are actuall y successful in maintaining a significant degree 
of customer dependenc y; in other words, high switching costs 
and price insensitivity are appliable to certain customers. Four 
of the firms (i. e. 2, 17, 25 and 32) are involved in the development 
and manufacturing of high technology products in high profit (growth) 
industries. In the case of firm 2, for example, patent protection 
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of certain products exists to insure high customer dependence. 
And, in the case of firm 25, it plays an essential role in the 
electronics industry by providing test equipment for larger firms 
in the industry. Test equipment by definition is produced in 
small volume, which large firms cannot justify on a cost or time 
effective basis. Consequent! y, the emphasis is primaril y on 
quality and "quick turnaround", rather than price. The only 
concern of customer dependency is the performance of its customers; 
"if they are doing well, we are doing well". 
Firms 9 and 15 do not appreciate the same degree of customer 
dependency as do firms 2, 17, 25 and 32 because of less technic-
all y oriented products and the availability of close substitutes. 
Price insensitivity is lower for firms 9 and 15 with "elbow-room" 
in pricing being no greater than 10 percent compared with the 
other firms enjoying "elbow-room" of more than 15 percent. 
Firm 9' s major customer (which accounts for 50 percent of its 
sales revenue) is highl y dependent on the repair of a particular 
type of automobile and places a premium on quality workmanship. 
Firm 15 maintains high customer dependence once the customer 
has tried its products (i. e. cosmetics) and found it with the 
necessary quality, despite the existence of close substitutes. 
Its cusomers are "obsessed" with their health and improving 
their looks; "once they find the right products, they stay with 
them" . Therefore, customer motivation can be considerable. 
The firm also seeks to increase switching costs of customers by 
keep-ing them informed about established and new products. 
Firms 11, 54 and 61 are exceptions to the positive relation-
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ship between customer leverage and price sensitivity. Firm 
11, despite price sensitivity (only 4 - 6 percent "elbow-room") 
attributed to homogeneous products (viz. food items) and generall y 
strong competition, does enjoy considerable low customer concen-
tration. The largest customer accounts for onl y 15 percent of 
the firm's total sales, with other customers accounting for no 
more than 5 percent each. Consequentl y, there is little dependence 
on anyone customer. And, even though switching costs are low, 
customers do not tend to "shop around"; customers are quite 
conservative and not well informed about rival firms. Firm 54 
has a similar situation whereby customers are price sensitive 
because of product homogeneity. However, the firm is able to 
exert a relati vel y large degree of customer dependence because 
of its recognised tremendously low cost advantage over its rivals 
and fostered personal relationships with customers. Consequentl y, 
it enjoys more than 15 percent "elbow-room" in pricing. Finally, 
firm 61 is confronted with high customer concentration; it is 
dependent on 5 major customers. These customers provide "sporadic" 
business and are well-informed of the firm's competitors. Nonethe-
less, because products (viz. theatrical props) are quite specialised 
and are important to the quality of customers' products, customer s 
are somewhat insensitive to price. This is reflected in the 
firm's comfortable pricing "elbow-room" of 10 - 15 percent. 
Firm 13 is quite unique compared to the other firms in 
discussing customers as a competitive force. The firm is 
dependent on other tourist-related firms (e. g. travel agencies, 
hotels, and car rentals) for access to customers. The customer s , 
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on the other hand, tend to be dependent on these "middlemen" 
to link them with tour firms. Customers are often "upmarket", 
concerned with convenience, and ignorant of the industry. There-
fore, they are likel y to be insensitive to price. Customers I 
moti vation tends to be quite strong because of their recognition 
of tour firms to actually saVe them money in terms of total holiday 
costs, which furthers price insensitivity. 
Suppliers. The influence of suppliers on the firms is 
considered at three levels: (1) positive; (2) neutral; and 
(3) negative. The great majority of firms (viz. 1, 9, 10, 13, 
15, 22, 25, 30, 52 and 61) regard suppliers as having a positive 
influence on their conduct and performance. Generall y, the firms 
expressed an awareness of a large number of suppliers offering 
similar (competitive) products or inputs, quality and service with 
li ttle or no threat of forward integration. Consequentl y, switching 
costs are quite low or even non-existent; as one firm stated, 
"it is merely a matter of picking up the telephone". Some firms 
noted that suppliers could be "played-off" one another in terms 
of price and delivery. Moreover, suppliers were often attributed 
with relieving cash flow difficulties. For example, firms 22 
and 52 said that their suppliers kept them informed of expected 
shortages which allowed for adjustments in ordering to maintain 
necessary inventory levels. Firm 30 appreciated a two month 
credit policy with its suppliers, given that it had a one month 
credit policy with its customers. 
Firms 5, 11, 17 and 34 consider their suppliers as having 
a neutral impact on their operations. Each of these firms noted 
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a high concentration of suppliers providing essentiall y undif-
ferentiated products or inputs. Also, forward integration by 
suppliers was considered common by firms 5, 11 and 34. However, 
switching costs were recognised as being quite low by all four 
firms. The reason is that the products or inputs tend to be 
homogeneous or standardised. In the computer software industry, 
for example, firm 17 stated that because research and development 
costs were exorbitant, component suppliers opted for standardised 
products emphasising high volume with low profit margins. In 
essence, the real threat of forward integration and the reliance 
on onl y a small number of suppliers was being offset by the 
competi ti ve pricing of undifferentiated products or inputs. 
Finall y, firms 2, 32 and 54 asserted that suppliers actuall y 
exert a negative force in their industries. These industr ies 
are characterised by high industry and supplier concentration, 
great (or at least potential) profitability, and specialised products 
and lor manufacturing processes. Consequently, it is of little 
surprise that suppliers have considerable market power. Firm 
2 stated that it was entirel y reliant on one supplier for certain 
inputs that were "almost like prototype work". Firm 32 is also 
largel y dependent on one supplier and the consequences have been 
dire. It was six months behind in production because of the 
supplier's delay. Moreover, every input has to be tested, 
approved and licensed before being sold by suppliers in the aero-
plane industry. It is no wonder so few suppliers exist. Firm 
32 is now considering backward integration as a means of alleviating 
much of its suppl y problem. Lastl y, firm 54 has experienced 
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tremendous growth (54 percent gross profits) because of its 
superior low cost advantage attributed to possessing the most 
modern machinery in the ind'.lstry and insignificant overheads. 
At its inception, the firm was able to acquire the machinery 
because of an exceptionall y inexpensive lease arrangement. Now 
that the supplier of this machinery has recognised its significance, 
the machinery is onl y available after an 18 month wait and at 
a very high price and "cash on the barrel". 
Substitutes. Finall y, in considering the influence of sub-
stitute products/services, it is useful to do so by placing firms 
in the following categories: ( 1) close substitutes; (2) infer lor 
substitutes; (3) no available substitutes; and (4) creating sub-
sti tutes. Firms 5, 10, and 15 are in industries with a proliferation 
of close substitutes and extensive market segmentation that tends 
towards overlapping and even replacement. In the cosmetic 
industry, for example firm 15 states that because customers are 
"obsessed" with health and beauty, they are always looking for 
something new. Consequentl y, the industry is constant! y seeking 
to not onl y improve quality, but introduce new products. And, 
in the knitwear industry, firm 5 argues that the market is becoming 
increasingl y fragmented, whereby both new and estab lished firms 
are, more and more, emphasising differentiation resulting in close 
sub sti tutes . This trend in the industry is in reaction to a more 
fashion-oriented mar ket. Customers in both the knitwear and 
cosmetic industries have a high propensity to substitute. In 
the cleaning industry, however, where the propensity to substitute 
is low, firm 10 indicated that the emphasis has to be on salesman-
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ship" and promotion in convincing customers of the effectiveness 
of their cleaning materials. The relative value /price of al ter-
nati ve products is otherwise not discerned by the customers. 
Customers are basicall y immune to altering their purchasing habits. 
In all three industries, the availability of such a large number 
of close substitutes has significantl y contributed to the fierce 
competi tion all three firms admit facing. 
Firms 2 , 11, 22, 30, 32 and 52 are in industries where 
substitutes are inferior or have a low relative value/price. 
Nonetheless, the performance of these firms tends to be mixed. 
And, inferiority has differen t connotations. For firms 2, 11 
and 52, inferiority is concerned with inputs or products that clearl y 
lack the right quality. Firm 2 noted that a major rival had 
introduced technical substitutes (i. e. man-made fabrics) with no 
success. Customers are rather conservative and prefer traditional 
materials. Firm 11 also remarked about the conservative attitude 
of customers being responsible for the lack of success of substitutes. 
Firm 52 has found that its principal customers will purchase soft-
wood fencing onl y if chestnut fencing is in short suppl y. Customers 
are concerned with longevity which softwood is ill-suited. Softwood, 
however, would be preferable to the firm because production costs 
would be reduced "by 10 percent. 
Firms 22 and 32 find that substitutes in their industries 
are simpl y too "upmarket" or overpriced to be viable. According 
to firm 22, "it will take 20 years before the cassette tape becomes 
obsolete. " And, there is no reason from the customers' view-
point to want more quality than the digital cassette can provide; 
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"the existing product already has too much quality." Because 
of customer satisfaction in the cassette tape's quality, it will 
be the large, high-profit firms who will introduce digital cassettes 
in the market; they are the ones with the necessary financial 
resources and research and development acti vi ties. Firm 32 
states that "up-market" acrobatic aeroplanes are twice as expensive 
as their aeroplane which provides similar performance. 
Firm 30 is enjoying a growth period in the consumption 
of wine at the expense of beer and spirits. Wine is particular I y 
gaining popularity in hotels and restaurants, the firm's major 
customers. There is a growing preference for wine because more 
and more people are taking their holidays to the Continent where 
more is consumed and simpl y because it is now fashionable, parti-
cularl y amongst young people. 
Firms 1, 9, 13, 54 and 61 contend that no substitutes are 
available, or likely to be, in their industries. In service 
industries, like auto repair and blind cleaning, in which firms 
1 and 9 respecti vel y exist, it is quite understandable. As firm 
9 pointedl y stated, "Robots can't do smashed windows. n Firm 
54 asserts that printed materials can either be laminated, varnished 
or neither. And, it is the type of printed material that deter-
mines its finishing. Therefore, varnishing is not considered 
as a substitute for lamination. 
no "obvious" substitutes exist. 
Lastl y, firm 61 argues that 
Theatrical costumes are customised 
to suit each particular customer demand. A similar situation 
exists in the holiday tours industry for firm 13. 
Finall y, firms 17, 25 and 34 base their conduct and perfor-
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mance on actual! y creating substitutes. Firm 17 understands 
that the computer software industry is fundamentall y concerned 
wi th continually introducing new products to meet changing 
consumer demands; there are always "new problems, new solutions". 
The firm, however, does not develop new technologies, but rather 
tries to adopt the latest "on-the-shelf" technologies. Firm 25 
designs and manufactures test equipment for the larger firms in 
the electronics industry; consequentl y, it is al way s "one step 
ahead" . And, similarl y, firm 34 is always reacting to unique 
customer needs and specifications and, in effect, producing new 
types of bulk baks. 
Competi ti ve Strategy 
Differentiation. Onl y firm 5 pursues this generic strategy, 
whereby it tries to appeal to all market segments in the knitwear 
industry. Its source of differentiation or uniqueness is design 
(viz. geometric patterns). In time, firm 5 may adjust its 
strategy towards a more focused approach, concentrating on particular 
customer types. However, because the firm has onl y been in 
existence for two years, it is admittedly quite ignorant of 
channels, customer locations and customer types. And, even 
though the firm desires such information, it feels it is "too costl y 
or even impossible to obtain" at this time. Firm 5 is very 
much constrained by its size (£7000 in total assets). And, given 
that the market is quite fashion conscious, it might be unwise 
to concentrate onl y on certain segments. Therefore, all things 
considered, the firm regards a focus strategy as being riskYil 
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Despi te firm 5 I S ignorance of market and industry segments, 
it is quite aware of its own value chain and its possible recon-
figuration to accentuate its uniqueness without unnecessaril y increas-
ing its costs. The firm realises that if it is to improve its 
competitive advantage, it must place greater emphasis on the value 
acti vi ty, mar keting and sales. It has been modestl y successful 
by preparing and distributing a catalogue featuring its products; 
this has "put a thumbprint on design". This action can onl y 
help emphasise differentiation without jeopardising its costs, 
especiall y since a grant was acquired for this purpose. However, 
a greater assignment of assets and costs to marketing and sales 
is still necessary; this value acti vi ty is fundamentall y important 
as a source of differentiation. 
Elsewhere in its value chain (viz. operations), firm 5 is 
contemplating reducing its dependence on outwork by purchasing 
new equipment. Purchasing new equipment will increase firm 
5' s sensitivity to the cost driver, capacity utilisation. New 
machinery is a fixed cost which creates a penalty for under-
utilisation. By maintaining a dependence on outwork, sensitivity 
to capacity utilisation is reduced since outwork is a variable 
cost. Reconfiguring the value activity, operations, with the 
purchase of new machinery, can onl y be justified with an appropriate 
(higher) volume based on increased sales. This concern clearl y 
reflects back on the critical importance of the value activity, 
mar keting and sales. 
Low cost. No firm was undertaking a cost leadership 
strategy. This is not particularl y surprising given that such 
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a strategy usuall y requires a firm to hold a large mar ket share, 
whereby significant economies of scale can be full y realised [as 
discussed in Chapter 31. And, none of the firms are on a large 
enough scale or long established to be the lowest cost producers 
market-wide; capital requirments are general! y prohi bi ti ve. 
Focus on differentiation. Firms 9,11,13,17,25 and 
61 all focus on certain market segments with an emphasis on differ-
entiation, particularl y with respect to products. Gi ven the small 
size of the firms, it is not surprising that in every case, except 
firm 17 location is regarded as a strategical! y relevant segment; 
i. e. the U. K. or a particular region is considered the main mar keto 
The exception, firm 17, despite its regard for the international 
economy as its main market, focuses on just one market segment, 
product variety (viz. computer software). It hopes to eventuall y 
expand into related segments (e. g. computer hardware). But, 
first it wants to build on its present products (referred to by 
thefirm as "bootstrapping n ) • 
Product variety, in addition to customer location, is an 
important strategic segment to firms 9, 11, 25, and 61. Firm 
9, for example, has been successful at establishing and sustaining 
its strategy of providing top quality auto repair for a particular 
make of automobile. Firms 11, 25, and 61 have also been 
successful because of their expertise and quality being superior, 
as well as unique. 
Customer type, in addition to customer location, is a sig-
nificant strategic segment for firms 13 and 25. Firm 13 caters 
primarily to American tourists in Scotland who want "culture with 
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a 'K'''·, th t d ese cus omer s are concerne with" seeing a bit of 
the country, visiting woollen mills, and staying in the right hotels." 
Sustaining the firm's strategic position is achieved through culti-
vation of customer channels (viz. hotels, travel agencies and car 
rentals). Firm 25 provides test equipment (viz. circuit boards) 
to larger firms in the electronics industry in Scotland on a subcon-
tracting basis. Sustaining this focus strategy rests on establishing 
a reputation for providing the right quality) necessary. (usuall y 
low) volume, and "quick turnaround n • 
Focus on low cost. Firms 1, 22, 52 and 54 have homogeneous 
products and are limited to certain strategic segments, where 
competitive advantage is achieved through low cost. Firm l' s 
strategic segments include customer location (the region), customer 
types (hospitals, schools and factories), and channels (safety 
and/or hygiene officers). The key cost drivers are the firm's 
discretionary policies regarding labour and type of customers. 
Firm 1 believes that it has the absolute minimum number of 
employees. And, by focusing on large, rather than small, 
customers, such as hospitals, allows the firm to effecti vel y 
utilise its capacity (labour). The use of safety and/or hygiene 
officers are effective channels in gaining access to hospitals, school s 
and factories. The firm felt there was little opportunity to 
reconfigure its value chain to improve its low cost position. 
Firm 22 must be content to stay in the "competitive fringe" 
of the tape cassette industry, where it satisfies the small volume 
needs in the UK market. Lack of size or capacity and domination 
of the upper-end (high volume) of the market by large (multi-
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national) firms means that the firm will "never get a famous pop 
group" . 
Perhaps, the firm's most sig:lificant cost driver is timing. 
When the firm entered the industry 10 years ago, low volume 
demand was not being effecti vel y satisfied. However, the firm 
believes that potential entrants in even the bottom-end (low volume) 
of the market would not confront many firms with significant scale 
economies in their own right. Having first-mover advantage has 
also allowed the firm to establish a solid customer base. 
The firm recognises that if it is to continue its growth 
it must be prepared to assign more assets and costs to the value 
activity, marketing and sales. At present, assets and costs 
are principall y assigned to operations (viz. labour, materials 
and machinery). Placing greater emphasis on marketing and sales 
would probabl y constitute a reconfiguration of the firm's value 
chain. Wi th an increase in sales revenue, the firm would seek 
to exploit the cost dri ver, scale economies, by becoming more 
automated with an increase in machinery, rather than labour. 
Presentl y, the firm is more concerned with capacity utilisation. 
Firm 54 has achieved what firm 22 hopes to in time; 
it has been able to effecti vel y compete at the upper-end (high 
volume) of the market in Scotland. The combination of the most 
producti ve machinery available and low overheads due to a reliance 
on onl y a few employees have allowed the firm to not onl y confront, 
but also take away market share from its multinational rival, 
the industry leader. The firm intends to improve its low cost 
position further with the purchase of more machinery which will 
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heighten scale economies even further; 
a 54 percent gross profit margin. 
it is currentl y enjoying 
Finall y. firm 52 is experiencing rapid growth primaril y 
because of two cost drivers, timing and location. It has recog-
nised that the demand for chestnut fencing has not been satisfied 
for a long time. Consequentl y, buyers have had to resort to 
inferior types of fencing. The firm believes that it has onl y 
tapped 5 percent of the market; "the potential is tremendous". 
Location is fundamentally important to the firm's success because 
it is the onl y producer in Northern Ireland and one of three in 
Scotland. Most of the rival firms are in southern England where 
chestnut is grown. However, high delivery costs keep them 
from being a viable threat. The firm cannot increase its capacity 
fast enough to satisfy this "rediscovered" mar ket. 
Focus on differentiation and low cost. Firms 2, 10, 15, 
30, 32 and 34 believe that they try to satisfy certain market 
segments by emphasising both differentiation and low cost. Firms 
10 p 15, and 30 are in industries where competition is quite intense, 
customers are very price sensitive, and a large number of close 
substi tutes exist. Consequentl y, the key value activities are 
marketing and sales and operations. Firm 10 tries to differentiate 
its products (i. e. soaps) by altering colour and aroma and com-
missioning a chemist to prepare an entirel y new compound unique 
to the firm. These actions do not affect its costs significantl y. 
Similarl y, firm 30 provides own-label bottles and prepares wine 
lists for its restaurant customers to enhance differentiation without 
negati vel y affecting its costs. Firm 15 avoids "glamourous" 
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packaging as a means of distancing itself from its rivals in the 
cosmetics industry. This differentiation action contributes to 
its emphasis on low cost. The significant cost driver for firms 
10 and 15 is their discretionary policy regarding service and 
deli very. Customers expect prompt deli very and will tend to 
provide further business given they are generall y pleased with 
the products' quality and consider the price reasonable. Relatedl y, 
location is fundamentall y important as a cost driver (particularl y 
for firm 15); being accessible can great! y influence customer 
motivation. 
Firms 2 and 34 manufacture both standardised ("run-of -the-
mill") and specialised products. Consequent! y, there is a dual 
emphasis on low cost and differentiation. Essentiall y, firm 2 
tries to focus on product segments with high value lines. Its 
principal cost driver is its discretionary policy regarding labour 
payments. Firm 2 prefers to have its workers on salaries, rather 
than pay them wages. This policy has resulted in higher 
producti vity. Another cost driver for the firm is learning. 
As employees of the previous (now defunct) firm, the owner-
managers of the present ("phoenix n) firm know which product lines 
to avoid. Essentiall y, sustaining its stategy requires the control 
of salaries and acquiring patents for certain products. 
Firm 34 is primaril y concerned with satisfying the specific 
demands of large intraindustry firms. Location is perhaps the 
most important cost driver. The firm's major supplier and 
principal customers are local. Consequent! y, inventory and 
deli very costs are kept at a minimum and close customer contact 
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is maintained, which ensures exact product specifications and 
quality . Capacity uti! isation is also a significant cost driver; 
overheads are kept at an absolute minimum. The emphasis on 
low cost is attributed to the ease with which imitation can occur, 
despite specialised needs of customers. 
Firm 32 offers a unique and low cost al ternati ve to expensive, 
high-performance acrobatic aeroplanes. Its one-seater, "kit" 
aeroplane can provide similar performance to the rivals' products 
and at "half the price n • The firm is able to achieve its superior 
cost position because of insignificant overheads and labour costs. 
Therefore, capacity utilisation is the cost driver that will sustain 
its cost leadership position. Nonetheless, the critical value 
acti vi ty is not operations, but mar keting and sales. In a sense, 
it is creating a market niche; 
to the firm's success. 
customer awareness is fundamental 
Defensi ve Strategy 
Inreasing barriers to entry. Most of the firms indica ted 
that they did not try and "consciousl y" increase entry barriers. 
These firms attributed lack of size, experience, and market 
infl uence as the fundamental reasons. The firms were intent 
on simply establishing a customer base by emphasising quality 
products, dependable service, prompt delivery, a fair price, 
and personal relationships with customers. The result, hopefull y, 
would be increased customer switching costs. (These characteristics 
of the firms and their attitude influenced many of the responses 
on Defensive Strategy. There was the general feeling that the 
firms were more concerned with creating, rather than defending, 
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market niches.) Some firms went as far as to convey a rather 
cavalier attitude; as one firm pointedl y stated, "My own competi-
ti veness will deter them." 
The outstanding exceptions, firms 22 and 54, were undertaking 
an active policy to increase entry barriers by increasing its scale 
economies with the purchase of capital equipment. Both firms 
are in industries where the emphasis is on low cost because of 
product homogeneity. 
Increasing retaliation which challengers can expect. The 
firms generally viewed retaliation with reluctance, if not disdain. 
The firms often expressed ignorance and a "wait-and see" attitude. 
One firm went as far as to say, "We keep ourselves to ourselves." 
Moreover, retaliation was sometimes considered too costl y and 
time consuming. In many instances, firms preferred to view 
their industry as a "fraternity" of "good" competitors where a 
"general understanding" existed to maintain "healthy" profit margins 
for all. Price-cutting, for example, was regarded as unnecessaril y 
disrupti ve, if not counter-productive. The extent of retaliation 
as expressed by most of the firms was that of matching guarantees 
and prices. However, such actions would not be taken to the 
point of "buying" business; the firms were al wa ys conscious of 
the "bottom line", profit. 
Firm 52 is the lone exception to avoiding significant retalia-
tory measures. The firm is having to consider expanding its 
manufacturing operations in Northern Ireland to counter the likel y 
encroachment into this market by a government subsidised firm 
from Eire. Firm 52 expressed having a deep commitment in 
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the market because of having first-mover advantage in a market 
with tremendous potential. 
Lowering the inducement on attack. Reducing profit margins 
and managing competitors I assumptions as a means of lowering the 
inducement on attac k is general! y uncommon amongst the firms. 
Nearl y every firm expressed a disinterest in lowering their profit 
margins. Most firms strongl y believed that they were already 
offering their products/services at a competitive price and empha-
sised non-price factors (e.g. quality and delivery) as a means 
of reducing customer price sensi ti vi ty . Moreover, many firms 
stated that pricing was already "rock bottom". Also, reducing 
prices might precipitate harmful retaliatory measures by rivals 
which could undermine the firms I market position. 
Managing competitors I assumptions was usual! y based on 
"just getting on with one's business". Trying to project a high 
profile by providing customer satisfaction through fair pricing, 
dependable service, and quick delivery was the basic approach 
used by the firms. Firm 15 went further and stated that having 
a prime (1. e. "high street") location greatl y impressed upon its 
ri vals the firm t s serious commitment. Firm 54' s rapid growth 
and successful confrontation with the industry leader (a multinational 
company), resulted in increased mar ket share for the firm at 
the expense of its larger rival, which greatl y impressed the other 
firms in the industry. On the one hand, the small firms were 
encouraged to see a similarl y-sized firm expose the weaknesses 
of the industry leader. Yet, on the other hand, they were wary 
of what the implications of firm 54' s success could be for them. 
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Using industry scenarios to examine deterrence possibilities. 
An industry scenario is not a forecast, but "an internall y consistent 
view of an industry's future structure". [Porter, 1985, p.448] 
They are used to assess important implications of competition 
and changing industry structure. Most firms did not involve 
themsel ves in scenario planning because of lack of information 
or anticipation of little or no change in competitive forces and 
rivals' strategies; the firms were admi ttedl y myopic in their 
outlook. Some preferred to simp I y wait and react to whatever 
changes might occur. As one firm stated, "We would not know 
what to do until it happened." However, firms 2, 34 and 54 
did appreciate the importance of industry scenarios. Firms 2 
and 54 said that they engaged in scenario planning on an active 
basis, but did not care to elaborate. 
Firm 34 has been forced to consider industry scenarios 
because of its own disruptive behaviour in the printing industry 
in Scotland. It has made substantial inroads in the industry 
leader's market share due to its superior low cost performance. 
The firm is now anticipating the likel y retaliatory actions of the 
industry leader to regain its lost market share, before it deterior-
ates further. The most likel y scenario is one where the industry 
leader employs predatory pricing (i. e. unit cost exceeding price). 
The firm believes that this is likel y given that the industry 
leader is a multinational company and can sub sidise this tactic 
from its other operations I profits. Consequentl y, the firm has 
been explaining this likel y move to its customers and stressing 
that it can on1 y be short-term given the losses the industry leader 
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will incur. Once the industry leader has reasserted its domin-
ance, customers can look forward to paying higher prices. The 
firm also plans to increase its capacity with the purchase of 
more machinery which will increase scale economies and lower 
unit costs further. 
Responding to attack. Nearl y every firm expressed concern 
for keeping abreast of changes in their industry and market. 
Attending trade shows was mentioned by a majority of firms as 
being the best source of information on market trends, rivals, 
suppliers, pricing, and technical advances. Moreover, trade 
shows were used by some firms to enhance their image and cultivate 
customer contacts. Other sources of information include suppliers, 
customers, trade magazines and journals, courses and trade contacts. 
Three firms found that rivals' advertising provided important 
insight into their strategies and what products were doing well. 
Discussion on "responding to attack· was limited by nearl y 
all the firms to seeking information. Most firms have not had 
to deal with responding to attack because they were so new to 
their industry and/or felt little chance of threat because of industry 
stability. In most cases, the firms (as well as their rivals) 
did not view themsel ves as threats and could therefore expect 
little or no confrontation. 
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Summary 
As indicated in Table 4, nearl y every firm operates in either 
a low or medium concentrated industry; onl y 3 firms operate 
in high concentrated industries (The firms are arranged according 
to level of concentration in both Table 4 and Table 5). The firms 
that are in low concentrated industries generall y regard competition 
as stong. As also shown in Table 4, these firms admit facing 
many similarl y-sized ri vals with similarl y-insignificant market 
shares. Moreover, entry and exit barriers tend to be easil y 
overcome. In particular, capital requirements are typicall y quite 
small. Consequentl y, firms intent on achieving competitive 
advantage place a priority on dependable service, quick delivery, 
competi ti ve pricing, and an intensive sales effort. Establishing 
a large customer base is the critical concern of these firms if 
they intend to be profitable and survive. Those firms that 
operate in medium concentrated industries also consider competition 
to be generall y strong and possess insignificant market shares, 
as seen in Table 4. However, all of these firms are in manufacturing 
industries dominated by a few large firms. Consequentl y, these 
firms must be content with being in the competitive fringe where 
there are a number of similarl y-sized rivals. The competi ti ve 
fringe exists because of the large firms being unable or disinterested 
in small and specialised volume demands due to their standard 
large-volume production facilities. 
Generally, the extent of customer influence is positively 
related to the degree of price sensitivity; ie. - - the more pr ice 
is sensi ti ve, the greater is customer leverage and vice and versa. 
Firms that noted significant customer leverage and pr ice sensiti vi ty 
I 
TABLE 4 
firm Industry Market Market Industrial 
Definition Share % Concentration 
1 Blind Cleaning Region <1 Low 
5 Knitwear Mfg lntl . (1 Low 
9 Auto Repair RegIon <l Low 
10 Industrial Cleaning Scotland <1 Low 
13 Holiday Tours Scotland 1 - 5 Low 
30 W 1 ne () 1s t. Region 31-50 Low 
61 Theal. Props. Mfg. Scotland 21-30 Low 
1 1 Food Mfg. Region 1 - ') Medium 
17 Computer Software Mfg. Int! . < 1 Medium 
22 Cassette Tape Mfg. U.K. <1 Medium 
25 Electron1cs Scotland <1 Med1um 
34 Bulk Bag Mfg U.K. 1 - 5 Medium 
52 fenc1ng Mfg. Scotland 1 - 5 Medium 
54 PrintIng Scotland " -20 Medium 
2 Security Blankets Mfg Intl. 11-20 High 
15 Cos.etics Region >15 High 
32 Aerobatlc Aeroplane Mfg IntI. n.8. High 
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sold products that were either regarded as homogeneous or close 
substitutes. (It is interesting to note that the firms in high 
concentrated industries maintained strong customer dependency 
which is much attributed to significant product differentiation. 
[See Tables 4 and 5]) Also, these firms are particularl y dependent 
on large (high volume) customers. And, the firms I customers are 
wel11informed about the firms I rivals. Consequentl y, these firms 
emphasised the development of customer loyalty by providing quality 
service and prompt delivery and cultivating personal relationships 
with customers. Developing customer loyalty increased customers I 
switching costs and reduced price sensitivity. Most of the firms 
that experienced customer dependency and price insensitivity 
manufactured high technology products. Thus, there was an emphasis 
on the right quality and deli very, rather than pr ice. 
The large majority of firms regard suppliers as having a 
positive influence on their operations. This finding is irrespective 
of the level of industry concentration as revealed in Tables 4 
and 5. There are often a large number of suppliers available 
of feri ng similar products or inputs at competi ti ve prices. Con-
sequentl y, switching costs tend to be very low. The few firms 
[viz 2, 32 and 54] that consider suppliers as a negative force 
are limited to a few suppliers because of the products or inputs 
being highl y specialised. It is interesting to add that firms 
2 and 32 are in high concentrated industries. 
Substitutes are generall y regarded as a positive or neutral 
competitive force. Most of the firms believe that substitutes 
are clearly inferior, do not exist, or are introduced [created] 
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by the firms themselves. Those few firms (viz 5, 10 and 15) 
that have products that confront close substitutes are in industries 
where ext"ensive market fragmentation exists. 
In the examination of the firms' competitive strategies, all 
of the firms (with the exception of firm 5) indicated a pursuit 
of a focus strategy where the emphasis is on either low cost, 
differentiation, or both. [See Table 5] The principal strategic 
segment is location. 
The firms are intent on satisfying demand because of their 
accessibility. Normall y, they cater to a particular lo~ale or 
region; lack of resources and experience prevent them from expanding 
their geographic market. To a lesser extent, product variety 
and customer type are strategicall y relevant segments. The most 
significant value activities are mar keting and sales and operations. 
There is a general need to assign more costs and assets to marketing 
and sales to increase potential customers' awareness and generate 
greater sales turnover. Consequentl y, the most important cost 
driver tends to be capacity utilisation, rather than scale economies. 
In most cases, firms must full y utilise their capacity in order 
to be profitable and sustain their existence. 
Generall y, the firms were relati vel y reticent on defensive 
strategy; the firms seemed more concerned with creating, rather 
than defending, their market niches. The firms attributed 
inadequate resources, experience, information, and market influence 
as the reasons. For instance, onl y two firms were significantl y 
invol ved in increasing barriers to entry, namel y by increasing 
their scale economies with the addition of new machinery. More-
over, many firms preferred to view their rivals as "good" compet-
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itors who shared the "general understanding" of avoiding disruptive 
practices such as predatory pricing and encroachment on others t 
market niches. Consequentl y, there was no need for considering 
retaliatory action and reducing inducements on attack. Also, 
nearl y all the firms did not acti vel y consider possible industry 
scenarios. The firms either expected little change in their 
industries or lacked sufficient information. Many firms simpl y 
preferred to wait and react to whatever industry changes might 
occur. However, nearl y all the firms were invol ved in obtaining 
more information about their industries. Sources of information 
include trade shows, suppliers, customers, and trade journals. 
CHAPTER VI 
Finance as a Barrier to Inception and Development 
Introduction 
The major deterrent to entrepreneurship is the inability 
to acquire financial. resources. If an entrepreneur is even to 
have the chance at being successful in "carrying out new combin-
ations" - viz. launching a business enterprise - he must first be 
successful in obtaining the necessary finance. As Schumpeter [1934] 
stated: nThe entrepreneur - in principle or as a rule - does need 
credit ... in order to produce at all, to be able to carry out 
his new combinations, to become an entrepreneur." 1 [p.101] 
Consequent! y, the entrepreneur must have the ability to create 
confidence and therefore be able to convince capitalists of the 
proposed enterprise's viability. 
Moreover, as Penrose [1959] correctly observed: n ... there 
is a relation between entrepreneurial ability and the finance a firm 
can attract; and that difficulties attributed to lack of capital 
may often be just as well attributed to a lack of appropriate entre-
preneurial services, in the sense that a different entrepreneur in 
the same circumstances might well achieve different results." [p. 39] 
10 The importance of credit is absolute in Schumpeter I s theory 
of economic development. (As discussed in Chapter II}.) Schumpeter IS 
circular flow is entirel y dominated by consumption. Schumpeter 
[1934] stated: "In the circular flow there would be on the one 
hand no such rich source, out of which to save, and on the other 
hand essentially less incentive to save." [p.72] Consequently, 
if innovation or "new combinations" are to be introduced and disrupt 
the circular flow , it must necessaril y be financed by credit (viz. 
"creation of money by banks"). 
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Marshall [1890] agreed that "ability always finds the necessary 
capital", but went further and stated that "no limit to the amount 
of borrowing is assumed. We hear 9f an efficient entrepreneur 
being able to 'borrow in one way or another almost any amount 
that he may need'''. [p.311] However, as Steindl [1947] pointed 
out: "Contrary to Marshall's assumption, there are in fact very 
strict limits to borrowing, especially borrowing by small entre-
preneurs. In practice it is in the first instance the creditors 
who see to it that the proportionate indebtedness of a firm is 
limited." [po 5] It is generally acknowledged that no matter 
how viable the prospective enterprise, investors often expect the 
entrepreneur to act in the capitalist's capacity to at least the 
extent that they do themselves; 
rarel y overlooked. 
the issue of moral hazard is 
Most new small firms do not have adequate financial resources. 
If they did, they would not necessaril y start small. Nevertheless, 
many new small firms do succeed, do raise additional capital, and 
do grow into large firms. Being able to start and run a new 
firm effectively on a shoestring and enable it to reach a size and 
position where its general credit standing is well established is 
a necessary and special attribute of the successful entrepreneur 
[Penrose, 1959]. The suggestion is that the real test of an entre-
preneur's ability is not in successfull y launching a new enterprise, 
but overcoming a shortage of money at critical times in its develop-
mente The needs and growth opportunities of a business are ever-
changing, which is particularl y true for the new small firm trying 
to implement appropriate competitive strategy to achieve competitive 
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advantage. Also, because of capital indi visibilities, smaller firms 
tend to require larger amounts of finance in order to expand, 
relative to their net worth, than bigger firms. Given that many 
entrepreneurs have nearly exhausted their personal finances in 
starting their firms and tend to experience liquidity or cash flow 
problems in the earl y years, there is a tremendous reliance placed 
on external finance. [Binks and Coyne, 1983]. 
Fundamentall y, the success of new small firms, in particular, 
depends on scrupulous financial control, especiall y with respect 
to appropriate financial leverage of- "gearing" levels and prudent 
cash flow management. To quote Edwards and Townsend [1958]: 
Inception 
Often it is proper that the business 
should suffer an earl y death: it lacks 
either the right ideas or the right men. 
But it sometimes happens that a firm 
with ideas and men reaches a point where 
the future hangs on someone' s skills or 
luck in scraping up the cash to meet 
tomorrow I s payroll.... Most men who 
have built up businesses, most who have 
tried and failed-, would echo the words 
of Anthony Fokker,' the Dutch aeroplane 
designer and manufacturer: " . .. I was 
able to struggle along by watching every 
penny, hoping that things would brighten 
up sooner, but the question of finance 
was to give me grey hair s time and 
again, before I finall y came out of the 
clear. Of all the troubles I have had, 
all the changes I have run, I think the 
question of financing myself has caused 
me the most grief." [po 29] 
For an entrepreneur setting-up a new business, he must 
have adequate information about such things as the market, industry, 
government assistance, premises, and, not least, finance, if he 
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is to have the best possible chance of success. Often times, 
he does not have adequate information and must turn to others 
for advice. Of course, the entrepreneur will never have compleat 
information and, according to Schumpeter [1934], must ultimately 
rely on "intuition, the capacity of seeing things in a way which 
afterwards proves true." [p. 85] 
It is generally understood that the bank manager and 
accountant are regarded as the obvious, if not the most important, 
sources of advice, particularl y for those inquiring about obtaining 
external finance. The research findings support this belief in 
that out of 52 cases where advice was sought prior to starting 
business, 45 indicated that they had contacted their bank manager 
and/or accountant. 
Over the past few years, there has been a plethora of 
publicI y sponsored initiatives (e. g. The Loan Guarantee Scheme, 
The Enterprise Allowance Scheme, and The Business Expansion 
Scheme) and a variety of well-publicised advisory services and 
agencies (viz. enterprise agencies). Consequentl y, the prospective 
entrepreneur is no longer limited to reI ying on his bank manager 
and accountant for general assistance. Anyway, it is somewhat 
naive to expect a bank manager or an accountant to provide 
comprehensive business advice. Few have the knowledge to do 
so effectivel y and many are simpl y not willing to act in such 
a generalist capacity. Furthermore, it has been argued that given 
that new small firms are typicall y ignorant of, or underestimate, 
the value of financial advice, accountants (in particular) have 
little incentive to invest in an expertise they are unlikel y to 
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sell [Kaplan, 1948; Bolton Committee, 1971; Woodcoc k, 1984; 
and Robson Rhodes, 1985]. 
Banks have traditionall y played an essential role in 
assisting the birth of business enterprises. The questionnaire 
data add credence to this view in that 34 firms contacted their 
bank manager for advice in advance of starting business; no other 
source of advice received more citations. [See Table 1] Further-
more, in 10 instances the bank manager was regarded as the most 
important source of advice. And 27 firms ranked the bank manager 
no less than third in importance. The bank manager's significance 
is not particularl y surprising given that small firms are invariabl y 
reliant upon some external financing and will ini tiall y look to 
its bank manager to meet this need (Wilson Committee, 1979; 
Storey, 1982; and Binks and Coyne, 1983]. In fact, undercapital-
isation is usuall y the major concern for small firms namel y for 
those just starting [Oxenfeldt, 1943; Steindl, 1947; Kaplan, 
1948; Penrose, 1959; and Cross, 1983]. Furthermore, because 
there is some correlation between longevity of a firm and its 
access to information about finance, potential entrepreneurs are 
likel y to look no further than their bank manager about obtaining 
the necessary finance; new firms are hesitant about investing 
in much time to seek out other sources of funding ( Bolton 
Committee, 1971; Wil son Committee, 1979; and Bannoc k , 1981 L 
The results of the questionnaire show that banks are, far 
and away, the most significant source of external finance, with 
fami! y and friends ·a distant second. (See Table 2] Specificall y, 
out of 33 firms that started with the use of external finance, 28 
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Level of 
1 2 3 
9 3 7 
10 7 12 
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SOURCES OF INITIAL EXTERNAL FINANCE 
SOURCE 
Level of Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Bank 14 8 5 1 0 
Famil y and Friends 8 0 1 0 0 
Hire/Purchase 2 4 1 0 0 
Lease 1 4 1 0 0 
Equity 2 3 0 0 0 
Local and Regional Govt. 2 0 2 0 0 
Scottish Development Agency 1 1 1 1 0 
British Steel 2 0 0 0 1 
Development Corp. 1 0 0 0 0 
Industry Dept. (Scotland) 0 1 0 0 0 
Enterprise Trust 0 0 1 0 0 
Advanced Contracts 0 0 1 0 0 

























used bank funds. And, in 14 of these 28 finns, banks were 
regarded as the most important source of finance. Moreover, 
in 9 cases no other source of finance was used. Famil y and 
friends were onl y cited in 9 firms. 2 
Arguabl y, one of the great attractions to bank finance is 
the overdraft facility. The overdraft facility is the most common 
form of short-term finance used by businesses primaril y for the 
purpose of funding wor king capital needs and / or cash flow difficulties. 
It is generall y the least cost! y type of finance as interest is 
charged onl y on the outstanding debit balance of the bank each 
day. 
Criticism is often raised that small firms would choose 
to borrow more than they do but that they are restricted in doing 
so by their banks [White, 1984]. It is assumed that banks want 
to avoid taking risks particularl y with new small firms since 
such enterprises have no track record in which to judge their 
performance and lack sufficient equity capital. Consequentl y, 
banks are thought to limit their lending whereby the "gearing" 
or leverage ratio - defined here as the proportion of a firm's 
d f f db b .3 d equi ty and retaine pro its inance y orrowlng - oes not 
generall y exceed 1: 1 . In other words, banks lend onl y to the 
2. Storey's [1982] survey of 152 new independent firms in 
Cleveland also showed that the major source of external funding 
was banks followed by fami! y and friends. 
3. In calculating the "gearing" ratios of the sample's firms, leas-
ing was not considered; of course, banks do take this expense into 
account when extending loans. Also, loans made to the firms by the 
owners were treated as equity, not debt. And, onl y the amount 
actuall y used of an overdraft was treated as debt. Finall y there 
was no distinction made between long and short term debt in the 
figuring of "gearing" ratios. 
/ 
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extent where the known assets of the business are able to cover 
the firm's debt in the event of liquidation. However, the 
questionnaire data suggest that banks are not as inflexible as 
sometimes thought. Out of 28 firms that borrowed from the bank 
in starting their operations, 9 did not have to provide some sort 
of security. Out of these 9 firms, banks were the only source 
of external finance in 5 firms and 4 firms cited other sources 
of external finance in addition to the bank. It should be added 
that in each of the 5' firms the "gearing" ratio was no greater 
than 1. Furthermore, 13 of the 28 firms had "gearing" ratios 
in excess of 1. In 10 of these firms multiple sources of external 
finance were used. However, 11 firms did provide security. 
And, this security extended beyond the assets of the firm (i. e. 
floating charges) to include personal guarantees, life policies of 
the owner-managers, heritable securities, stock exchange securities, 
and guarantors. [see Table 3] Though banks seemed concerned 
about limiting their risk, there was the suggestion that banks 
had a greater appreciation for the capital needs of new small 
firms in that nearl y half the firms using bank finance of some 
sort had initial "gearing" ratios greater than 1. The involvement 
of other sources of external finance and the willingness of owner-
managers to provide security extending beyond the assets of the 
business have encouraged banks to lend to what would be considered 
risky firms where the debt is greater than the net worth. 
The questionnaire results also show that banks do not signi-
ficantl y act as a barrier to new small firms in quest of external 
finance. Out of 40 firms that were wholl y self-financed at their 
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Stock Exchange Securities 
Heritable Securities 
Floating Charges 








* 23 firms provided security 
TABLE 4 
OBSTACLES TO OBTAINING INITIAL EXTERNAL FINANCE 
Level of Importance 
OBSTACLE TOTAL 
1st 2nd 3rd 
Lack of personal finance 11 4 0 15 
Establishing the idea a 
market existed 11 6 0 17 
Lack of previous business 
success 2 1 0 3 
Difficulty in producing 
satisfactory financial 
statements 3 1 4 8 
PrevIous employment 
experIence 2 0 1 3 
Other 2 0 0 2 
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inception, 15 confronted obstacles to obtaining external finance. 
(Alternativel y stated, 25 firms were not looking for outside funds 
to start operations. 4) Out of the 15 firms that were unsuccessful 
in otaining external finance, 7 did not seek any advice and in 
onl y 4 cases was a bank consul ted. The obstacles confronted 
by firms unable to attract any kind of external finance were princi-
pall y the inability to establish the idea a market existed for 
the firm's products, insufficient owners' injections, and inability 
to produce satisfactory financial statements (e. g. cash flow forecasts, 
projected profit and loss statements, and pro forma balance sheet). 
[See Table 4] With proper advice and consequent better prepar-
ation of business plans, these obstacles may have been overcome. 
And here the bank manager could have been of assistance. 
Banks' participation in the provision of loan finance to 
new small firms have been heightened in recent years with the 
Government's introduction of The Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) 
and The Business Start-up Scheme more familiarl y known as The 
4. The high number of self-financed start-ups indicates a 
strong preference to a void any external finance (at least ini tiall y) 
as a means of keeping costs down and avoiding interference by 
outsiders in the management of the firm. (This concern for main-
taining complete control is further pronounced in that only 5 firms 
issued equity in order to start. [See Table2] Also, many firms 
expressed a need to establish a track record whereby they could 
be in a more favourable position to attract outside funds and to 
take advantage of a growth opportunity. Generall y, firms did 
not like to be saddled with a great deal (if any) of debt at the 
beginning of its operations. Another disincentive to borrowing 
was the common condition of a provision of security. For new, 
small firms it is not unusual for borrowing to be secured by the 
assets of the business and the personal assets of the owner-managers 
or guarantors. Out of 23 firms that provided security in order 
to obtain initial external finance, in onl y 3 instances were the 
assets of the firm soleI y acceptable as security. 
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Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS). The L GS was launched in 
1981 based on the belief that insufficient funds existed for feasible 
business ventures; the finance was unavailable because proposers 
were unable or unwilling to provide guarantees or security which 
financial institutions deemed necessary or did not have a track 
record on which the venture's success could be judged. Essentiall y, 
the innovative attraction of the scheme was that the Government 
would act as guarantor for 80 per cent of each loan (with an upper 
limit of £75,000 extending over 2 - 7 years). This aspect greatl y 
relieved the issue of security for participating banks in lending 
to what would otherwise be considered risky businesses. More-
over, from the proposers' vantage point, banks could only ask 
for security on assets of the business; personal guarantees from 
the firm's owners or their personal assets could not be considered 
for security. Initiall y, the L GS was a three year pilot with 
an allotment of £50 million for each of the years. However, 
because of excess demand, the £150 million committment was doubled 
a year after its introduction. By 1985 well in excess of £500 
million had been lent to more than 16,000 businesses under the 
scheme by the 30 financial institutions involved, including all 
the clearing banks except the TSB, a number of smaller banks 
and merchant banks, together with the ICFC [Woodcock, 1985]. 
However, progress reports of the scheme undertaken by the chartered 
accountants Robson Rhodes [1985] revealed that appraisals of appli-
cations and the monitoring of the use of the loans were inadequate. 
They also found that borrowers showed little understanding and 
care for the financial management of their businesses. Consequentl y, 
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more than £60 million of the loans were called and about two 
out of five businesses were in receipt of loans failing [The 
Guardian, 19851. The scheme was intended to be self- financing 
gi ven that a premium of 3 per cent was imposed by the Government 
on each loan. However, given the losses involved, once the 
three year pilot was concluded the Government reduced its guaranteed 
proportion of the loan to 70 percent, leaving the lenders to carry 
a larger proportion of the risk, natura 11 y leading to greater 
caution on their part. Also, the premium charged for the guarantee 
was increased to 5 per cent to reduce the cost to the taxpayer 
and effecti vel y adding a further 3.5 per cent (i. e. 70 percent 
of 5 percent) to the overall interest charges. Of course, there 
was never any intention of it being a cheap loan scheme and 
borrowers were expected to pay a ful1 commercial charge for the 
loan. Al though borrowers did not seem to mind about the original 
interest cost, the increase in the premium has had a dramatic 
effect in the number of loans issued. National Westminster Bank, 
for example, which had 37 per cent of the market for guaranteed 
loans has seen the number of proposals it has accepted be reduced 
by 50 per cent [The Guardian, 19851. Final1 y, the Government's 
decision to allow banks to ask for personal assets as security, 
rather than just those of the business, has also contributed to 
the decline in the number of scheme loans. The questionnaire 
data support the growing lack of interest in the GLS in that onl y 
2 firms had undertaken a guaranteed loan. 
Alternativel y, The Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS) has 
consistentl y played an influential role in stimulating new firm 
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formation and attracting bank finance. The EAS was introduced 
in 1982 by the Government to assist unemployed people who want 
to start their own business by paying a flat rate, taxable allowance 
of £40 per week for 52 weeks. To qualify people have to be 
out of work or under notice of redundancy for at least 13 weeks 
and have at least £1000 available to invest in the business, which 
can be in the form of a bank loan or overdraft. The stipulated 
minimum of 13 weeks is to allow for proper consideration and 
preparation of the busness to be undertaken, which may include 
finding premises, conducting market research, acquiring finance, 
etc. In the first year of the scheme some 28,000 places were 
taken up and in the following year 46,000 people benefitted. 
Moreover, 86 per cent of the participants who used the full year's 
allowance were still trading three months after their allowance 
had come to an end_ [The Guardian, 1986]. Clearl y, the scheme 
has contributed to creating some stability in that crucial initial 
year of operations when cash flow can be particularly problematic. 
The Government's own confidence in the value of the scheme 
was indicated by the allocation of a further £325 million to enable 
the scheme to continue until March 1988 [Woodcock, 1985]. In 
support of the EAS, banks have taken a positive attitude and 
response towards it, with the Midland Bank, for example, offering 
free business banking service to those participating in the scheme. 
Also, banks are more inclined to lend to new businesses where 
the owner- manager (s) is involved in the scheme. There is some 
indication of this in the research findings. In the sample, 15 
firms reported participation in the EAS. Out of these 15, 7 
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firms started their business with the assistance of bank finance. 
In another 1 firms that participated in the scheme, there was 
no desire expressed to use any external finance. This is con-
firmed by the fact that these 7 firms stated that they did not 
confront any obstacles to obtaining outside funds. The remaining 
unaccounted firm of the 15 established under the scheme's assistance 
was able to attract other (non-bank) financing. 
The questionnaire data and Government assistance (viz. 
the LGS and EAS) support the premise that banks are being more 
instrumental in the growth of nascent firms. At the very least, 
banks appear not to be acting as a barrier to new firm formation. 
Banks may well be, as Schumpeter [1934] so vigourously argued, 
"capitalist par excellence" and "ephors of the exchange economy". 
Accountants are important to prospective entrepreneurs because 
of their specialised knowledge. They are of considerable aid 
in preparing a business plan for the firm in need of raising finance. 
The success of any business depends on a highly developed com-
petitive strategy [as discussed in Chapters III and V] and having 
the necessary resources (personnel and capital) to effecti vel y 
impliment it. And, it is the business plan which is the instrument 
by which potential investors are persuaded of the firm's likel y 
success. The accountant's specific contribution to a business 
plan is preparing the necessary financial documents, including 
the pro forma balance sheet, projected profit and loss statement, 
and cash flow forecasts. The accountant can also ascertain the 
particular tax implications which can greatl y determine the type 
of business _ e. g. sole trader and 1 imi ted company _ the prospecti ve 
135 
entrepreneur should undertake, as well as the kind and timing 
of capital investments. Using an accountant can greatl y offset 
the risk of displaying financial naivety and ineptitude on the 
part of the entrepreneur when presenting a business plan to potential 
investors. Often there is an inverse relationship between the 
financial expertise of owner-managers and the size and age of 
a firm; the smaller and younger a firm the greater the reliance 
on an accountant. According to a recent unpublished study by 
Milne and Thomson [1984] of Glasgow University, the financial 
management skills of owner-managers of new firms are in need 
of a considerable upgrading. 
The accountant's importance to new small firms is supported 
by the questionnaire date. Out of 51 firms that sought advice 
prior to starting, 32 noted their accountant. [See Table 1] It 
compares favourably with the bank and enterprise trust. And 
in 22 cases, the accountant was ranked either first or second 
in importance. Also, in 22 instances, firms that sought an 
accountant's advice indicated that they did not confront any 
obstacle to obtaining finance to start their business. Of the 
remaining 12 firms that did use an accountant and admitted having 
to overcome obstacles, onl y 1 cited difficulty in producing satis-
factory financial statements as an obstacle to acquiring outside 
finance. The others primaril y had difficulty in establishing 
the idea a market existed for their products. It should be 
added that 11 firms that used an accountant in starting their 
operations did not seek external finance. Nonetheless, the evid-
ence does indicate that the accountant does playa significant 
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role in helping firms attract external funding and begin trading. 
In addition to the bank manager and accountant, the other 
significant source of advice is the local enterprise agency (more 
commonl y referred to in Scotland as the enterprise trust). Almost 
from their inception in 1978, enterprise agencies have played 
a vital role in the formation and growth of small businesses. 
Evidence of their increasing role is seen in their proliferation, 
particularl y over the past few years. There were 61 enterprise 
agencies in April 1982, 103 a year later and 180 by the middle 
of 1984. By June 1986, there are expected to be 300 in Britain 
[Financial Times, 1985]. The primary function of enterprise 
agencies is to provide advice. What makes them so attractive 
given that there are other sources of advice is the nature of 
the agencies. They are typicall y set up joint! y by the private 
sector and local authorities. The involvement of the private 
sector is particularl y with regard to the lending of experienced 
managers or specialists for an extended period of time (usuall y 
9 months to several years). Secondees from (normall y) large 
corporations and financial institutions are recognised for providing 
the best possible consultancy. And, it is free, independent, 
and non-political. In addition to providing general business 
advice, enterprise agencies can readil y find suitable premises 
and attract financing for viable projects because of their personnel's 
respect and influence with the financial community. Finall y, 
enterprise agencies' effectiveness is part! y attributed to being 
accessible because they are at the local level. 
A recent report produced by the Centre for Employment 
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Initiatives [1985] examined the effectiveness of 12 enterprise 
agencies in England, Scotland and Wales. The survey was based 
on 370 in-depth interviews. Essentiall y, the report was very 
supporti ve of the effectiveness of enterprise agencies. Clients 
and others rated the agencies in first position in terms of contri-
bution to their specific businesses and to small firms generall y. 
Eleven per cent of those starting in business and 9 per cent of 
those already in business felt they would not have started or 
would have gone into liquidation without the assistance provided. 
A further 53 percent of start-ups and 34 per cent of existing 
firms felt that it would have been more difficult to start or that 
they would have taken longer to do so, or that they would have 
so many people employed without assistance from an agency. 
The research findings also support the important influence 
of enterprise agencies. In 33 instances an enterprise trust was 
noted as a source of advice; this compared favourabl y with the bank 
manager and accountant. [See Table II Given that 25 per cent 
of the firms in the sample were started prior to 1982 when there 
existed just one enterprise trust in Scotland [i. e. the Ardrossan, 
Saltcoats, Stevenston Enterprise Trust, Ltd. (ASSET)], the number 
of firms citing an enterprise trust as a source of advice under-
states the importance of enterprise trusts. The questionnaire 
data also show that the enterprise trust was noted as either being 
the most important or second in importance in providing information 
by 24 firms. The accountant and bank manager, however, were 
ci ted 22 and 17 times respecti vel y in this regard. 
Finall y, in examining those firms that received some special 
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finance (i. e. government grants, reduced rental on premises, etc). 
[See Table 5], 20 firms that considered the special finance helpful 
and/or necessary to starting-up sought the advice of an enterprise 
trust; this figure compares favourabl y with the bank manager 
and accountant with 23 and 20 citations respectively. [See Table 6] 
Furthermore, in 13 cases where the special finance was considered 
necessary to start-up, the enterprise trust was used for advice, 
onl y the bank manager was noted as often. Gi ven the rapid 
growth of enterprise trusts and their unique and necessary role 
in small business development , it is not surprising that the data, 
should find them at least as important as the bank manager and 
accountant. 
The questionnaire data shows the Scottish Development Agency 
as fourth in importance as a source of advice with 26 responses. 
[see Table 1] Many firms indicated reluctance in dealing with 
the bureaucracy of this government entity. Moreover, there 
was the common expression that the SDA was not interested in 
assisting the particularl y small firm. In fairness to the SDA, 
the tremendous growth in the number of enterprise trusts over 
the past few years has shifted the SDA' s emphasis away from 
advice to new firms towards more indepth counselling for 
established firms. Nonetheless, the SDA has a wealth of compre-
hensi ve expertise and resources to assist all businesses, irrespective 
of type, size or age. 
The remaining sources of advice noted include fami! y and 
friends (20 responses), local government authorities (12 responses), 
and other (4 responses). [See Table 1] Other included solicitor, 
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TABLE 5 
SPECIAL FINANCE SCHEMES NECESSARY HELPFUL 
Enterprise Allowance Scheme 7 [3 
Employment Grant 3 15 
Investment Grant 5 13 
Reduced Rental on Premises 5 111 
Special Tax Credits 2 4 
Other 2 1 
TOTAL 24 55 
Necessary: The firm would not have started without the 
special finance. 














Family and Friends 12 6 
Bank Manager 23 13 
Accountant 20 11 
Enterprise Trust 20 13 
SDA * 17 8 
Local Government 8 3 
Other 0 0 
* Scottish Development Agency 
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Industry' Department (Scotland), ICFC, and individuals in industry. 
Advice from fami! y and friends was usual! y with regard to the 
question of obtaining finance. In 7 out of 8 cases where a firm 
considered fami! y and friends as the most important source of 
external finance, fami! y and friends were also cited as a source 
of advice. 5 Local authorities concerned with nurturing small 
businesses tend to work closel y with local enterprise trusts. 
Their involvement is particularl y helpful with respect to the 
provision of industrial premises and finance. However, the 
assistance of local authorities does not appear to be substantial 
6 for the firms in the sample. 
Development 
If a new small firm intends to survive and develop it must 
have additional finance. There are primaril y three types available: 
(1) earnings; (2) equity; and (3) borrowed funds. Usuall y, 
the new small firm is reliant on more than one type. The relative 
use of these types of finance is the result of an equilibrium between 
ris k and return on investment. The smaller the share of net 
worth (i. e. owners' equity and retained earnings) in the total 
5. Outside capital for a new, small firm can usual! y onl y 
be acquired from fami! y and friends; "no one else will .be able 
to guage the true worth of the main asset of the business - the 
personalities of those who will run it". [Andrews, 1955, p.241] 
6. See Storey [1982] for further evidence of the role of local 
authorities. Storey I s data showed that local authorities are 
an important source of information on premises and other information 
as well as being the major planning authority, but were an 
unimportant source of financial advice. 
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funds of the firm, the greater is the risk to the lenders and 
to the owners themselves. The risk is accounted for in two 
principal ways. First, irrespective of a firm's performance, 
interest payments on borrowed funds must be made according to 
the arrangements set forth in the loan agreement. And, the greater 
the outstanding debt vis-a-vis the net worth of the firm, the 
greater the risk of not being able to service it. Second, and 
perhaps even more important, any changes in liquidity needs or 
increased demands from creditors for payment will be more difficult 
to accommodate of such a firm owing to the low proportion of 
owners' funds in its financial structure. The owners' funds 
which do not have to be repaid serve as a cushion to protect 
a firm against such changes. For these reasons, the risk of 
such a firm not being able to meet its debt obligations is more 
pronounced than in the case of a firm in which the proportion 
of borrowed funds is substantiall y smaller. Consequentl y, if 
there is the desire to minimise a firm's risk, the owners will 
strive to reduce its level of debt in proportion to its equity 
holdings. The level of financial leverage of "gearing" is a measure 
of the security a firm provides on its borrowings. 
The questionnaire data suggest that new small firms are 
highl y dependent upon borrowed funds. In the short life of 
the sample's firms onl y 12 never used debt finance, as indicated 
where the highest "gearing" ratio equals zero. [See Table 7] 
And, out of 34 firms that started with the use of borrowed funds, 
18 had a "gearing" ratio greater than 1. Even though the number 
of firms using borrowed funds increased from 34 to 61, the riskiness 
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of firms tended to decline in that onl y 11 firms at present have 
a "gearing" ratio greater than 1 as compared with 18 that started 
operations with a ratio greater than 1. 
This concern for decreasing the level of debt relative to 
the level of equity is further supported in examining the firms' 
expectations of their "gearing" ratios over the next 3 years. [See 
Tables 8 and 9] Out of the 11 firms with a present "gearing" 
ratio greater than 1, 8 expressed a desire to reduce their level 
of financial leverage at least over the next year. Moreover, 
a total of 31 firms expected their "gearing" ratio to drop over 
the next year. The major reasons for this drop were an antici-
pation of increased profits and retirement of debt. And, 12 
out of 13 firms that thought their "gearing" ratio would remain 
unchanged over the next year had a present "gearing" ratio no 
greater than 1. (In fact, 7 of the 12 firms had a ratio of zero.) 
Finall y, in examining the financial leverage expectations of the 
firms over the next year, 19 firms expected their "gearing" ratio 
to increase, namel y because of the acquisition of debt finance. 
However p 16 of these firms had a present "gearing" ratio not in 
excess of 1. In other words, these firms did not feel that 
additional debt would jeopardise their level of safety. Expectations 
for the second and third years further support the firms' concern 
for reducing the level of their debt in proportion to their net 
worth, in that 33 firms anticipated their "gearing" ratios to drop 
in the second year and 26 firms expecting the same in the third 
year. There were onl y 7 responses for both years that regarded 
their "gearing" ratio to increase. Unsurprisingl y, the number 
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TABLE 8 
EXPECTED CHANGES IN "GEARING" OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS 
CHANGE Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Fall 31 33 26 
Rise 19 7 7 
Stay the same 13 17 16 
Do not know 10 16 24 
TABLE 9 
REASONS FOR EXPECTED CHANGES IN "GEARING" 
OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS 
REASON Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Increase in earnings 36 39 32 
Increase in equity 4 4 3 
Increase in debt 22 13 8 
Losses 0 0 1 
Retirement of debt 22 27 25 
Unsure 10 16 25 
Other * 4 5 5 
*Other refers to profit-taking and dividends payout 
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of firms indicating "do not know" rose for the second and third 
years to 16 and 24 respectively from the first year's 10. Many 
of these firms stated that it would be "sheer guesswork" to think 
what their firm's financial structure would be in 3 years, partic-
ularl y because they had not even been in operation for that long. 
Aside from the concern of maintaining low levels of debt 
relative to equity in order to minimise risk, new small firms 
may desire to restrict their reliance upon borrowed funds initiall y 
to better enable it to secure finance when a big opportunity presents 
itself [Robinson, 1966] . Establishing a good record may not be 
easy for a firm that is burdened with alarge amount of debt to 
service in the earl y years. However, the firm with minimal 
debt can more readil y service it and therefore establish a record 
that will enhance its borrowing position. There is some suggestion 
of this in the questiomaire' s findings. [See Table 7] There were 
54 firms with a "gearing" ratio no greater than 1 when they started 
operations. (Of these 54 firms 38 had a beginning "gearing" 
ratio of zero.) And, since starting, 34 firms had increased 
their level of "gearing" indicating an increase in borrowing. 
In fact, 10 firms borrowed to the point of placing their "gearing" 
ratio above 1. This suggests that these firms had built up enough 
confidence in their lenders through their performance to place 
the firms in what might be regarded as a risky position. 
Minimising risk is onl y one aspect in the use of borrowed 
funds; the other factor is the increase in profitability or, more 
important! y, the generation of positive cash flow, whereby the 
cash receipts exceed the cash disbursements (as discussed later). 
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A borrowing firm generating a positive cash flow despite the add-
i tional cash outlay of interest payments will increase the owners' 
equity and thereby reduce the level of "gearing". In this case, 
the return to the owners is greater than that to the lender. 
In other words, borrowed funds can be used to finance growth 
and also reduce risk. In addition to the return to the lender 
being fixed, rather than being based on the firm's performance, 
the other major advantage to borrowed funds is that the interest 
is recognised as a tax-deductable expense. In effect, the cost 
of borrowed funds is cheaper than paying dividends on equity 
where double taxation applies. 
Aside from the equity owners inject into a firm, the provision 
of external equity is usually viewed with disdain by small firms 
in that it is regarded as an erosion of control in the firm and 
of the personal and financial rewards. Also, access to equity 
from the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), 7 ICFC and venture 
capitalists is usual! y beyond the reach of the new small firm 
given the large capital amounts invol ved_ [Binks, 1979; Jarret 
and Wright, 1982; and Foley, 1985]. The USM and venture capital 
funds primaril y provide equity for those firms in need at a later 
stage in their development. Also, the costs of placement (over 
£40,000 on the USM) are generally prohibitive and the amounts 
7. The USM was set up in November 1980 part! y in response 
to the 1978 Wilson Committee report on small firms, which drew 
attention to the prohibitive expense and difficulty for many young 
companies in acquiring a full public listing in the stock market. 
The single largest source of equity capital for small businesses 
is the USM. The USM has the particular attraction of onl y 
requiring 10 percent, rather than 25 percent, of equity funds 
to be sold to the pUblic. 
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provided (e.g. the average investment by the ICFC is £120,000) 
are far too large for the firms under consideration. Finall y, 
the hidden costs of management time taken up in preparing for 
a flotation can be a substantial barrier. 
The questionnaire findings are supportive of new small 
firms' preference for debt, rather than equity, finance. As 
Table 2 shows, only 5 firms used some type of external equity 
in starting their operations. And, as Table 9 reveals, no more 
than 4 firms in any of the next 3 years anticipate using external 
equity. Moreover, the use of debt finance has been helpful 
in generating growth for the sample I s firms. According to 
Table 10, where the change in the firms I equity (new worth) 
are deducted from the changes in total assets (present and starting) 
and changes in ngearingn ratios (present and starting), 53 firms 
(out of 63 with sufficient information) improved upon their starting 
net worth. In 42 of these firms, debt finance was used. 
Clearl y, debt finance was instrumental in fostering growth as well 
as improving the financial structure. 
As for internal earnings or positive cash flow, young small 
firms intent on being competitive and making necessary and long-
lasting inroads into the market are invariably unable to create 
large liquidity reserves by which to finance capital expansion. 
In support, Binks [1979] stated: nIn embryonic form, firms 
are often maintained with a view to their potential rather than 
actual profitability. Where this is not the case, it is rare 
for a firm's profit margin to be sufficient! y high in its initial 
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consequentl y !the] capital base required for the kind of expansion 
under consideration here." [p. 36] Though Binks is essentiall y 
correct in recognising the inadequacy of earnings generated from 
operations as a source of funds to finance expansion plans, he 
is wrong in his use of the word profitability. Alternatively, 
the emphasis must be on liquidity or operational cash flows 
(a phrase borrowed from Eckford [1984] >. A firm can be high I y 
profitable but if it cannot convert profits into "real cash", 
particularl y at critical times, it faces the prospect of bankruptcy. 
As Lee [1985] pointedl y stated: 
is a physical resource." [p. 93] 
"Profit is an abstraction; cash 
The emphasis on cash flow, 
rather than profitability, is especiall y applicable to the new 
small firm where debtors (particularl y large customers) are notorious 
for their slow payment in recognition of the new small firm's 
zealousness in generating sales and establishing customer goodwill. 
The questionnaire data suggests that new small firms do 
indeed have cash flow problems. When asked whether cash flow 
difficulties were ever confronted, 52 firms (71 per dent of the 
sample) replied in the affirmative. The most significant reasons 
attributed to liquidity problems were an insufficient overdraft 
facility and delinquent debtors. [See Table 11] One might argue 
that delinquent debtors were more significant than an insufficient 
overdraft facility since an insufficient overdraft facility could 
be the result of a larger than expected number of bad customers 
and not the cause of poor positive cash flow. Overinvestment 
also ranked high as a cause of cash flow difficulties. Overinvest-
ment could well be concerned with stock rather than capital goods, 
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TABLE 11 
REASONS FOR CASH FLOW PROBLEMS 
REASON roo Level of Importance TOTAL 
1 2 3 4 5 
Insufficient overdraft 16 13 2 1 0 32 
facility 
Delinquent debtors 16 8 3 1 0 28 
Overinvestment 9 6 5 2 0 22 
Inadequate credit policy 
with suppliers 4 2 0 1 2 9 
Delinquent suppliers 3 1 1 1 0 6 
Inadequate credity policy 
with customers 1 2 2 0 0 5 
Other 4 1 0 0 0 5 
TABLE 12 
REASONS FOR DEBT FINANCE SINCE START-UP 
REASON NUMBER OF FrRMS* 
New or expanded premises 
Purchase of plant and equipment 
Increase in stoc k 
Additional employees 






* 44 firms used debt finance since start-up 
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which might suggest lack of proper management. In fact. every 
firm except one that cited overinvestment also cited an insufficient 
overdraft facility, delinquent debtors, and/or inadequate credit 
policies. 
capital. 
All three of these reasons are associated with working 
Finall y, in examining the reasons for firms acquiring 
debt finance since they began operations, the questionnaire findings 
show that out of 44 firms 22 acquired debt finance to overcome 
cash flow problems. [See Thble 12] In 16 of these firms, debt 
finance was acquired for other reasons as well. 
CHAPTER VII 
Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis was to obtain a greater know-
ledge and understanding of the development of the new small firm 
by means of an empirical investigation. The intention was to 
be positivist without providing obvious normative implications. 
Moreover, this investigation was performed partl y in response 
to the lack of research that has been devoted to the direct 
examination of new small firms in Scotland. 
The research undertaken for this thesis had three important 
stages: (1) un~structured design work; (2) the administered 
questionnaire; and (3) the semi-structured interview. The 
unstructured design work was accomplished in the capacity of 
consul tant for the Ardrossan-Sal tcoats-Stevenston Enterprise Trust 
Ltd. (ASSET). This experience provided the opportunity to 
observe and actuall y participate in the inception and development 
of new small firms in the Ayrshire region. Consequentl y, the 
acquired insight assisted in the formul-ation of the administered 
questionnaire and the semi-structured interview and the interpre-
tation of the data. Also, the experience with ASSET provided 
the necessary contacts or channels (viz. enterprise trust directors) 
by which the sample was generated. 
The semi-structured interview is concerned with how 
competi ti ve strategy is formulated, implemented, and sustained. 
Essentiall y, entrepreneurial activity is being examined. The 
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aim of "carrying out new combinations" is the achievement of com-
petiti ve advantage. The extent of competitive advantage is 
measured by profit and illustrated by the development of the 
firm. The semi-structured interview was conducted amongst a 
subset of the sample. Therefore, some of the data from the 
administered questionnaire supplemented the data from the semi-
structured interview in the anal ysis of competi ti ve strategy. 
The semi-structured interview adopts Porter I s [1980 and 
1985] framework and Reid I s design. It contains three distinct, 
yet related, sections: ( 1) competitive forces; (2) competitive 
strategy; and (3) defensive strategy. The first section examines 
the competitive forces - i.e rivalry (existing and potential), 
customers, suppliers, and substitutes - which fundamentally deter-
mine the generic competi ti ve strategy undertaken. The second 
section anal yses how the generic competitive strategies -
i.e. low cost, differentiation, and focus - are implemented. 
The "va"lue chain" is an important tool used to systematicall y 
assess a firm's activities which are the ultimate source of com-
peti ti ve ad vantage. These activities include inbound logistics, 
operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and service. 
The third section discusses the defensive strategies availab Ie 
to a firm to sustain competitive advantage. In particular, 
increasing barriers to entry, increasing retaliation which challengers 
can expect, lowering the inducement for attac k, using industry 
scenarios, and responding to attack are considered. 
In the examination of the evidence in Chapter V, the 
competi ti ve forces, existing and potential rivals, are arguabl y 
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the most compelling. Nearl y every firm operates in either low 
or medium concentrated industries. All of these firms regard 
competition as fierce. And, these firms generall y confront 
similarl y-sized rivals with similarly-insignificant market shares. 
For those firms in low concentrated industries, entry and exit 
barr ier s are q"uite 
to be very small. 
low. In particular, capital requirements tend 
Achieving competitive advantage is therefore 
based on emphasising quality service, prompt delivery, fair pricing, 
and marketing and sales. All of the firms operating in medium 
concentrated industries are involved in manufacturing and are much 
larger than those firms in low concentrated industries. In the 
medium concentrated industries, the firms general I y operate in 
the "competitive fringe" because of the existence of large firms 
who dominate the large volume part of the market. The "com-
petltive fringe" exists because of the large firms being unable 
to satisfy or disinterested in small and speCialised volume demands 
because of their standard large-volume production facilities. 
The degree of customer influence tends to be direct! y 
related to price sensitivity; i.e. the more sensitive is price 
the greater is customer leverage and vice and versa. The firms 
that experienced significant customer leverage and price sensitivity 
sold products/services that were regarded as close substitutes 
or homogeneous with respect to their rivals' products / services. 
These firms tended to be high I y dependent on large (i. e. high 
volume) customers. Moreover, customers were generall y very 
knowledgeable about the firms' rivals. Consequent! y, the firms 
often undertook an active policy of developing customer loyalty 
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by emphasising service, delivery, and personal relationships as 
a means of increasing customers I switching costs. Those firms 
that enjoyed customer dependency and price inconsistency manu-
factured high technology products. Customers were concerned 
with the right quality and quick delivery, rather than price. 
Most of the firms consider suppliers as': being a positive 
competi ti ve force. Usuall y, a number of suppliers are available 
offering similar products/inputs at competitive prices. Little 
or no switching costs tend to be invol ved. The small minority 
of firms that regard suppliers as being negati vel y influential 
require specialised products /inputs of which there are few suppliers. 
Substi tute products / services tend to be regarded as either 
a positive or neutral competitive force. Nearly all of the firms 
assert that substitutes are either clearly inferior, non-existant, 
or introduced by the firms themselves. The few firms that 
consider substitutes a threat are in industries where extensive 
mar ket fragmentation exists because of the rapid introduction of 
new, yet similar, products (e. g. knitwear and cosmetics). 
In consider ing competitive strategy, all of the firms (except 
one) follow a focus strategy with the emphasis on either low cost, 
differentiation, or both. The most important strategic segment 
is location (viz. locality or region). Due to lac k of size and 
ex per ience, in particular, the firms generall y have to concentrate 
their operations on a limited geographical area. To a lesser 
extent, product variety and customer type were noted as significant 
strategic segments. Clearl y, the prominent value activities are 
marketing and sales and operations. Usuall y, there is an admitted 
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lack of costs and assets allocated to marketing and sales. Firms 
recognise the importance of increasing their customer base and 
sales turnover, but lac k the resources and mar keting expertise. 
Operations was often mentioned as an important value activity. 
Firms had to be intent on full y utiliSing capacity in order to 
be profitable. The emphasis on scale economies, as opposed 
to capacity utilisation, was less of a concern. 
The firms generally did not "consciously" pursue a defensive 
strategy. Most of the firms were still trying to establish their 
niche in the market. The firms also cited lack of resources, 
experience, information, and mar ket power as reasons. Moreover. 
some firms believed that defensive strategy was unnecessary given 
that their competitors were viewed as part of a "fraternity" that 
frowned upon disruptive behaviour such as predatory pricing and 
encroachment on others I market niches. There was also the 
view commonl y held that industry structure did not significantl y 
change. Therefore, industry scenarios were rarel y contemplated 
as a matter of strategic planning. Nonetheless, most of the firms 
did actively seek information to try and improve their competitive-
ness. Primary sources of information include trade shows, 
customers and suppliers. 
Entrepreneurship - viz. the inception and development of 
a firm - fundamentall y depends on adequate financing. In Chapter 
VI, evidence from the Finance section of the administered question-
naire was examined. Tradi tiona 11 y, the bank manager and account-
ant are considered the most important sources of information for 
the new small firm [Woodcock, 1984]. The research findings support 
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this view in that no other sources of information were more often 
cited. In fact, out of 52 firms that sought advice initiall y, 
45 noted the bank manager and / or the accountant. The other 
prominent source of advice cited was the enterprise trust. New 
small firms seek information on finance, in particular. Under-
capitalisation is most often the principal concern for new small 
firms [Steindl, 1947. Penrose, 1959; Cross, 1983]. Otherwise, 
perhaps, small firms would not necessarily start small. There-
fore, an accountant is important in the preparation of the financial 
statements and business plan used to persuade capitalists, such 
as banks, to provide the necessary finance. 
The primary source of external finance for the new small 
firm is the bank [Wilson Committee, 1979; Storey, 1982; Binks 
and Coyne, 1983]. Out of 33 firms that started with the assist-
ance of external funds, 28 borrowed from the bank. And, in 
half of these firms, bank funds were considered the most important 
source of external finance. A particular attraction of the bank 
is the overdraft facility whereby interest is onl y paid on the 
amount actuall y borrowed, rather than the amount made available. 
Often banks are criticised for their reluctance to engage 
in lending to new small firms because of their lac k of a trac k 
record and owners' injections [White, 19841. Banks are widely 
considered to limit their lending in order that the "gearing" 
(leverage) ratio - i. e. proportion of debt to owners' eq ui ty -
be no greater than 1: 1. However, the evidence suggests that 
banks are not so inflexible in their lending practices to new small 
firms. Al though banks seemed concerned with limiting their 
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exposure to risk, they appeared to be appreciative of the firm I s 
capital needs. Nearl y half of the firms that borrowed from 
banks at their inception had a "gearing" ratio greater than 1:1. 
The participation of other sources of external finance and the 
willingness of owner-managers to provide security beyond the 
assets of the firm have encouraged banks to lend to what would 
be regarded as risky ventures. 
Perhaps, not surprising is the fact that 40 firms (over 
50 percent of the sample) started with no external finance. 
Moreover, 25 of these firms did not even seek external finance 
at their inception. Many firms wanted to avoid interference 
by outsiders. Also, a number d)f firms preferred to wait and 
become established to enable them to be in a more favourable 
borrowing position and take advantage of growth opportunities. 
Furthermore, many owner-managers simpl y did not want to use 
their personal assets as security. 
Since starting operations, onl y 12 firms never used some 
kind of debt finance. However, the level of risk tended to 
decline for the firms as a whole. Onl y 11 firms at present, 
compared with 18 firms at inception, have a "gearing" ratio greater 
than 1:1. Generally, there is the concern to reduce the level 
of debt vis-a-vis equity over the next three years. Specificall y , 
31 firms expect their "gearing" ratio to decline over the next 
year. Nearl y every firm with a present "gearing" ratio greater 
than 1: 1 anticipated a reduction due to increased profits and the 
retirement of debt. Over the next year, however, 19 firms 
believed their "gearing" ratio would increase namel y because of 
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the acquisition of debt finance to fund development. However, 
16 of these firms had a It gearing" ratio not exceeding 1: 1. 
Internal earnings, in comparison to external finance, tend 
to be considered an inadequate source of funds to finance the 
new small firm's development [Binks, 1979]. This concern is 
reflected in the cash flow problems small firms often confront 
particularl y in their earl y years. The research findings lend 
support to this view. Over 70 percent of the sample experienced 
cash flow difficulties at one time or another. The most sig-
nificant reasons were an insufficient overdraft facility and 
delinquent debtors. 
Finall y, it must be said that the time constraint has pre-
vented the established data base from being full y exploited. 
In particular, the data from the Pricing, Costing, and Sales and 
Competi tion sections of the administered questionnaire remain 
virtuall y untouched. (However, it should be stated that the 
data from these three important sections have been carefull y 
"neglected" in view of the fact that G. C. Reid is credited with 
the formulation of these sections.) And, a more rigorous inte-
gration of the numeric data from the administered questionnaire 
and the textual information from the semi-structured interview 
is needed to be performed. Also, there is the need to appl y 
advanced statistical methods, namel y with respect to the sequencing 
and ranking aspects of the administered questionnaire. These 
opportunities promise to further enhance our understanding of the 
entrepreneurial activity and development of the new small firm. 
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
Department of Economics 
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OVer the past few years, attention has been shifted away from the large, 
corporate enterprise to the small enterprise as the major source of employment 
creation and economic growth. Significant support for the small business has 
come from the Scottish Development Agency, Scottish Business in the Community, 
and Enterprise Trusts. This support has been primarily in terms of attracting 
finance, finding suitable premises, and offerin,g advice regarding drawing-up 
a business plan, marketing, cash flow, etc. Unfortunately, not enough 
attention in terms of research has been given from the University level, which 
could help promote awareness for further support. 
It is our contention that the prospects for success of the small business can 
be enhanced by increasing the knowledge of such enterprises' strategies to 
establish their place in the market. Proper management (in addition to adequate 
finance) is often a major obstacle in achieving and maintaining sucess for the 
small firm. Consequently, we are undertaking a comprehensive study of 70-80 
small businesses by examining first-hand their policies and strategies to not 
only survive, b~t prosper and grow. Our study involves the questionnaire, 
structured int.erview, and case study methods. 
With your co-operation, we would very' much like to take an hour of your time 
to go through our questionnaire. This objective exerciss can be of immediate 
benefit to your bUSiness in that you will perhaps learn (or at least be 
reminded) how much you know about the conduct of your business and its 
effectiveness in relation to your competitors. certainly, once the study has 
been completed (sometime late this summer) the findings will be made available 
to you if you so desire. Of course, the utmost in confidentiality will be 
upheld. 
If you should have questions regarding our study or ourselves, please contact 
Mr Peter Duke, Director, EVENT. We will be contacting you in a few days time 
to see if and when it would be convenient for one of us to meet you. Thank you. 
Yours sincerely 
Guide to Interviewer 
[Note: Not for respondent. To be held by interviewer at all times] 
Thank you for your cooperation in undertaking this investigation. These 
notes are intended to guide you in your role as administrator of this 
questionnaire. 
(a) This questionnaire is to be administered during a home 
interview. You should sit opPosite, or at right angles 
to your respondent, and ensure that you have a hard surface 
on which to lean, and a pen or pencil. 
(b) You are administering the questionnaire, and therefore 
have a part to play in controlling the pace at which it ;s 
completed. Do not rush the respondent. Furthermore, do 
not let the respondent rush you. It is not a speed or 
comprehension test, but an instrument of scientific 
investigation. You should avoid giving the impression 
that you are quizzing or analysing the respondent, and 
should not encourage him to think he is involved in a 
competition. 
(c) You should put the respondent at his ease by starting with 
the following words: 
"Thank you very much for agreeing to complete this 





conducted by staff of the Economics Department of the 
University of Edinburgh. As such, the investigation 
has no affiliation with any other body, institution, 
agency or any organization whatsoever, and the material 
is gathered in strict confidence. The identity of you 
or your firm as such will not be revealed in the study: 
nor is it of any relevance to the study. We would ask 
your permission that the data we gather may be used 
in an anonymous way for purely scientific purposes. 
If at the end of the questionnaire you have any general 
questions you would like to raise, I would be happy to 
answer them." 
questionnaire is made up of four types of material, which are 
app ropri ate.1 y colour-coded: ( i ) the questionnaire proper, 
which is in white; (ii) lists, which are to be handed to 
the respondent for self-completion, and are i n ye 11 ow; ( iii) 
show cards, which are also to be handed to the correspondent 
for self completion and are in pink; and (iv) standard industrial 
classification (SIC) numbers which are in blue and have to be 
handed to the respondent at the beginning of the interview in 
order that he can identify his own SIC number. 
/ (e) 
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(e) At the end of the interview !Ll material shou.ld be back in your 
hands. As you progress through the questionnaire schedule, you will 
find your instructions in square brackets. Do not deviate from 
these instructions. In particular, make sure that you do retrieve 
material which has been handed to the respondent: in the sequence 
indicated. 
(f) At the end of the interview you should ensure that you have: 
(i) Gathered all the material together, and picked up 
your personal belongings. 
(ii) Warmly thanked the respondent for his cooperation and 
helpfulness. 
(iii) Assured the respondent that you would be happy to be 
contacted by him at an address you are willing to leave 
(make it the Economics Department). 
(iv) Suggested that, should he be willing, it might be helpful 
to approach him again at a later date. 
(g) The motivation for f(iv) above is that the follow-ups to this 
questionnaire analysis are structured interviews, and then a 
limited number of case stUdies. It wo~ld be appropriate to 
mention this at the end of the interview, but this is not a 
matter that should be pressed. If the respondent volunteers 
further cooperation, assure him you will be in contact to 
/adv;se 
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advise him as to whether his help might be needed again. 
(h) At the beginning of the questionnaire you expressed a willingness 
to be questioned further, at the end of the interview,in a general 
sense. You should be willing to do this, as promised, but should not 
prompt the respondent. Time is limited, and you may start off 
issues in areas which, if pursued too much, will leave you adrift. 
Be businesslike, but courteous. A good exiting excuse is that you 
have a further person to interview. 
- 4 -
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Name of interviewer: 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4 
Date of. interview: · ............................... . 
Time interview started: · . . . . ........................... . 
Part 1 (GENERAL) 
This questionnaire ~s divided up into five sections: a general one; 
pr~c~ng; costs; sales and competition; and financing. The typical 
way ~n which we will proceed will involve my asking a question, and then 
noting your reply. In addition there are a number of lists from which 
you will be asked to choose options, and then rank them; and also 
"show cards 11 ",hieh depie t various pa ttems of cos ts, from '..,.hich I would 
like you to make a selection. It is helpful to begin in a general way. 
This will help us to identify the ma~n features of your business, beiore 
go~ng into detail. May we begin then ",ith the general questions? 
?ART 1 
1 • 1 
Part 1 (GELlERAL) 
We need to know what kind ~f business you run. ;'.n 
easy way to do this is to refer to a standard list. 
Here it is. 
[Hand over SIC list] 
In which category is your business? 
(Enter SIC code] SIC code •••••.• 
1.2 When did you start your business? .••••.••••••.• 
1.3 Could you tell me, how many people are working for you 
full time? •••• 
1. 3. 1 




If yes: How many? •••.• 
1.3.2: 
What about trainees? 
Yes 
1.3.2.1 
If yes: How many? •••.. 
('. 1 
1.4 what kind of business do you run? Is It: 
[Tick appropriate choice] 
(a) a one-man business? 
( b) a partnership? 
( c) a private company? 
( d) a public company? 
(e) or is it something else? 
1 .4. 1 
If (e) Could you briefly describe your kind of 
business? 
[Enter respondent's rep:y] 
1.5 Approxi~ately what size was your sales ~urnover in the 
last tax year (excluding VAT)? ••••••••.••••.• 
1.6 
1 .6 • 1 
1.7 
Suppose you sold different ki~ds of hats and and also 
different kinds of gloves. 
Then "hats" is 'Ilhat we call a product group and so is "gloves". 






(f) More than 50 
What would you say was your main product group 
in terms of sales value? ......................................... . 
[Before proceeding to 1.7, insert in 1.9 the respondent's reply 
to this question.] 
If you sold two kinds of hats (like bowlers and 
boaters), hats being a product qroup, and two 
kinds of gloves (like mittens and driving gloves), 
gloves being a product group, you would be selling 
a total of four products, two from each oroduct 
group. With this in ~ind, how many products do 
you sell? 
( a ) 1-10 
( b) 11-20 
( c ) 21-40 
( d) 41-60 
( e ) 61-80 
(f) t"ore than sc 
(.3 
1.8 ~hat do you regard as the principal market for your 
main product group? 
(a) The local community 
(b) The region (e.g. Grampian, Lothian) 
( c) Scotland 
(d) The U.K. 
( e) The international economy 
1.9 In terms of your principal market, what is your 
market share for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
[Insert respondent's speci~ied main product group from 1.6.1.J 
[Tick below according to respondent's reply] 
( a ) Under 1% 
( b) 1-5% 
( c) 6-10% 
( d) 11-20% 
( e) 21-30% 
( f) 31-50% 
( g) Over 50% 
(h) Not known 
1. 10 Can you dis-cinguish be~ween major and minor competitors 
for your main product group? 
Yes If yes go to 1. 10. 1 
:Jo If no go to 1.10.2 
1. 10. 1 To be answered if above response was yes] 
How many competitors do you have in each 
category? 
Major competitors ~1inor competitors . 
(a) None (a) None 
(b) 1-5 (b) 1-5 
( c) 6-10 ( c) 6-10 
( d) 11-30 ( d) 11-30 
( e ) 31-50 [ ( e ) 31-50 
( f) More than 50 ( f) :"lore than 50 
( g) Do not know ( g) Do not know 
1.10.2 [To be answered if above response was no] 
Can you tell me how many competitors you have? 
( a) None 
( b) 1-5 
( c) 6-10 
( d) 11-30 
( e ) 31-50 
( f) t--10re than 50 
( g) Do not know 
1. 11 
1. 12 
How would you compare products in your main 
product group with those of your competitors? 




(d) Cannot say 
Now I would like to look at the buying behaviour of your 
customers. Here is a list of possible descriptions of 
your customers. More than one may be applicable. 
[Hand over List 1.12 to respondent] 
Indicate with a tick any statement which applies to your 
customers 
[Pause to permit completion of this] 
1.12.1 
Now could you please underline the statement that is 
most applicable 
[Retrieve List 1.12] 
Part 2 (PRICING) 
Thank you. Now we' have finished the general ques tions • Next we 
are going to look at pr~c~ng. In this section I will be presenting 
you with further lists, from which you will have to choose options 







Part 2 (PRICI~;G) 
If you brought a new product onto the market, would you 




How are prices within your main product group usually determined? 
Could you put a tick by ~ statement on this list which is true 
for you? 
One or more of the statements may be applicable. 
[Hand over List 2.2 to respondent. 
Pause to permit completion of this] 
2.2. 1 
Now please underline the statement on this list which is most 
applicable. 
[Retrieve List 2.2] 
Is the pricing policy of competitors crucial to your own pricing? 
Yes 
No 
Do you hold down price to ~eat your competitors? 
\1ha t action do you take when a boom 
demand cannot be met from stocks. 
any that apply. 
2.5. 1 
[Hand over List 2.5. 
its completion] 
Yes 
in de8and occurs and 
Cn this list, please 
Pause to per:7Cit 
t.his 
ci c:-<.: 
Now please indicate ~here ~ossible on t.h~s lise, t~e or~er in d~~~~ 
you do t~ings '-:Jy ringi:'1g the numbers or. t.~.e r lC;i:c na:'1o side, "lher~ 
ringing 3. 1 for an option ,v'ould indicate ::}-:at this is';i~ct ~·cu 'N'Ot.!l, 
GO first. 





What action do you take in a recession? en this list, please 
tick those that apply. 
[Hand over List 2.6. 
completion] 
Pause to permit its 
2.6.1 
As previously, could you please indicate where possible on this 
list, the order in which you do things by ringing the numbers 
on the right hand side. 
[Pause to permit completion. Retrieve List 2.6] 
what action do you take if the demand falls for a product within 
your main product group? Please tick ~ that apply on this list. 
2.7.1 
[Hand over List 2.7 to respondent. 
permit completion of it] 
Pause to 
Indicate where possible, on this list, the order in which you do 
things by ringins ~he numbers on the right hand side. 
[Pause to permit completion. Recrieve List 2.7] 
Part 3 (COSTS) 
Fine. We have finished with prkckng. Now in just the same way 
we will look at costs. All the questions relate to products ~n your 
malan product group. In this section we will be using the "show cards" 






Are your costs split up into fixed (that is, overhead, ~r 
indirect) and variable (that is, prime or direc~) costs? 
3. 1 • 1 If yes: 
Are these cost divisions useful in the 
running of your firm? 
When you intend to increase the output of a 
?roduct, do you calculate the additional cost 
it will involve? 
Do you have a level of output which you 
regard as the capacity or ~aximum {ossible 
output? 
3.3. 1 !f yes: 
At what ?ercer.~age of t~is maximum possible 
output do you think you ~ormally ~cer~te? 
( a ) Less tllan 50% 
( 'c:l ) 51-60% 
( c) 61-70% 
( d) 71-8C~ 
( e ) R 1--?CCI; 









3.4 This next question aims to get an idea of the 
way your costs vary as you increase your output 
up to the maximum level possible. Could you 
examine the cost pictures on these sheets and 
hand to me any which approximate to your 
cost pattern? 
[Hand respondent show-cards 3.4(a) to 
3.4(e)] 
Underneath each picture you will find an 
explanation in words which you may prefer to 
use in making your choices. Please ask me if the 
pictures are not entirely clear. 
[Pause for selection to take place. Retrieve 
selected sheets, and note below the selections 
made] 
(a) ( b) ( c) ( d) ( e ) 
[Retrieve remaining sheets] 
~. 10 
Part 4 (SALES and CGr1PETITION) 
Good. vJe are now half-way through. Next we will look at sales and 
competition. Questions will again refer to products in your main 
product group. 
4. 1 
Part 4 (SALES and COMPETITION) 
Does your enterprise use market research methods of any kind, 
including forecasts by official bodies, trade associations etc.? 
4. 1 • 1 
Yes 
No 
If yes: For 'Nha t purposes. are the results 
of market research used? 
(a) To find out how important price changes 
are to customers 
(b) To find out how interested ~uyers are in 
your products 
(c) To find out the reaction of competitors 
(d) To get an idea of future developments in 
the market 
[ ] 
4.2 How would your sales react to a 5% price change, where it 
is assumed that your competitors do not react and that 
business conditions are normal? We will look at the 
consequences of a price cut and a price increase separately. 
4.2.1 For a price cut of 5% the amount purchased 
would: 
(a) increase more than 5% 
(b) increase less than 5% 
(c) increase by approximately 5% 
(d) not increase at all 
(e) possibly increase, possibly not. One 
cannot say. 
4.2.2 For a price increase of 5% the amount 
purchased would: 
(a) fall more than 5% 
(b) fall less than 5% 
(c) fall by approximately 5% 
(d) not fall at all 
(e) possibly fall, possibly not. One 
cannot say. 
Q. 12 
4.3 What about a 10% price change? Again let's assume normal 
business conditions and no reaction on the part of your 
competitors. 
4.3. 1 For a price cut of 10% the amount 
purchased would: 
(a) increase more than 10% 
(b) increase less than 10% 
(c) increase by approximately 10% 
(d) not increase at all 
(e) possibly increase, possibly not. One 
cannot say. 
4.3.2 For a price increase of 10% the amount 
purchased '.vould: 
(a) fall more than 1C% 
(b) fal~ less than 10% 
(c) fall by about 10% 
(d) not fall at all 





4.4 If you reduce your price do you reckon that 
your strongest competitors will do the same 
and reduce their prices, first of all 















4.5 Do you reckon that your competitors would raise their 
prices if you increased your price, first of all 














Q. ' 5 
4.6 Do you believe that you have a certain amount of 
"elbow-room" in pricing, within which a price change 
by you does not bring about a reaction from competitors? 
4.6. 1 
If yes: 




( c) 4-6% 
( d) 7-9% 
(e) 10-15% 
( f) more than 15% 




4.7 On this list various ways in which you can alter your 
selling price are mentioned. Tick any that apply to 
you. 
[Hand over List 4.7. Pause to permit 








4.8. 1 If yes: 
Are these prices set: 
(a) in different marketing areas 
(b) in home and foreign markets 
(c) for different customers 
(d) for large and small traders ( 
(e) Other 
If (e), please specify if possible 
4.9 Do you ever offer price rebates? 
Yes 
No 
4.9. 1 If yes: 
Are rebates higher, the greater the amount 





4.10 Are any of your goods sold at controlled prices? 
4.'11 Are any of your goods sold at recommended 
prices? 
4. 11 • 1 If yes: 
\";hat percentage of your customers end up 
paying ~~e recommended price? 
(a) Less than 30% 
(b) 31.-60% 
(c) 61-80% 
( d) 81-90% 
(e) 91-100% 







Do you advertise? Yes 
No 
4.12.1 If yes: 
What form does your advertising take? 
(a) Generic advertising, that is, advertising 
aimed at expanding demand for all firms in the 
industry 
(b) Individual advertising, that is, advertising aimed 
at promoting your product over that of rivals 
(c) Both generic and individual 
advertising 










4. 15 How would you describe competition in your market? 
(a) Intense in every aspect (price, quality, 
rivalry etc.) 
(b) Generally strong, but weak in some aspects (for 
example, absence of price competition, but strong 
quality competition and inter-firm rivalry) 
(c) Generally weak, but strong in some aspects 
[If (c) is ticked, go to 4.15.1 below] 
(d) Generally weak in all its aspects 
4.15.1 [To be answered if (c) is ticked in 4.15 above] 
In your market is the dominant form of competition by: 
(a) Price 
(b) Quality 
( c) Sales 
(d) Market Share 
(e) Advertising 
(f) Other 
If (f), please specify: 
Q.20 
Part 5 (FINANCE) 
Excellent'. We have made very good progress. Now we turn to the 
last part of the questionnaire, on finance. 
PART 5 
Part 5 (FINANCE) 





If no: go to 5.2. 
5.1.1 If yes: 
Who did you contact for advice on how to get your 
business started? On this list various sources of 
of advice are described. 
[Hand respondent List 5.1~lJ 
Could you indicate ~ith a tick any source ~hich 
applied to you? 
[Pause to permit completion of this] 
5.1.1. 1 
Now could you ?lease rank in order of importance 
the various alternatives, using the numbers on t:,e 
right of the listed sources. 
[Pause to permit completion. Retrieve List 5.1. 1 ] 
5.2 ~hat was the approximate Slze of your business ~~ ter~s 
of total assets (book value) when you started? ................ 
5.3 What is the a~oroxirnate size o~ your business today ~n 
> • 
~er~s of ~ot~l assets (8ook value)? ................. 
~.2; 
5.4 Did you find it difficult to obtain financial 
support for starting your business? 
5.4.1 
5.4.1.1 




What were the obstacles in obtaining 
financial support? On this list please tick all 
those that apply. 
[Hand over List 5.4.1, pause to permit its 
completion] 
Now please rank the obstacles in order of 
importance by ringing the numbers on the right 
hand side. The most significant obstacle should 
have a 1 ringed, the second most significant a 
2 ringed and so on. 
[Pause to permit completion. Retrieve 
List 5.4. 1 ] 
C:. 22 




If yes: Go to 5.6 
5.5.1 If no: 
~'lhat other sources did you use? On 
this list, indicate with a tick any statement 
which is applicable to you. 
[Hand over List 5.5.1 to respondent. 
Pause to permit its completion] 
5.5.1.1 
Now could you indicate the importance of these 
sources by ringing the numbers on the right 
hand side. The most important should have 
a 1 ringed, the next most important a 2 ringed 
and so on. 
[Pause to permit completion. Retrieve 
List 5.5.1] 
5.5.2 
What sort of security did you have to provide 
in seeking funds? Tick any that apply on this list. 
[Hand over List 5.5.2. Pause to per~lt its 
completion. Retrieve List 5.5.2.] 
C.23 
5.6 Gearing is a technical term you may have come 
across which means debt (i.e. borrowing) 
divided by owners' injection of finance. So 
if you borrowed £10,000 and put- ~n £20,000 yourself 
your gear~ng ratio would be 10,000 divided by 20,000: 
that is one half. What, approximately speaking, was 
your gearing ratio when you set up the business7 
Enter gearing ratio figure . . . . . . . . . . 
5.6.1 
What is your gear~ng ratio at present? . . . . . . . . . . 
5.6 •. 2 
What has been your highest gear~ng ratio? ~ . ~ . . . . . . . 
5.6.3 
And what has been your lowest gear~ng ratio? ~ . . . . . . . . . 
ll_24 
5.7 What do you expect to happen ~o your gearing 




Fall Rise Same Know 
(a) After 1 year [ 
(b) After 2 years 
( c) After 3 years 
[Fill in responses to a, b, c above in List 5.7.1 also] 
5.7. 1 
Why do you expect your gearing ratio to behave the way you have 
indicated, over the next three years? Please tick all that apply 
on this list. 
[Hand respondent List 5.7.1. Pause to permit its 
completion. Retrieve List 5.7.1] 
c:.25 
5.8 Were the following special financial schemes necessary, 
helpful, or not applicable to the starting up of your 
business? 
Necessary Helpful 
(a) Enterprise allowance scheme 
(b) Employment grant 
(c) Investment grant . [ 
( d) Reduced rental on premises 
(e) Special tax credits 
( f ) Other 





5.9 Have you ever had cash-flow difficulties? 
If no: go to 5.10 
5.9.1 If yes: 
What factors on this list contributed 
Yes 
No 
to your cash-flow difficulties? 
tick all those that apply. 
Please 
5.9.2 
[Hand respondent List 5.9.1. Pause to 
permit completion of it] 
Indicate if possible the relative importance 
of these factors by ringing the numbers on 
the right hand side. The most significant 
factor should be ranked as 1, the next most 
significant as 2, and so on. 
[Pause to permit completion. 
Retrieve List 5.9.1] 
Q.27 
5.10 Have you used external finance (e.g. deb~) since star~ing 
your business"? 
If no: go to 5.11. 
5.10.1 If yes: 
Yes 
No 
Wha t were your reasons for 'Nishing to 
increase your external finance? On this 
list, please tick any that apply. 
[Hand respondent List 5.10.1 Pause 
to permit completion of list. Retrieve 
List 5. 10 • 1 ] 
[ 




[Read the following to respondent] 
That is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for 
completing it. I hope you have also derived some interest 
yourself from dOing so. Your time and co-oper~tion are very 
much appreciated. Let me remind you that the strictest 
confidentiality will be upheld regarding the information you 
have provided about your business. If you should be interested 
in our general findings regarding the development of small 
businesses, we will be more than happy to share these results. 
I·le hope that our research will contribute to the success and growth 
of small businesses. We wish you all the very best with your 
firm. 
Time interview cQ~pleted 
Signature of interviewer 
• • • • • • • • • 6 • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
~.29 
SIC Classification Numbers 
01 Agriculture and horticul~ure 
02 Forestry 
03 Fishing 
11 Coal extraction and manufacture of solid fuels 
12 Coke ovens 
13 Extraction of mineral ~il and natural gas 
14 Mineral oil processing 
15 Nuclear fuel production 
16 Production and distribution of electricity, gas and other 
forms of energy 
17 Water supply industry 
21 Extraction and preparation of metalliferous ores 
22 Metal manufacturing 
23 Extractions of other minerals 
24 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 
25 Chemical industry 
26 Production of man-made fibres 
31 Manufacture cf other metal goods 
32 J\!echanical englneering 
33 ~anufacture of office machinery and data procesSlng 
equ.:i..pment 
34 21ectrical and electronic engine~ ring 
35 :·(anufacture of l-:lotor vehic les anc parts 
36 ~lanufacture of other transport equipment 
37 Instrument engineering 
41/42 foed , ~rink and toba cco man~facturir.g 
~3 ~extile inoustry 
4.i 'Ianufacture of 1eat!'e r dnd leather soeds 
~3 Foo~wear and clothing ir.dlstries 





























Hanufacture of paper and paper p roducts; p ri n ting and 
publishing 
Processing of rubber and plastics 
Other manufacturing indus~ries 
Construction 
Wholesale distribution 
Dealing in scrap and waste materials 
Commission agents 
Retail distribution 
notels and catering 
Repair of consumer goods and vehicles 
Railways 
Other inland transport 
Sea transport 
Air transport 
Supporting services to transport 
Miscellaneous transport services and storage not elsewhere 
specified 
Postal services and telecommunications 
Banking and finance 
Insurance 
Business services 
Renting of movables 
Owning and dealing in real estate 




Research and development 






Other services provided to the general public 
Recreational services and other cultural services 
Personal services 
Domestic services 
:'i s t 1. 12 
,Jow I would like to loo ;C at t he buying be ha viour of your cus tomers . Here 
is a list of possible descrip~ions o f your c u s tome r s . ~ore chan one ~ay be 
applicable. 
Could you indicate I",i th a tick an y statement \"h i ch appl i es to your 
customers. 
(a) Technical differences between our products and t hose of 
our rivals are too sma l l for our customers to disti nguis h . 
Price, brand, design, advertising intensity , pac kaging , a nd serv ice 
all determine the customers' attitude. 
(b) The customer is not technically minded but ma y ha v e in 
mind a few technical features t hat the product 
should have. 
(c) Before making a purchase, the customer needs ~o be 
informed on the technical features of a pr oduct, and 
is guided by such factual ma~ters. 
(d) The customer is fairl y expert about t he p r oduct concerned 
and can draw on personal e x peri e nce a s wel l a s cec hn i cal 
information available in specialist pub l ications , 
trade journals ecc. 
( e) The cus tome r is an e xpe rt and can determine by h i s 
m vn j uogme n t the te c hnical qua l ity o f the t? rocuct . 
No w co bac k and unde r line che state~e~ ~ t hac is ~ost c.. poL.cable . . 
Li st 2 . 2 
How are prices within your main p roduct group u sua lly determi n e d ? One 
or more of the following statements may be applicable. 
Put a tick by any statement which is true for you. 
(a) Price is made up of direct (i.e. prine, or variable ) cost p er unit 
plus a fixed percentage mark-up. The mark-up is set at a leve l 
designed to achieve a desired level of gross profit. 
(b) Price is based on direct (i.e. prime, or variable) cost per 
unit, as in (a) above, but the percentage mark-up is not fixed: 
it may be raised (or lowered) to increase gross profi~. 
(c) Price is set at the highest level the market can bear. 
(d) Price is specified by your principal customer. 
(e) Price is determined by a regulatory agency. 
(f) Price is set at a statutory level. 
(g) Price is determined in other ways. 
If (g), please say how: 
Now p lease underli ne t he statemen c wh ich i s most appl i c a ble to you . 
r ? ~ 
List 2 .5 
What action do you take when a boom in demand occurs and this demand cannot 
be met from stocks? 
Please tick any that apply: 
(a) Increase overtime or shift work 1 2 "') 4 5 6 7 ..J 
(b) Increase capacity (this could include 
the recruitment of more personnel) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ..... 
( c) Engage subcontractors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( d) Buy up rival firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(e) Lengthen your order books 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( f ) Raise price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
( g) Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If (g), please specify, if possible. 
Indicate where possible the order in whi ch you do t hings by ring ing ~he 
numbers o n the righ t lla nd side, where ringing a 1 for any option would 
imply that this is what you would do first. 
L.2.5 
List 2. 6 
what action do you take in a recession? 
On this list, please tick those that apply: 
( a ) Reduce overtime 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :3 
(b) Introduce short-time working 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(c) Reduce capacity (including the 
laying-off of personnel) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
( d) Improve productivity or efficiency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(e) Increase sales effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 
( f) Cut price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
( g) Reduce stockholding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(h) Other 1 2 3 4 :) 6 7 8 
If (h), please specify, if possible. 
Now please indicate, where possible, the order in whic h you do t h i ngs by 
ringing t h e numbers on t h e right hand side. 
L . 2 . F. 
List 2.7 
what action do you take if the demand falls for a particular product 
within your main product group? 





( e ) 
( f) 
( g) 
Switch to a new pY'oduct 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Reduce overtime 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Introduce short-time working 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Increase sales effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cut price 2 3 4 5 6 
Increase quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 
If (g), please specify, if possible. 
Now please indicate, where possible, the order in ~hich you do 
things by ringing the numbers on the right hand side. 








Lis t 4.7 
On this list, events which might lead you t o a l te r your selling Drice are 
mentioned. 
Which options on this list refer to you? 
(a) When a new business year (or ne w season of production ) 
commences 
(b) ~vhen a new tax year commences 
(c) When cost changes occur 
(d) When demand shifts substantially 
(e) When demand changes 
(f) When a regulatory agency permits an increase 
(g) When wage bargaining negotia~ions in the firm or 
in the industry have been concluded 
(h) When the most important competition changes price 
(i) Other 
If (i), specify if possible: 
List 5. 1 • 1 
Who did you contact for advice on ho w t o get your busines s 
started? 
On this list, indicate ~ith a tick a ny sour ce whi ch applies to you. 
(a) Family and/or friends 1 2 3 4 
( b) Bank manager 2 3 4 
( c) Accountant 1 2 3 4 
( d) Enterprise trust 1 2 3 4 
(e) Scottish Development Agency (SDA) 2 3 4 
( f) Local government authority 1 2 3 4 
( g) Other 2 3 4 
















various alternativ e contacts f o r a dvice. The mcst important s r.oul d nave 
a 1 ringed, t he second most i mportan t a 2 ri nged and so on . 
L . S . 1.1 
•. 
List 5.4.1 
What were:: the obstacLes in obtaining- financial 
PU.t;- a tick by any' atatement · which:, is. true for you. 
'" ..... -
rr !. 
financial. inj ec.tions r .. 
success in 
venturef s} 
financi~- sta.tements or ,proposed .. business 
~~- ~ 
:!". 'f;/'-' '.l :~' .. 
"projected cash f~ow budget) r 4 5 6 
..... ! .• 
.. , ~ .. 
..' 
~ :'. 
(e'),. Pr'evious emp~oyment ~per'ience [ r 2 3 '* 
(f: ). Other' [ J 3 4 6 
"'., " 
Lf, f 'f') I p'Lease specify: "" .. -' 
'. ~\ 
Now indica~er if possible, the extent of the various obstacles 01 ringing the 
numbers on the right hand side. ~~ b;cr est obstaclo should have a _ l: e .... Jg -~ ringed, 
the second biggest the 2 ringed and so on. 
L.5.4. 
List 5.5. 1 
What sources of finance, apart from personal finance, did you use in setting 
UP your business? 
On this list, indicate with a tick any statement which app lies to you. 
(a) Borrowing from friends, relatives 
or acquaintances 1 2 3 5 4 r o 
( b) Eorrmving from banks 2 3 4 5 6 
( c) Hire purchase 1 2 3 4 5 6 
( d) Leasing 2 3 4 5 6 
(e) Equity finance 2 3 4 5 6 
( f ) Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 
If (f) please specify , if possible. 
Now please indicate, where pos sible, the importance of these various alternaciv 
sources of finance. The most importa~t should have a ringed, t he second mas 
important a 2 ringed and so on. 
List 5.5.2 
What sort of security did you have to provide in seeking funds? 
Tick any that apply on this list. 
(a) Personal guarantee (implying a liability 
to repay loans) 
(b) Life policies 
(c) Guarantors 
(d) Stock exchange securities 
(e) Heritable securities (e.g home, 
property, premises, land) 
(f) Floating charges (i.e. securities 
on plant, equipment, stocks etc.) 
(g) Other 
If (g), please specify if possible: 
List 5. 7. 1 
In the question which we have been considering you indicated that your 




Fall Rise Same Know 
( a) After 1 year 
(b) After 2 years 
( c) After 3 years 
Why do you expect your gearing ratio to behave like this? Please tick 
any that apply: 
(a) An increase in ploughed-back profits 
(b) An increase in owners' injections 
(c) An increase in debt (i.e. borrowing) 
(d) Running at a loss 
(e) A reduction in debt (i.e. borrowi ng) 
(f) No certain answer 
(g) Other 







List 5 .9.1 
what factors contributed to your cas h-flow di ff i c ulties? 
that apply: 
(a) Delinauent debtors 
(b) Delinquent suppliers 
(c) Overinvestment 
(e.g. in stock or capital goods) 
(d) Inadequate credit policy with 
buyers 
(e) Inadequate credit policy with 
suppliers 
(f) Insufficient oveydraft facility 
(g) Other 













































Now l ndicate , if possib le, the re lativ e i n po r tance of t he se factors by ringi~g 
the numbers on the r i ght hand side. The most significan~ shou16 ~e ran ked 1, 
the next mos t signi f icant 2 , and so on . 
List 5. 10. 1 
What were your reasons for wishing to increase your external finance? 
On this list, please tick any that apply. 
(a) New or expanded premises 
(b) Purchase of plant or equipment 
(c) Increased stock or inventory 
(d) Hiring of new employees 
(e) Cash flow problems 
(f) Other 
If (f), please specify if possible. 
L . S . 10 . 1 
Show-Card 3.4 (a) 
Cost 
Quantity 
(a) Total cost increases ~n line with 
amopnt supplied i.e. for each extra 
unit supplied, your cost rises by the 
same extra amount. 
~;C .3. 4 (a) 
Show-Card 3.4 (b) 
Cost 
Quantity 
(b) Total cost does not increase as fast 
as amount supplied i.e. the extra cost 
of supplying each additional unit falls 
as more is supplied. 
Show-Card 3.4 (c) 
Cost 
Quantity 
(c) Total cost increases raster than supply 
i.e. each extra unit supplied adds Qore 
to cost than the last unit supplied. 
SC.3.4(c) 
Show-Card 3 .4 (d) 
Cost 
Quantity 
(d) At first total cost does not increase 
as fast as supply, but t hen it increases 
faster than supply. 
SC . 3 • .l(d) 
Show-Card 3. 4 ( e ) 
Cost 
Quantity 
(e) Total cost increases in line wit h supply 
until the maximum possible supply ( full 
capacity) is reached. After this point, 
the extra cost of supplying another u!1it 
rises sharply. 
SC . 3 . 4( e ) 
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
Department of Economics 
WILLIAM ROBERTSON BUILDING, GEORGE SQUARE, EDI.'-lBURGH EH8 9JY 
031-667 1011 ext 655 I 
(WHITE) FRONTPIECE 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW AGENDA 
Name of interviewer: 
Interviewee code: 
Date of interview: 
Time interview started: 
(WHITE) PRE-AMBLE 
[The content of this pre-amble should be explained to the interviewee] 
PRE-AMBLE 
Thank you for agreelng to this further interview. The same basis of strict 
confidentiality continues to apply. Last time the interview was concerned with 
very specific questions which could be answered by "yes" or "no", by ticking 
alternatives, by ranking options etc. Today, the approach is less structured . 
. I have a number of areas which I would like to look at with you, all of which are 
concerned with general aspects of business strategy. 
Strategy involves adapting the capabilities and resources of your firm to 
the opportunities in its market environment. We will explore strategy in terms 
of a list of headings, or agenda, and this outline should help to give you a 
general idea of how the interview will proceed. 






















AGENDA OUTL INE 
Bargaining leverage of customers 









Increasing barriers to entry 
AGENDA OUTLINE: RESPONDENT'S COPY 
Increasing retaliation which challengers can expect 
Lowering the inducement for attack 
Deterrence 
























Bargaining leverage of customers 









Increasing barriers to entry 
AGENDA OUTLINE: INTERVIEWER'S COP~ 
Increasing retaliation which challengers can expect 
Lowering the inducement for attack 
Deterrence 





Industry concentration and balance 
Indus try growth 
Fixed costs relative to value added 
Intermittent overcapacity 
Extent of product differentiation 
Diversity of competitors 
Leqel of strategic stakes 












Relative buyer volume 
Castomers' switching costs 
Ability to backward integrate 






(BLUE) COMPETITIVE FORCES 
1.2.2 Price sensitivity of customers 
Probe on: 
Significance of costs in relation to total costs of customers 
Extent of differentiation of products pu~chased 
Profitability 
Bearing of your product on customers' product quality 




(BLUE) COMPETITIVE FORCES 
1.3 Suppliers 
Probe on: 
Extent of suppliers' concentration 
Suppliers' in relation to customers' concentration 
Availability of substitutes 
Significance of suppliers' product as a customer's input 
Extent of differentiation of supplier group's products 
Switching costs of customers as compared with suppliers 




(BLUE) COMPETITIVE FORCE~ 
1.4 Potential entrants 
Probe on: 




Access to distribution channels 
Absolute cost advantages including: 
Product know-how or design characteristics 
Favourable access to inputs 
Favourable location 
Government subsidies 
Learning or experience curve 
Government policy (regulation, pollution control, etc) 
Expected retaliation 




(BLUE) COMPETITIVE FORCES 
1.5 Substitutes 
Probe on: 
Products that perform the same function as industry's 
Relative value/price of substitutes 
Substitutes produced by high profit industries 
Collective industry response to substitutes 
Customers' ropensity to substitute 
Field Notes: 
Summary Note: 
(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE ST~~TEG 
2 Competitive Strategy 
2.1 Cost leadership 
Probe on: 
Value chain and assignment of costs and assets 
Cost drivers and their interaction 
Competitor's value chain 
Relative costs of competitors and their sources 
Strategies to lower relative costs including: 
Control of cost drivers 
Reconfiguration of value chain 
Reconfiguration of downstream value 
Trade-off between differentiation and cost reduction 




(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATE 
2.2 Differentiation 
Probe on: 
Identification of real customer 
Identification of customer's value chain 
Customer's purchasing criteria 
Existing and potential sources of uniqueness in firm's value chain 
Identification of existing and potential sources of differentiation 
Value activities that create the most valuable differentiation for customers 
(relative to costs of differentiating) 
Sustainability of differentiation strategy 
Cost reduction ~n activities that do not affect differentiation 
Field Notes: 
Summary Note : 
(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATE 
2,3 Focus 
Probe- on: 
Whether strategy is towards cost or differenti ation focus or both 
Strategically relevant segments including: 
Product variety 
Customer type 
Channel (i.e. immediate buyer) 
Customer location 
Significance of chosen segment(s) for competitive advantage 
Interrelations among segments 
Sustainability of focus against: 
Broadly targeted competitors 
Imitators 





(PINK) DEFENSIVE STRA~EGY 
3 Defensive Strategy 
3.1 Increasing barriers to entry 
Probe on; ~ 
Filling product gaps 
Blocking channel access 
Raising customers' switching costs 
Raising costs of product trial 
Defensively increasing scale economies 
Defensively increasing capital requirements 
Foreclosing alternative technologies 
Tying up suppliers 
Raising costs of competitors' inputs 
Defensively pursuing interrelationships with other firms 
Encouraging government or agency policies that raise barriers 
Forming coalitions to raise barriers 




(PINK) DEFENSIVE STRATEGY 
3.2 Increasing retaliation which challengers can expect 
Probe on: 
Signalling commitment to defend 
Signalling erection of barriers 
Establishing blocking positions 
Matching guarantees 
Raising own penalty of exit or of loss of market share 
Accumulating retaliatory resources 
Encouraging "good" competitors 
Setting examples 




(PINK) DEFENSIVE STRATEGY 
3.3 Lowering the inducement for attack 
Probe on: 




(PINK) DEFENSIVE STRATEGY 
3.4 Deterrence 
Probe on: 
Choosing defensive tactics to block l i kely attacks 
Managing the firm's image as a tough defender 
Setting realistic profit expectations 
Using industry scenarios to examine deterrence possibil i ties 
Knowledge of specific sources of barriers 
Anticipation of likely challengers (esp. dissatisfied competitors ) 





(PINK) DEFENSIVE STRATEGY 
3.5 Responding to attack 
Probe on: 
lutting priority on early response 
Investing in early discovery of moves by: 
Contact with suppliers 
Contact with advertising media 
Monitoring of attendance at trade shows 
Contact with most adventurous customers in industry 
Monitoring of technical conferences, college courses etc. 
Basing response on reasons for attack 
Deflecting challengers 
Taking challengers ser ious ly 
Viewing response as a way to gain pos~t~on 
Disrupting test or introductory markets 
Leapfrogging with new product or process 
Litigation (e.g. patent, anti-trust suits) 
Field Notes: 




Time interview completed: ............................ 
Signature of interviewer: 
Andrews, K. [1971] 
Ill. : 
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